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xABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on two independent areas: the analysis of biofuel and related
energy policies, and the relationship between trade and the environment with heterogeneous
firms. Chapter 1 provides quantitative estimates of the welfare benefits of U.S. biofuel and
related energy polices. The remaining two chapters investigate the firm-level relationship be-
tween trade and the environment using theoretical model and empirical evidence. Chapter 2,
theoretical in nature, explores the impact of the stringency of environmental policy and expo-
sure to trade on the induced clean technology adoption and on firm dynamics. Using a unique
detailed facility-level dataset containing criteria air emissions and economic activity data, chap-
ter 3 investigates whether exporters are more environmentally friendly than non-exporters in
terms of lower emissions per value of sales.
1CHAPTER 1. WELFARE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE BIOFUEL
AND ENERGY POLICIES
1.1 Introduction
Two interrelated critical issues facing the U.S. and world economies are the dwindling
supply of fossil fuels and the increasing emissions of carbon into the atmosphere. The U.S.
dependence on imported oil has increased sharply in the past quarter century, with a number
of significant economic and political consequences. Oil imports worsen the U.S. balance of
trade deficit and, together with growing energy consumption from developing countries such as
China, lead to higher prices. This dependence on oil imports weakens U.S. national security and
entails significant military and defense expenditures to ensure continued U.S. access to world
oil supplies. Separately, there is the concern with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated
with fossil energy use. While some disagreement exists on the potential implications of carbon
buildup in the atmosphere, it seems major industrialized countries are moving toward a regime
in which these emissions will be regulated and (or) priced.
Partly in response to such issues, government support for biofuels has led to rapid growth
in U.S. ethanol production. U.S. fuel ethanol production has increased from 1.65 billion gallons
in 2000 to 10.76 billion gallons in 2009, making the U.S. the largest world producer of ethanol.
U.S. ethanol production currently benefits from a $0.45/gallon subsidy (technically an excise
tax credit), an out-of-quota ad valorem import tariff of 2.5% and a $0.54/gallon duty on ethanol
imports.1 In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 specified a renewable fuel standard that
”mandates” specific targets for renewable fuel use, the level of which has been considerably
expanded by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) of the Energy Independence and Security
1On January 1, 2012, U.S. ended a subsidy of $0.45/gallon on ethanol, and also terminated a tariff of
$0.54/gallon on ethanol imports.
2Act of 2007. Since then, the ethanol mandates under the RFS2 have been more than met.
Under the RFS2, the renewable fuel requirement rises from 12.95 billion gallons in 2010 to 20.5
billion gallons in 2015, and to 36 billion gallons in 2022; of these latter amounts, up to 15 billion
gallons may come from ethanol, while the rest are meant to come from ”advanced biofuels,”
such as cellulosic biofuel.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of the welfare implications of
U.S. policies that impact biofuels production. Facets of this topic have been the subject of a few
studies. de Gorter and Just (2009a) analyze the impact of a biofuel blend mandate on the fuel
market. They find that when tax credits are implemented along with the blend mandate, tax
credits subsidize fuel consumption instead of biofuels. de Gorter and Just (2009b) also develop
a framework to analyze the interaction effects of a biofuel tax credit and a price-contingent
farm subsidy. The annual rectangular deadweight costs-which arise because they conclude that
ethanol would not be commercially viable without government intervention-dwarf in value the
traditional triangular deadweights costs of farm subsidies. Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) set up a
multimarket international ethanol model to analyze the influence of trade liberalization and the
removal of the federal tax credit in the U.S. on ethanol markets. They find that the removal of
current tariffs on imported ethanol would lead to a 13.6% decrease in the U.S. domestic ethanol
price and a 3.7% increase of ethanol’s share in U.S. fuel consumption, and that the removal of
both tax credit and tariffs would cause U.S. ethanol consumption to fall by 2.1% and the price
of ethanol to fall by 18.4%.
The foregoing studies do not account explicitly for the impact of climate policies on GHG
emissions associated with the fuel energy sector. Khanna, Ando, and Taheripour (2008) exam-
ine the welfare impact of a carbon tax ($25/tC) on fuel consumption, when the purpose of the
tax is to correct the pollution externality from carbon emissions and to account for the other
external costs associated with congestions and accidents. At the time of their study, they found
that the fuel tax of $0.387/gallon and then-current ethanol subsidy of $0.51/gallon reduces car-
bon emissions by 5% relative to the no-tax situation (laissez faire). Their second best policy
of a $0.085 mile tax with a $1.70/gallon ethanol subsidy could reduce gasoline consumption by
316.8%, thereby reducing carbon emissions by 16.5% (71.7 million metric tons).2
In assessing the effectiveness of ethanol in reducing GHG emissions, an issue that has
commanded considerable attention is that of ”indirect land use” effects: diverting feed corn
to ethanol production in the United States increases aggregate demand for agricultural output
and might bring new marginal land into production (Searchinger et al. 2008). To assess the
global economic and land-use impacts of biofuel mandates, Hertel, Tyner, and Birur (2010)
use a computable general equilibrium model, which is built upon the standard Global Trade
Analysis Project modeling framework. To jointly meet the biofuel mandate policies of the
United States (15 billion gallons of ethanol used by 2015) and the EU (6.25% of total fuel as
renewable fuel by 2015), they find that coarse grains acreage in the United States rises by 10%,
oilseeds acreage in the EU increases dramatically, by 40%, cropland areas in the United States
would increase by 0.8%, and about one-third of these changes occur because of the EU mandate
policy. The U.S. and EU mandate policies jointly reduce the forest and pasture land areas of
the United States by 3.1% and 4.9%, respectively. The most recent RFS2 pronouncement
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) accounts for international indirect land use
changes (ILUC) and makes several changes for GHG emissions reduction of ethanol from all
feedstocks (EPA, 2010). Accounting for ILUC, the EPA finds that corn ethanol still achieves a
21% GHG reduction compared to gasoline. The EPA also finds, using its ILUC modification,
that sugarcane ethanol qualifies as an advanced biofuel since it achieves an average 61% GHG
reduction compared to baseline gasoline, which exceeds the 50% GHG reduction threshold for
advanced biofuels.
Lapan and Moschini (2009) note that most existing work does not explicitly account for
the welfare consequences to the U.S. of policies supporting biofuel production (such as the
externality of GHG emission or the benefits to the U.S. that accrue either from improved terms
of trade or ”improved national security” due to decreased reliance on oil imports). To consider
first- and second-best policies within that normative context, they build a simplified general
equilibrium (multi-market) model of the United States and the rest-of-the-world economies that
2Some studies discuss emissions in terms of metric tons of carbon (tC), other in terms of metric tons of carbon
dioxide (tCO2). One ton of carbon is equivalent to 3.67 tons of carbon dioxide. Of course, when reductions are
expressed in percentages, units will not matter.
4links the agricultural and energy sectors to each other and to the world markets; they model
the process by which corn is converted into ethanol, accounts for byproducts of this process,
and allows for the endogeneity of world oil and corn prices, as well as the (different) carbon
emissions from gasoline derived from oil and that which is blended with ethanol. The analysis in
Lapan and Moschini (2009) is theoretical in nature, aiming at providing analytical insights and
results. They find that the first best policy would include a tax on carbon emissions, an import
tax on oil, and an export tax on corn. If policy is constrained, for example by international
obligations, they find that a fuel tax and an ethanol subsidy can be welfare enhancing. They
also find that an ethanol mandate is likely to welfare-dominate an ethanol subsidy.
In this paper we construct a tractable computational model that applies and extends the
analytical setup of Lapan and Moschini (2009), and we use the model to provide quantita-
tive estimates of the welfare benefits of alternative policies. The model specification allows
endogenous determination of equilibrium quantities and prices for oil, corn and ethanol and
is calibrated to represent a recent benchmark data set for the year 2009, using the available
econometric evidence on elasticity estimates. By varying government policy, we explore how
these policies affect equilibrium (domestic and world) prices of corn, oil, ethanol and gasoline.
Using standard welfare measures, we compare the net welfare implications of alternative poli-
cies and show how different groups are affected by the policies. In addition to characterizing
the first best policy, we consider a number of second best interventions involving various com-
binations of ethanol mandates, ethanol subsidies and a fuel tax. Using the model, we calculate
the optimal values for the policy instruments (given the constraint on which instruments are
used) and the associated welfare gains. We then explore the robustness of our conclusions by
varying the values of various parameters.
Our results consistently show that the largest economic gains to the U.S. from policy inter-
vention come from the impact of policies on the U.S. terms of trade, particularly on the price
of oil imports. We also find that first best policy outcomes, which would require oil import
tariffs that are not consistent with U.S. international obligations, can be closely approximated
by second best tools such as fuel taxes. Furthermore, our results probably underestimate the
gains that come from reducing U.S. oil imports because the model does not account for any of
5the ”national security” gains that could arise from reduced U.S. dependence on imported oil.
1.2 The Model
We adapt and extend the model developed in Lapan and Moschini (2009) to make it more
suitable for simulating the consequences of alternative policies directed toward reducing U.S.
emissions and reducing U.S. reliance on oil imports. The extension recognizes that when oil is
refined, other products, in addition to gasoline, are produced (e.g., distillate fuel oil, jet fuel,
etc.). We aggregate all the non-gasoline output into a single good called petroleum byproducts.
The model is a stylized economy with three basic commodities: a numeraire good, corn (food)
output and oil. In addition, there is a processing sector that refines oil into gasoline and other
petroleum byproducts, and another sector that converts corn into ethanol, which may then be
blended with gasoline to create ”fuel” used by households. Consumers are assumed to have
quasi-linear preferences (which can then be aggregated into a representative consumer) with
utility function
U = y + φ(Df ) + θ(Dc) + η(Dh)− σ(xg + λxe) (1.1)
where y represents consumption of the numeraire, and (Df , Dc, Dh) represent consumption
of fuel, of food, and of petroleum byproducts, respectively. The last term, σ(·), represents
environmental damages from carbon emissions due to aggregate combustion of gasoline and
ethanol. The parameter λ reflects the relative pollution emissions of ethanol as compared to
gasoline (we will return to this parameter later).
The basis elements of the model consists of the following:
(I) U.S. demand for corn as food/feed, represented by Dc(pc)
(II) U.S. demand for fuel Df (pf )
(III) U.S. demand for petroleum byproducts Dh(ph)
(IV) U.S. corn supply equation Sc(pc)
(V) U.S. oil supply equation So(po)
6(VI) Foreign oil export supply curve S¯o(pwo )
(VII) Foreign corn import demand curve D¯c(pwc )
(VIII) U.S. oil refining sector, which converts oil into gasoline and petroleum byproducts
(IX) U.S. ethanol production sector, which converts corn into ethanol, and produces a byprod-
uct of dried distillers grains with solubles (DDGS), which becomes part of the food/feed
supply
Components (I)-(VII) of the model are self-explanatory. In particular, the (household) demand
curves (I-III) come from utility maximization, and thus are the inverse of the marginal utility
relations φ′(Df ), θ′(Dc), and η′(Dh), respectively, and pf , pc, ph are the prices facing house-
holds.3 The domestic supply relations (IV and V) come from competitive profit maximization
so that (assuming no externalities associated with their production) they are the inverse of
the marginal private (and social) costs; because we assume no taxes on domestic corn or oil
producers, (pc, po) represent both supply and demand prices.4 The foreign relations (VI and
VII) represent aggregate excess world oil supply and world corn demand, and distinguishing
the world prices (pwo , pwc ) from domestic prices allows for the possibility of U.S. border policies
(tariffs or quotas) that would cause U.S. prices to diverge from world prices. Note that if the
United States were a small country, world prices (pwo , pwc ) would be exogenous to U.S. economic
conditions. However, in reality, the U.S. is a large economic agent in both markets and our
simulation will reflect that fact. Finally, components (VIII) and (IX) of the model require a
bit more elaboration.
3Since the marginal utility of the numeraire is one, the marginal rate of substitution between each one of the
three consumption goods (food, fuel and petroleum byproducts) and the numeraire is the same as the marginal
utility of that good. The price of the numeraire is (by definition) normalized to one, so pf , pc, ph represent
relative prices.
4We do allow for taxes or subsidies on fuel and ethanol, which is equivalent to taxes or subsidies on gasoline
and ethanol.
71.2.1 Oil Refining Sector
The refinement of oil yields gasoline xg and petroleum byproducts xh. We assume a fixed
coefficients production technology so that the process is represented as follows:5
xg =Min[βxo, zo] (1.2)
xh =β2xg/β (1.3)
where xg is gallons of gasoline output, xh is gallons of the petroleum byproduct, xo is barrels
of oil input (where domestically produced oil and imported oil are perfect substitutes), and zo
is the amount of a composite input, which aggregates all other inputs used in the oil refining
process. Thus, β is the number of gallons of gasoline per barrel of crude oil, and β2 is the
number of gallons of the petroleum byproduct per barrel of oil. This technology and perfect
competition imply the following relationship among input and output prices:
βpg + β2ph = po + βwg (1.4)
where wg represents the unit cost of the composite input zo, including the rental price of
capacity.
1.2.2 Ethanol Production Sector
We also assume a fixed coefficients production process for ethanol production:
xe = Min[αxc, ze] (1.5)
where xe is ethanol output and ze the amount of other inputs used per unit of ethanol output.
Because the energy content of ethanol is much lower than that of gasoline, and given our
working assumption that consumers’ demand take that into account (e.g., they ultimately care
about the miles traveled with any given amount of fuel, as discussed in de Gorter and Just,
2010), it is important to keep track of this fact to handle the blending of ethanol and gasoline
(into fuel) in a consistent fashion. Consequently, xe in equation (1.5) and in what follows is
5Although in reality there is some substitutability among the various products produced from crude oil, it
seems that this substitutability is limited and that the assumption of fixed proportions in output provides a
reasonable approximation.
8measured in what we term ”gasoline-energy-equivalent gallon” (GEEG) units.6 Furthermore,
we wish to account for the valuable bioproducts of ethanol production by counting only the
”net” use of corn in the technological relation in (1.5). That is, if one bushel of corn used in
ethanol production also yields δ1 units of distillers dried grains with soluble (DDGS), which,
being a close corn-substitute in feed use, we assume commands a price of δ2pc, then the net
amount of corn required to produce a gallons of ethanol is only (1−δ1δ2). Hence, the production
parameter α in (1.5) satisfies
α = aγ1− δ1δ2 (1.6)
where a is the number of gallons of ethanol (in natural units) per bushel of corn; γ captures
the lower energy content of ethanol (relative to gasoline); δ1 represents the units of DDGS per
bushel of corn used to produce ethanol; and δ2 represents the relative price of DDGS.
Given perfect competition in the ethanol sector, this implies the following price relation
between the supply price of ethanol and the price of corn:
pe =
pc
α
+ we (1.7)
where we is the cost of all inputs other than corn, including the rental cost of plant capacity,
required to produce one unit of ethanol (measured in gasoline energy equivalent units) and pe
is the price of one GEEG of ethanol.
1.3 Equilibrium
In order to simulate the model, we need to specify the equilibrium conditions that must hold
and the set of policy instruments that are considered. For the purpose of our policy analysis,
the policy instruments that we allow are border policies, fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies/taxes
(or border policies, ethanol mandates and ethanol subsidies).7 We assume there is trade in
6This measure is related to the more common notion of a ”gasoline gallon equivalent,” which is defined as
the amount of alternative fuel it takes to equal the energy content of one gallon of gasoline (essentially this
represents the reciprocal of our measure).
7If we also allowed, for example, a tax/subsidy on corn production, we would have to distinguish between
the supply and demand prices for corn.
9crude oil but no trade in the refined products, which is a fair approximation of the status quo.8
Given all that, the equilibrium conditions are as follows:
Sc(pc) = Dc(pc) + D¯c(pwc ) + xe/α (Corn Market Equilibrium) (1.8)
Df (pf ) = β
{
So(po) + S¯o(pwo )
}
(Fuel Market Equilibrium) (1.9)
Dh(ph) = β2
{
So(po) + S¯o(pwo )
}
(Petroleum Byproduct Equilibrium) (1.10)
βpg + β2ph = po + βw − g (Zero Profit Condition Oil Refining) (1.11)
pe =
pc
α
+ we (Zero Profit Condition Ethanol Industry) (1.12)
po = pwo + τo (Oil Import Arbitrage Relation) (1.13)
pwc = pc + τc (Corn Export Arbitrage Relation) (1.14)
Note that equation (1.8) embeds the technological relationship xc = xe/α. In equations (1.13)
and (1.14), (τo, τc) are the oil-import-specific and corn-export-specific tariffs, respectively (as-
sumed to be non-prohibitive, so trade still occurs). To close the model, consider first the
hypothetical case of laissez faire equilibrium, in which τo = τc = 0 and there are no other
active policy instruments that interfere with the competitive equilibrium. Then we must also
have pe = pg = pf , and subject to this restriction, conditions (1.8)-(1.14) can be solved for the
equilibrium prices (pc, pwc , po, pwo , pf , ph) and for the ethanol quantity xe. For scenarios in which
there are active policy instruments, on the other hand, model closure needs to be tailored to
the specifics of the policy that applies (e.g., the case of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies, or that
of a binding ethanol ”mandate”).
1.3.1 Equilibrium with Fuel Taxes and Ethanol Subsidies
Let t be the consumption tax on fuel, per gallon, and b be the volumetric blending subsidy
per gallon of ethanol. Then, because gasoline and ethanol are modeled as perfect substitutes
for consumers once measured in GEEG units, and because one gallon of ethanol is equivalent
8Although imports account for over 50% of U.S. crude oil consumption, over the period 2007-2009 net im-
ports of gasoline averaged about 1.7% of total consumption and net trade of ”Refinery and Blender Finished
Petroleum Product” averaged (in absolute value) under 3% of total consumption (calculated from the ”Supply
and Disposition Tables” of the U.S. Energy Information, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_
d_nus_mbbl_m_cur.htm).
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to γ GEEGs, arbitrage relations imply,9
pg =pf − t (1.15)
pe =pf +
b
γ
− t
γ
= pg + b˜ (1.16)
where b˜ ≡ (b − t(1 − γ))/γ is the effective net subsidy to ethanol, as compared to gasoline,
per GEEG unit.10 Thus, for the case of taxes and subsidies, equations (1.8)-(1.14), (1.15) and
(1.16) can be used to calculate the equilibrium, given the policy parameters {τo, τc, t, b}.
1.3.2 Equilibrium with Mandates
With a binding ethanol mandate (denoted by xMe ) equations (1.8)-(1.14) still apply, but
with xe = xMe exogenously set. Note that in this case the amount of corn utilized by the ethanol
industry is fixed at xMe /α, and so, as equation (1.8) makes clear, the corn price is effectively
determined in the corn market. Furthermore, the prices of fuel, gasoline and ethanol will have
to be such that arbitrage possibilities are exhausted, i.e., blenders that combine ethanol and
gasoline earn zero profit. This zero profit condition, allowing for the existence of exogenous
fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies, can be expressed as
(pf − t) ·Df (pf ) = pg
[
Df (pf )− xMe
]
+ (pe − b˜) · xMe (1.17)
Equation (1.17) states that the price of fuel is a weighted average of the price of its components
(ethanol, gasoline), where the amount of ethanol is exogenously determined. Thus, with a
mandate, the equilibrium is calculated using equations (1.8)-(1.14) and (1.17). As shown in
Lapan and Moschini (2009), the impact of an ethanol mandate is that of combining a fuel tax
with an ethanol subsidy in a revenue neutral fashion.
1.4 Welfare
In defining welfare, we assume all tax revenue is returned to domestic consumers and that
there are no externalities other than those due to carbon emissions. Domestic welfare could be
9The assumption of perfect substitutes seems valid up to at least a 10% utilization rate for ethanol.
10Note that (1.16) also accounts for the fact that the tax on fuel t is levied per volume unit. Because it takes
1/γ > 1 gallons of ethanol to make one GEEG of fuel, the effective tax on ethanol is higher than that on gasoline.
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calculated using the indirect utility function along with the profit function for the domestic oil
and corn industries and government tax revenue, or by using the direct utility function along
with the production costs for domestic oil and corn, and the net imports from world trade in
oil and corn. Using the latter approach, and consumer preferences in equation (1.1), we have
W =
{
I − C(Qc)− Ω(So)− wexe − wgxg −
[
pwo S¯o − pwc D¯c
]}
+ [φ(xg + xe) + θ(Dc) + η(Dh)]− σ(xg + λxe) (1.18)
The term in curly brackets in (1.18) measures consumption of the numeraire good, y, while the
term in square brackets on the second line measures consumer utility derived from consumption
of fuel, corn and petroleum byproducts, and the last term measures the disutility due to
pollution arising from energy consumption.11 Consumption of the numeraire in (1.18) is total
income I (taken as exogenous and measured in numeraire units) less (i) C(Qc), the cost of
aggregate corn output; (ii) Ω(So), the cost of domestic oil production; (iii) {wexe +wgxg}, the
cost of the other inputs used in ethanol production and oil refining; and (iv) [pwo S¯o − pwc D¯c],
the value of net imports of oil and corn, which are paid for with the numeraire good. Note that
the competitive equilibrium conditions C ′(Qc) = pc and Ω′(So) = po yield the inverse supply
curves, so specification of the supply curves for the two goods, used in equilibrium conditions
(1.8) and (1.9), implies the form of the cost relations in (1.18). Similarly, specification of the
demand relations used in (1.8)-(1.10) imply the forms of the sub-utility functions in (1.18),
so the only additional specification of functional forms needed for the welfare calculations is
that of the externality term, σ(·). Thus, for the simulation exercise, welfare comparisons for
different policy tools (τc, τo, t, b;xMe ) can be made by solving the equilibrium conditions from
section 3, specifying σ(·) and then using (1.18) to calculate welfare.
To understand how the optimal (or second best) policies are determined, take the total
differential of (1.18) and rearrange terms to yield (Lapan and Moschini, 2009)
dW =(θ′ − C ′)dDC +
(
φ′ − λσ′ − we − (C ′/α)
)
dxe +
([
φ′ + (β2/β)η′ − σ′
]− wg − (Ω′/β)) dxg
+
(
Ω′ −
[
pwo + S¯o(dpwo /dS¯o)
])
S¯′odp
w
o +
([
pwc + D¯c(dpwc /dD¯c)
]
− C ′
)
D¯′cdp
w
c (1.19)
11This formulation does not explicitly impute pollution to the use of distillates. However, because gasoline
and distillates are derived from a barrel of oil in fixed proportions in the model, then a tax on any one of them
- properly adjusted - will have the same effect.
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The first three terms in (1.19) relate to domestic resource allocation decisions, whereas the last
two relate to trade decisions, and for each term, optimality entails equating marginal benefit
to marginal cost. Thus, θ′ is the value to consumers of additional corn consumption, C ′ is the
marginal cost of corn production, and hence optimality requires that marginal benefit equals
marginal cost {θ′ = C ′}. Similarly, the second term-relating to ethanol production-says that the
marginal value of fuel to consumers, less the pollution cost, should be equated to the marginal
cost of producing ethanol. A similar interpretation applies to the third term, where the term
in square brackets is the net social value of another unit of refined gasoline and byproducts,
and [wg + Ω′/β] is the extraction and refining cost of producing that gallon. The two terms in
the second row relate to trade decisions and are the only places where (world) prices appear
explicitly; domestic prices affect domestic welfare only insofar as they affect resource allocation,
but changes in world prices affect domestic welfare directly. Thus, the last two terms state that
the marginal cost of producing oil domestically should equal the marginal cost of importing oil,
and that the marginal cost of producing corn domestically should equal the marginal revenue
derived from corn exports.
In a market economy, rational consumers equate the marginal private value of a good to
the market price they face, and competitive profit-maximizing firms will equate the marginal
private cost to the prices they face. Hence, the rationale for government intervention arises
when there is some divergence between private and social costs or benefits. In our model
this divergence obviously occurs when fuel is consumed, because of the externality generated
by the combustion of that fuel. Furthermore, from the perspective of the domestic economy,
a divergence between private and (domestic) social costs also occurs if the country’s trade
decisions affect world prices. For example, for a competitive firm importing oil, the marginal
private cost of the import is its price pwo , but from the perspective of the economy as a whole,
if additional imports increase world price, the marginal cost of the import is higher than that,
namely, pwo + S¯o(dpwo /dS¯o). Similarly, for corn exports, the marginal value perceived by a
competitive corn exporter is pwc , whereas the marginal revenue for the country as a whole
is pwc + D¯c(dpwc /dD¯c). Thus, as shown in Lapan and Moschini (2009), the first best policy
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entails oil import tariffs, corn export tariffs and a tax on carbon emissions.12 As for the latter,
the ”carbon tax” is fully equivalent, in this model, to a fuel tax (i.e., a tax on both gasoline
and ethanol) along with an ethanol subsidy (because of the assumed differential pollution of
ethanol, captured by the parameter λ).13 Specifically, it is shown that the ”first best” policy
instruments are14
t∗ =σ′(·)
b˜∗ =(1− λ)σ′(·)
τ∗o =S¯o(·)/S¯′o(·)
τ∗c =D¯c(·)/D¯′c(·)
(1.20)
In our analysis, such a first best scenario provides an important (and insightful) benchmark
for other, perhaps more realistic, policy scenarios. Another useful benchmark is the ”laissez
faire” scenario, i.e., the unfettered competitive equilibrium with t = b = τo = τc = 0. In fact,
all welfare calculations are reported as differences relative to the laissez faire, and comparisons
of each policy scenario with the first best provide information as to the efficacy of the various
second best policies considered. Note that in all scenarios except the first best we restrict tariffs
to be zero (i.e., τo = τc + 0) so that, realistically, they presume that the United States is in
compliance with its WTO obligations.15 Once we impose this restriction, we are operating in
a ”second best” environment and the (constrained) optimal values of these second best instru-
ments depend on the feasible policy space. As noted, we assume the feasible policy instruments
are fuel taxes and/or ethanol subsidies (or ethanol mandates and/or ethanol subsidies or fuel
taxes).16 Using these policy restrictions and the behavioral conditions outlined earlier, (1.19)
12Article 1, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution states ”No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State” so that the first best policy could not be supported through export tariffs on corn. However, there
are other constitutionally permissible policies that have the same economic consequences of export tariffs.
13The first best net ethanol subsidy, b˜, reflects the differential pollution rates between the two energy sources.
The fact that the statutory fuel tax is in gallon terms implies a higher effective tax on ethanol in GEEG units.
Thus, even if ethanol caused the same amount of pollution as gasoline, the first best would require a positive
gross subsidy b to ethanol to offset the higher fuel tax.
14To calculate the actual values of the instruments, the equilibrium conditions described in Section 3 must be
used in conjunction with (1.19).
15Because an import tariff on a given good is equivalent to a domestic production subsidy and a domestic
consumption tax of the same amount, banning import tariffs is equivalent to placing a restriction on domestic
policies, which explains the second best nature of these policy scenarios.
16Thus, for example, we do not allow a tax on domestic corn production.
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can be rewritten as
dW = (pf − pe − λσ′)dxe + (pf − pg − σ′)dxg − S¯odpo + D¯cdpc (1.21)
Thus, when tariffs are not permitted, in determining the welfare consequences of domestic
policy instruments, one must consider their impact on the terms of trade as well as on carbon
emissions. As we shall see from the simulations, under many plausible scenarios, it is these
”large country” effects that dominate the welfare calculations. When there are no border
policies, it can be shown that (1.21) reduces to17
dW =
(
pf − pe − λσ′ + D¯c
αQ′(pc)
)
dxe +
(
pf − pg − σ′ − S¯o∆′(po)
)
dxg (1.22)
Here ∆(po) ≡ β(S¯o(po) + So(po)) is the supply of unblended gasoline, and Q(pc) ≡ {Sc(pc) −
Dc(pc)− D¯c(pc)} is the residual supply of corn for ethanol. When both fuel taxes and ethanol
subsidies can be used, the second best policies are
tsb =σ′ + S¯o∆′
b˜sb =(1− λ)σ′ + S¯o∆′ +
D¯c
αQ′
(1.23)
where the superscript ”sb” denotes second best. The tax tsb can be thought of as the tax
levied on gasoline, which incorporates two positive components because increased gasoline use
worsens the U.S. terms of trade for oil and increases pollution costs. The difference between
the tax and subsidy optimal levels, b˜sb − tsb = D¯c/αQ′ − λσ′, represents the effective overall
subsidy (or tax) on ethanol; the positive component reflects the fact that increased ethanol
use benefits the United States by increasing world corn prices, while the negative component
reflects the pollution costs associated with ethanol use.
When the ethanol subsidy is the only choice variable, the government cannot independently
control gasoline and ethanol consumption. For this case it can be shown that the optimal
17The paper by Lapan and Moschini (2009) contains the details, but the logic underlying (1.22) is direct. If
the government induces increased ethanol use, this increases the price of corn: specifically, dpc/dxe = 1/αQ′.
Similarly, increased gasoline use will drive up the price of oil, harming the country by making imports more
expensive.
15
ethanol subsidy, as a function of the exogenous fuel tax, t0, is18
b˜sub = D¯c
αQ′
− λσ′ + ρ
(
σ′ + βS¯o
ψ′
)
+ (1− ρ)t0 (1.24)
where
ρ = β∆
′
β∆−D′f + β∆′(β2/β)2(D′f/D′b)
∈ (0, 1)
Note that b˜sub = b˜sb + (1− ρ)(t0 = tsb). Hence, when the fuel tax is not a choice variable and
t0 < tsb, then the subsidy will generally be lower than the second best subsidy and this subsidy
will be increasing in the exogenous tax rate.
When only the mandate is the choice variable, it can be shown that the first-order condition
for an optimal choice of the mandate reduces to19
dW
dxe
=
(
pf − pe − λσ′ + D¯c
αQ′
)
+
(
pf − pg − σ′ − S¯o∆′
)(
dxg
dxe
)man
= 0 (1.25)
where the superscript ”man” denotes the mandate scenario, and
(
dxg
dxe
)man
=
−
(
1 +
(−D′f
α2Q′
)
s+ (1− s)δ
(−D′f
xf
))
1 + (−D′f)
(
1
β∆′ +
(β2/β)2
−D′
f
)
(1− s) + sδD′fxf
where s ≡ xe/(xe+xg) ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of ethanol in total fuel, and δ ≡ (pf−pg− b˜) >
0. In the simulations that follow, we consider each of the cases discussed above.
1.5 Calibration of the Model
The baseline model is calibrated to fit 2009 data using linear supply and demand curves.
In order to calibrate the model, we need to specify the values of the exogenous parameters and
the value of the policy variables in this baseline period. In addition, we also need to specify the
domestic and world import demand functions for corn Dc(pc) and D¯c(pwc ), the domestic supply
of corn Sc(pc), the domestic and world export supply functions for oil So(po) and S¯o(pwo ), the
demand for fuel Df (pf ) and the demand for petroleum byproducts Dh((ph). If these functions
18This formula differs from the corresponding one in Lapan and Moschini (2009) because here we explicitly
allow for the presence of petroleum byproducts, a feature that is important for the quantitative results of interest
in this study. In the special case where β2 = 0 (i.e., no byproducts), of course, the two conditions are identical.
19Again, the procedure for deriving this result is similar to that in Lapan and Moschini (2009), but the specific
result differs because of the presence, in our model, of petroleum byproducts.
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come from a two-parameter family of functions, as for the linear functional forms that we will
be using, each demand or supply function can be ”calibrated” using an estimate of the elasticity
(of supply or demand) for that function and the value of the relevant variables in the baseline
period.
Table 1.1 gives the assumed baseline values, and sources, for the primitive parameters (e.g.,
elasticities) used in the calibration of the model, and Table 1.2 gives the value of some other
calculated parameters, and their method of calculation, which are provided to ease the inter-
pretation of the model. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 give the primary sources (or methods of calculation)
and the 2009 value used for each baseline variable, including the policy variables. Some param-
eters are drawn from a comprehensive survey of the literature, while others are calculated from
their definitions in terms of more primitive terms. In general, data for corn utilization and price
are gathered from the Feed Grain Database of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/, and data for oil, gasoline and oil refinery
byproducts are obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) website at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/. Ethanol quantity data are from the Renewable Fuels Association
(RFA) website and ethanol prices are provided by the Nebraska Energy Office (NEO) website at
http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html. More specific information on sources of data
used is provided in the tables that follow.
1.5.1 Prices in the Baseline
Because ethanol has a lower energy content than gasoline, its quantity, price, fuel tax and
subsidy level used in the simulation are all converted to be expressed per GEEG. Currently, fuel
consumption (blended gasoline with ethanol) is subject to the federal tax of $0.184/gallon plus
state-level taxes, which are, on average, equal to $0.203/gallon. Hence, for gasoline, t0 = $0.39.
However, because one gallon of ethanol equals only 0.69 GEEG, the fuel tax on ethanol is
t0/γ, that is, $0.565/GEEG. Ethanol production has a tax credit of $0.45/gallon when blended
with gasoline, which is equivalent to a net subsidy to ethanol of b˜0 = $0.475/GEEG. The U.S.
ethanol price of $1.79/gallon is the 2009 average rack price F.O.B. Omaha, Nebraska, and this
17
Table 1.1: Primitive Parameters Used to Calibrate the Model
Parameter Symbol Value Source/Explannation
Domestic supply elasticity of oil εo 0.20 de Gorter and Just (2009b)
Foreign supply elasticity of oil ε¯o 3.00 de Gorter and Just (2009b)
Domestic supply elasticity of corn εc 0.30 Westhoff (2010)
Foreign demand elasticity of corn η¯c -1.50 FAPRI (2004)
Domestic demand elasticity of corn ηc -0.20 de Gorter and Just (2009b)
Demand elasticity of fuel ηf -0.50 Toman, Griffin and Lempert (2008)
Demand elasticity of petroleum
byproducts ηh -0.50 Assumed equal to ηf
Ethanol produced by one bushel of
corn (gallons/bushel) a 2.8 Eidman (2007)
DDGS production coefficient δ1 0.303 δ1 = 17/56
DDGS relative price to corn δ2 0.776 δ2 = (114.4× 56)/(3.74× 2205)
Gasoline production coefficient
(gallon/barrel) β 23.6 β = xg/xo
Ethanol heat content
(BTUs/gallon) γe 76,000 NREL (2008)
Gasoline heat content
(BTUs/gallon) γg 110,000 NREL(2008)
CO2 emissions rate of gasoline
(kg/gallon) CEg 11.29 Wang (2007)
CO2 emissions rate of ethanol
(kg/GEEG) CE2 8.42 Farrel et al. (2006)
Marginal emissions damage
($tCO2)
σ˜′(·) 20 Stern (2007), NHTSA (2009)
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corresponds to a price of $2.59/GEEG.20 Prices of fuel and (unblended) gasoline are calculated
from arbitrage conditions, which are assumed to hold in the status quo, that is, pf = pe−b˜0+t0 =
$2.50/GEEG, and pg = pe − b˜0 = $2.11/GEEG.21 The crude oil price of $61.00/barrel is the
refiner’s composite acquisition cost of crude oil, the weighted average of acquisition costs of
domestic and imported oil. The corn price of $3.74/bushel uses the averaged farm price. The
USDA price of the byproduct in ethanol production, DDGS, is $114.40/t (metric ton), which
reflects the wholesale price in Lawrenceburg, IN. We used EIA data to calculate a weighted
average retail price, excluding taxes, for petroleum byproducts in the oil refining process; this
price index is denoted ph, and its 2009 value is $1.76/GEEG.22 The prices of the ”other” inputs
used in gasoline and ethanol production, wg and we, are derived from the zero profit condition,
wg = pg + β2ph/β = $1.10/GEEG and we = pe − pc/α = $1.11/GEEG, respectively. The
estimated productivity parameters α, β and β2 are discussed next.
1.5.2 Productivity Parameters
One bushel of corn produces approximately 2.80 gallons of ethanol (Eidman, 2007); thus
a = 2.80. The production of ethanol generates bioproducts that are useful as animal feed
(and thus can replace corn in that use). The nature of such bioproducts depends on whether
ethanol is produced in a dry milling plant or in a wet milling plant. Because dry milling plants
are much more common, we construct the model as if all ethanol is produced in dry milling
plants.23 According to industry sources (RFA), such a process generates as a byproduct about
17 lbs of DDGS per bushel of corn; given that there are 56 pounds in a bushel, then δ1 = 0.303.
The DDGS price relative to the corn price is captured by the parameter δ2 = 0.776, calculated
as described in Table 1.1 from the data discussed in the foregoing. Given the assumption of
20See http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html for the primary data.
21This calculation method ensures the internal consistency of our model. A question, perhaps, is how close
this calculated value is to 2009 observed data. From EIA data, the average retail price of all grades and all
formulations of gasoline in 2009 was $2.406/gallon, which is fairly close to the calculated fuel price. Also, from
the same source, the average wholesale (rack) price of gasoline in 2009 was $1.75/gallon, which is not too close
to our computed gasoline price.
22Because prices for all the byproducts of the refining process were not available, the price index we constructed
only uses the prices of aviation gasoline, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil.
Together, these products account for 70%, by weight, of all petroleum byproducts in the oil refining process.
23According to the RFA, more than 80% of corn used in ethanol production is processed via dry milling plants,
with the remaining 20% processed via wet milling plants.
19
Table 1.2: Calculated Parameters Used in the Model
Parameter Symbol Value Source/Explanation
Derived supply elasticity of ethanol εg 5.01 εe = (εscSc − ηcDc − η¯cD¯c)αpe/Qcpc
Derived supply elasticity of gasoline εg 1.61 εg = (εoSo + ε¯oS¯o)βpg/xopo
Portion value of DDGS returning
to corn market δ1δ2 0.24 calculated
Ethanol produced by one bushel of
corn accounting for DDGS value
(GEEG/bushel)
α 2.53 α = aγ1−δ1δ2
Petroleum byproduct production
coefficient (GEEG/barrel)1 β2 21.1 β2 = 42× 1.065− β
Ethanol energy equivalent
coefficient (GEEG/gallon) γ 0.69 γ = γeγg
Relative pollution efficiency λ 0.75 λ = CEg/CEg
Normalized marginal emissions
damage of gasoline ($/gallon) σ
′(·) 0.226 σ′(·) = σ˜′(·)CEg/1000
1 A 42-U.S. gallon barrel of crude oil provided around 6.5% average gains from processing crude oil in 2009
(see Refinery Yield Rate Table (EIA) accessible at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_pct_dc_
nus_pct_m.htm
perfect substitution between corn and DDGS in feed use, then each processed bushel of corn
generates, as a byproduct, the equivalent of δ1δ2 = 0.24 bushels of corn.24 Hence, the ethanol
production coefficient, accounting for byproduct value, is α = 2.53 GEEG/bushel.
1.5.3 Quantities in the Baseline
For the baseline scenario, we use domestic production including stock changes and other
adjustments to measure domestic supply, net exports of corn to measure foreign demand and net
imports of oil to measure foreign oil supply. In the status quo (for 2009), there are 13.15 billion
bushels of corn and 1.93 billion barrels of domestic oil produced in the U.S. The quantities of
foreign corn demanded (U.S. exports) and oil supplied (U.S. imports) were 1.86 billion bushels
and 3.29 billion barrels, respectively. Corn utilization consists of three main uses: domestic
food/feed use (exclusive of ethanol use), foreign demand (exports) and ethanol use. The U.S.
ethanol production of 10.76 billion gallons (RFA data) corresponds to 7.43 billion GEEG. Given
24EPA now assumes that 1 pound of distillers grains will replace 1.196 pounds of total corn and soybean meal
for various beef cattle and dairy cows in 2015. The displacement ratio remains at 1:1 for swine and poultry
(EPA 2010).
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the assumed fixed-proportion technology of ethanol production, the net amount of corn used
in ethanol production is calculated to be Qc = xe/α = 2.94 billion bushels. The corn food/feed
use is then obtained from market balance, where Dc = Sc − D¯c − Qc = 8.35 billion bushels.
EIA reports data for the finished motor gasoline product, including blended ethanol, of 134.4
billion gallons, which measures total fuel consumption in volumetric units. Subtracting ethanol
production (in volumetric units) from the figure for finished motor gasoline gives unblended
gasoline’s contribution to total fuel consumption, xg = 123.6 billion GEEG units. Final fuel
consumption, measured in GEEG units is the sum of gasoline and ethanol consumption in
the same units, xf = xg + xe = 131.0 billion GEEG units. The assumed fixed-proportions
technology in oil refining gives the calculated yield of gallons of gasoline per barrel of crude oil
as β = xg/xo = 23.6 GEEG/barrel.25 Given β, the yield of petroleum byproducts (in gallons)
from a barrel of crude oil is calculated to be β2 = 21.1.26
1.5.4 Carbon Emissions
We use the carbon emission rate of gasoline, measured as carbon dioxide (CO2), of 11.29
kg/GEEG (Wang, 2007).27 As for the net carbon dioxide emissions of ethanol, in our baseline
we apply the rate of 8.42 kg/GEEG of CO2 from the life cycle perspective suggested by Farrel
et al. (2006), which is close to the emission rate of corn ethanol with feedstock credits but
without land-use changes reported in Searchinger et al. (2008).28 These values, in turn, imply
that the relative pollution efficiency of ethanol to gasoline (i.e., the parameter γ) is around
0.75 in our benchmark case, a parameterization that is consistent with EPA (2010). There
25Alternatively, one could recover the parameter from refinery yields data reported by EIA, e.g., β =
(42 gallon/barrel)× (1−Annual Average Process Gains)× (Finished Motor Gasoline Yield). Note that this for-
mula accounts for the fact that EIA measures gains as negative numbers. This procedure would yield β = 20.6
GEEG/barrel. The discrepancy of this value with the one we use, as explained in the text, is likely due to the
additives in blended gasoline.
26As explained in Table 1.1, there are 42 gallons per barrel of crude oil, and because of a yield gain in the
refining product, there are approximately 44.7 gallons of refined product per barrel of oil. Subtracting the
calculated value of 23.6 gallons of gasoline per barrel of crude oil provides the calculated value of β2.
27Numerous factors complicate the choice of an appropriate emissions rate. Fixed proportions between gasoline
and distillates (and no trade in these products) imply the emissions rate used here should reflect the pollution
generated by both gasoline and distillates. On the other hand, because in our model U.S. policy depresses the
world oil price, the lower U.S. oil consumption is partly offset by increased usage in the rest of the world (i.e., a
leakage effect), which leads to a lower net emissions rate. Our parametric assumptions essentially presume that
these effects offset each other.
28The feedstock credits refer to the carbon benefit of devoting land to biofuels (Searchinger et al. 2008).
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Table 1.3: Value of Variables at the Calibrated Point (raw data for year 2009)
Variable Symbol Value Source/Explanation
Fuel tax ($/gallon) t0 0.39 sum of federal tax 18.4c/gal and weighted aver-age of state tax 20.6c/gal (EIA).1
Ethanol subsidy
($/gallon) b
0 0.45 RFS2
Oil price ($/barrel) po 61.0 composite acquisition cost of crude oil (EIA).2
Corn price ($/bushel) pc 3.74
weighted average farm price of corn (Feed
Grains Database, USDA).3
Ethanol price
($/gallon) p
v
e 1.79 ethanol average rack price in Omaha, Nebraska
DDGS price ($/ton) pd 114.4
wholesale price in Lawrenceburg, IN (Feed
Grains Database, USDA).4
Domestic oil supply
(billion barrels) So 1.93
production plus adjustments and stock changes
(EIA).5
Foreign oil supply
(billion barrels) S¯o 3.29 net import (EIA).
Ethanol supply (billion
gallons) x
v
e 10.76 domestic production (RFA).
Fuel demand (billion
gallons) D
v
f 134.4 finished motor gasoline including ethanol (EIA).
Domestic corn supply
(billion bushels) Sc 13.15
domestic production (Feed Grains Database,
USDA).6
Foreign corn import
demand (billion
bushels)
D¯c 1.86 net export (Feed Grains Database, USDA).
1. These tax values are taken from the EIA table ”Federal and State Motor Fuels Tax” at:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/petroleum_marketing_monthly/
current/pdf/enote.pdf.
2. Oil price comes from table ”Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil” (EIA) http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/
pet/pet_pri_rac2_dcu_nus_m.htm.
3. Corn price comes from table ”Corn and Sorghum: Average Prices Received by Farmers” (Feed Grains Data,
USDA), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/Table.asp?t=09.
4. DDGS price comes from table ”Byproduct Feeds: Average Wholesale Price, Bulk, Specified Markets” (Feed
Grains Data, USDA), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/Table.asp?t=16.
5. Oil domestic/foreign supply and fuel/ethanol supply on volumetric basis come from table ”Supply and
Disposition” (EIA), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbbl_m_cur.htm.
6. Corn supply and foreign demand come from table ”Corn: Supply and Disappearance” (Feed Grains Data,
USDA), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/Table.asp?t=04.
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is, of course, considerable uncertainty (and controversy) about ethanol’s actual carbon dioxide
emissions. For example, Searchinger et al. (2008) estimate that, when they account for land-
use changes, the net carbon emission of ethanol is 93% larger than gasoline.29 To capture the
influence of such uncertainty, the sensitivity analysis carried out later will consider the range
[0.5, 2] for the parameter λ.
Table 1.4: Variables at the Calibrated Point (calculated values)
Variable Symbol Value Source/Explanation
Net ethanol subsidy ($/GEEG) b˜0 0.477 b˜0 = b0/γ − (1− γ)t0/γ
Ethanol price ($/GEEG) pe 2.59 pe = pve/γ
Fuel price ($/GEEG) pf 2.50 pf = pe − b˜0 + t0.1
Gasoline price ($/GEEG) pg 2.11 pg = pe − b˜0
Price of inputs other than corn in
ethanol production ($/GEEG) we 1.11 we = pe − pc/α
Price of inputs other than oil in
gasoline production ($/GEEG) wg 1.10 wg = pg + β2ph/β − po/β
Price of petroleum byproducts
($/GEEG) ph 1.76
weighted average retail price exclud-
ing taxes (EIA).2
Quantity of petroleum byproducts
(billion GEEG) xh 110.3 xh = β2xo
Oil supply (billion barrels) xo 5.22 xo = So + S¯o
Corn used in ethanol production
accounting for byproduct value
(billion bushel)
Qc 2.94 Qc = xe/α
Domestic corn demand as
foodn/feed uses (billion bushels) Dc 8.35 Dc = Sc − D¯c −Qc
DDGS supply (billion bushels) xd 0.89 xd = δ1Qc
Ethanol supply (billion GEEGs) xe 7.43 xe = γxve
Gasoline supply (billion GEEGs) xg 123.6 xg = Dvf − xve
Fuel demand (billion GEEGs) Df 131.0 Df = xg + xe
1. Ethanol subsidy, quantity and price are converted into GEEG units in simulation.
2. Price index includes resale prices to end users excluding taxes for aviation gasoline, kerosene-type jet fuel,
kerosene, distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil, which come from table ”Refiner Petroleum Product Prices
by Sales Type” (EIA), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_refoth_dcu_nus_m.htm.
29Hertel et al. (2010) provide a lower estimate of ILUC emissions, which is roughly one-fourth the value
estimated by Searchinger et al. (2008). But their estimates still suggest the pollution inefficiency of ethanol
relative to gasoline when accounting for ILUC.
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1.5.5 Carbon Emissions Cost
There are many estimates regarding the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions. Tol (2009)
surveys 232 published estimates of the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide. The mean of
these estimates is a marginal cost of carbon emissions of $105/tC (metric ton carbon), which
is equivalent to $28.60/tCO2, with a standard deviation equivalent to $243/tC ($66/tCO2),
where social costs are measured in 1995 dollars. The widely cited ”Stern Review” (Stern, 2007)
has a higher estimate of approximately $80/tCO2, due to a lower discount rate applied to future
economic damage from climate change. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) calculates their proposed corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard by re-
lying on Tol’s (2008) survey, which includes 125 estimates of the social carbon cost published
in peer-reviewed journals through the year 2006 (NHTSA, 2009). Tol (2008) reports a $71/tC
mean value, and a $98/tC standard deviation of these estimates of the social carbon cost (ex-
pressed in 1995 dollars). Adjusted to reflect increases of emissions at now-higher atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs, and expressed in 2007 dollars, Tol’s (2008) mean value corresponds to
$33/tCO2, and this is the mean value for the global cost of carbon used by NHTSA (2009). The
EPA (2008) derives estimates of the social carbon cost using the subset of estimates in Tol’s
(2008) survey and reports average global values of $40/tCO2 (for studies using a 3% discount
rate) and $68/tCO2 (for studies using a 2% discount rate).
Because of the U.S.-centered welfare function used here, the pollution externality cost used
in our modeling framework should arguably reflect local and global warming costs to the United
States. In the baseline we use a value of $20/tCO2, which essentially is the estimate provided by
the Stern review, adjusted to reflect the U.S. share of the world economy. Whereas some might
think that the reference parameter of the Stern review is perhaps too high,30 others might yet
argue that it is the global damage due to carbon emission that ought to be considered. Also,
as noted by a reviewer, other externality costs associated with congestion, accidents and non-
carbon pollution are not explicitly taken into account.31 In the end, because of the uncertainty
30Using a more conventional discount rate, Hope and Newbery (2008) find that the (global) carbon cost from
the Stern report could be reduced to the range of $20-$25/tCO2.
31Parry and Small (2005) take the lower and upper limit of pollution damages to be $0.7/tC and $100/tC
respectively, and the central value to be $25/tC (expressed in year 2000 dollars). They also account for external
congestion costs of 3.5c/mile, and an external accident cost of 3c/mile.
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and controversy surrounding this parameter, one might want to rely on sensitivity analysis to
explore the impact of alternative parametric assumptions. For the sensitivity analysis discussed
later, we take the global value of the Stern Review estimate of $80/tCO2 as the upper bound of
the range we consider, with a lower bound of $5/tCO2. Given the assumed linear cost function
of the emissions externality σ(·), the marginal effect σ′(·) represents the normalized constant
marginal emissions damage from gasoline. Given our assumption of $20/tCO2 for the cost of
carbon dioxide pollution, σ′(·) = $0.23/GEEG.
1.5.6 Elasticities
The elasticity values that we use are taken from the literature to reflect the consensus on
the available econometric evidence. For the corn supply elasticity we rely on FAPRI estimates
(Westhoff, 2010) and set εc = 0.3 in our benchmark,32 with a range of [0.1, 0.5] used in the
sensitivity analysis. The elasticity of domestic food/feed demand of ηc = −0.2 is from de
Gorter and Just (2009b), and we explore the range [−0.5,−0.2] in the sensitivity analysis.
The estimates for the elasticity of foreign corn import demand range from an inelastic value
of −0.30 (short-run value) used by Gardiner and Dixit (1986), to a considerably more elastic
value reported by the country commodity linked system performed by the Economics Research
Service at the USDA. The latter, following a sustained exogenous shock to the world price of
corn only, obtain an implied elasticity of net foreign corn imports in the third year of −2.41.
We use a benchmark value for this parameter of η¯c = −1.5, which is consistent with a popular
modeling platform (FAPRI, 2004), and also carry out sensitivity analysis within the range of
[−3,−1].
For the elasticities of domestic oil supply we follow de Gorter and Just (2009b) and assume
εo = 0.2, with the range [0.1, 0.5] explored in the sensitivity analysis. This is a more inelastic
assumption than that suggested in Toman, Griffin, and Lempert (2008), who provides a range
of [0.2, 0.6] for the long-run domestic oil supply elasticity with a baseline value of 0.4. For the
foreign export oil supply elasticity we assume the baseline value of ε¯o = 3, which is similar to
32Gardner (2007) uses a short-run elasticity of 0.23 and a long-run elasticity of 0.5; de Gorter and Just (2009b)
use 0.2 as the elasticity of corn supply.
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the 2.63 value used by de Gorter and Just (2009b), and analyze the range [1, 5] in the sensitivity
analysis. The elasticity of fuel demand is assigned a benchmark value of ηf = −0.5, with the
range [−0.9,−0.2], as suggested by Toman, Griffin, and Lempert (2008), which is fairly similar
to the value and range considers by Parry and Small (2005). Not much explicit evidence exists
on the elasticity of petroleum byproduct demand, hence we adopt the same baseline value and
range as the elasticity of fuel demand. As for elasticities of gasoline and ethanol supply, the
construction of our model does not need these as primitive parameters, although the implied
elasticities of the derived ethanol supply and gasoline supply are easily derived for the purpose
of comparison with other models.33
1.6 Results
Given the assumed parameters discussed in the foregoing section, the remaining parameters
of the model are calibrated (i.e., the coefficients of the postulated linear supply and demand
curves are computed) to replicate price and quantity data of the baseline (or status quo) scenario
for the calendar year 2009. We then consider a number of policy environments; only in the
first-best situation are border policies (import and export tariffs) allowed. These scenarios are
as follows:34
(i) Laissez faire, with no border or domestic taxes or subsidies.
(ii) No ethanol policy: current fuel tax but without ethanol subsidy or mandates.
(iii) Status quo, with the current fuel tax and ethanol policy.
(iv) The first best: border policies and domestic policies are used.
(v) The second best: the fuel tax and ethanol subsidy are chosen optimally.
(vi) The ethanol subsidy is chosen optimally; the fuel tax is set at its current level.
33Quantities are given by production technology, and prices are found from long-run equilibrium conditions,
as explained in the text. Given these quantities and prices, the implied elasticities (in the baseline case) of the
derived ethanol supply and gasoline supply can be calculated as per the formulae reported in Table 1 to yield
εe = 5.01 and εg = 1.61, respectively.
34Our analysis does not consider other farm policies, such as deficiency payments. The policies we do consider
may make the economic impact of these other policies essentially irrelevant.
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(vii) An ethanol mandate is chosen optimally; the fuel tax is set at its current level.
For each scenario, we report in Table 1.5 the values of the policy instruments and the
equilibrium value of the simulated variables. In Table 1.6, for the same sets of scenarios, we
report the welfare impacts (as changes from the fictitious laissez faire equilibrium), broken
down into their components so as to illustrate the distributional effect, as well as the impact
of each scenario on the total carbon emission.35 The overall net welfare gains are calculated
in the usual manner, by summing the (changes in) producer surpluses, consumer surpluses,
government tax revenue and the pollution damages.36 Our results show that all the policy
scenarios improve upon the laissez faire equilibrium solution. The presence of a market failure
implies that optimally chosen policies must do so, of course, but it is perhaps a bit surprising
that seemingly ad hoc policies (like the status quo) also do so. In particular, the status quo
equilibrium with ad hoc levels of the ethanol subsidy and the fuel tax captures over one-half of
the maximum gain that can be achieved with first-best policies.37
1.6.1 Status Quo and Status Quo Ante Ethanol
The status quo values for prices and quantities reflect the actual (average) values of those
variables for 2009. Compared to the simulated laissez faire equilibrium, the fuel tax of
$0.39/GEEG and the gross ethanol subsidy of $0.45/gallon lead to higher (retail) fuel prices,
higher ethanol prices, a modest 3% decline in (world and domestic) oil prices but a significant
18% increase in corn prices. Consequently, the combined policy causes domestic fuel consump-
tion to fall somewhat, as a 6.9 billion gallon decline in gasoline consumption is only partly offset
by a 4.73 billion gallon (equivalent to 3.26 billion GEEG) increase in ethanol consumption. This
35The producer surpluses for ethanol producers and oil refiners are zero because of the assumed constant-
returns-to-scale technology and competitive behavior in these sectors
36Because ethanol production for 2009 exceeds the mandate level, in calibrating the model we assume that the
mandate does not bind, and that it is the fuel tax and ethanol subsidy policies that affect equilibrium values.
37We note at this juncture that we do not explicitly model the fact that energy is an input in the production
of corn and ethanol (the calculation of emissions, which uses the lifecycle approach, does account for the energy
content of this production). Because in this model resources have to be diverted from production of other
goods (the numeraire) to increase corn and ethanol production, this omission would matter if corn and ethanol
production were more energy-intensive than other sectors in the economy. In such a case, the resulting corn and
ethanol supply curves would depend upon energy prices and be more inelastic since increased corn production
will raise energy prices, shifting the supply curve leftward. In this case, policies promoting ethanol are likely to
lead to even higher increases in corn prices than in our model.
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Table 1.5: Market Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios
Laissez No Ethanol Status First Optimal Tax Optimal Optimal
Faire Policy Quo Best & Subsidy Subsidy Mandate
Fuel tax 0.00 0.39 0.39 0.23 0.96 0.39 0.39
($/gallon)
Ethanol subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.11 1.02 0.67 0.00
($/gallon)
Oil tariff 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.53 0.00 0.00 0.00
($/barrel)
Corn tariff 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
($/bushel)
Fuel price 2.36 2.64 2.50 2.75 2.74 2.44 2.47
($/GEEG)
Gasoline price 2.36 2.25 2.11 2.52 1.78 2.05 1.98
($/GEEG)
Ethanol price 1.63 1.43 1.79 1.78 1.95 1.96 2.01
($/gallon)
U.S. oil price 62.8 62.0 61.0 75.7 58.7 60.5 60.1
($/barrel)
U.S. corn price 3.17 2.44 3.74 3.71 4.32 4.38 4.56
($/bushel)
Petroleum byproduct 1.56 1.65 1.76 2.00 2.02 1.81 1.86
price ($/GEEG)
Gasoline quantity 130.5 127.4 123.6 115.1 114.3 121.7 119.9
($/GEEG)
Ethanol quantity 6.03 0.05 10.76 13.94 15.51 16.02 17.45
(billion gallons)
Corn production 12.55 11.78 13.15 13.12 13.76 13.83 14.01
(billion bushels)
Corn demand 8.61 8.93 8.35 8.37 8.10 8.07 7.99
(billion bushels)
Corn export 2.29 2.83 1.86 0.94 1.43 1.38 1.25
(billion bushels)
Oil domestic supply 1.94 1.94 1.93 2.03 1.92 1.93 1.93
(billion barrels)
Oil import 3.57 3.45 3.29 2.84 2.91 3.21 3.14
(billion barrels)
Notes: Although we use GEEG units for ethanol price, subsidy and quantity in our simulation, as discussed in the
text, for ease of interpretation the results reported here are converted into natural units.
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(small) drop in fuel consumption, and the substitution of some ethanol for gasoline, leads to
a 3% (or a 50.9 million tCO2) decrease in carbon emissions; at the baseline cost of $20/tCO2,
this is equivalent to a $1 billion decrease in pollution costs. As Table 1.6 shows, the principal
beneficiaries of this status quo policy are the government (higher tax revenue) and corn pro-
ducers, while oil producers are hurt by the fuel tax and consumers are hurt by higher prices
(but they benefit, however modestly, because of the reduced externality incidence). Relative
to the laissez faire there is a $6.7 billion increase in net welfare, which amounts to 58% of the
maximum gain achievable by optimum policies. U.S. dependence on foreign oil also declines,
as oil imports fall by about 8%.
The column ”no ethanol policy” in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 looks at the scenario in which the
current fuel tax of $0.39/GEEG continues to apply, but there is no subsidy or other policy
supporting ethanol production. When compared to the status quo scenario, this case provides
a useful characterization of the marginal impact of current U.S. ethanol policies. Specifically,
without such policies the ethanol industry would be almost non-existent (only 0.05 billion gal-
lons of production). The lack of explicit government support is not the only effect working
against ethanol production in this scenario: the fuel tax, being levied per volume of fuel, im-
plicitly taxes ethanol at a higher rate (because of the latter’s lower efficiency level in GEEG
terms). The fuel price is also higher with no ethanol policy than in the status quo, which
illustrates an aspect of current policies discussed by de Gorter and Just (2009b): the ethanol
subsidy has a consumption subsidy effect for final consumers. As for welfare effects, the intro-
duction of the current ethanol support policy is beneficial (the welfare measure of the status quo
exceeds that of the no ethanol policy scenario by $6.2 billion). But note that the mechanism
by which this happens is not by reducing pollution, which actually is higher under the status
quo than under the no ethanol policy scenario (by 19.2 million tCO2). Instead, ethanol policies
are mostly useful because of their terms-of-trade effects. Comparison of these two scenarios in
Table 1.6 also illustrates that the big winners from the ethanol policy are corn producers and
fuel consumers.
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Table 1.6: Welfare Effects of Alternative Policies (change relative to laissez faire)
Laissez No Ethanol Status First Optimal Tax Optimal Optimal
Faire Policy Quo Best & Subsidy Subsidy Mandate
Social welfare – 0.5 6.7 11.5 9.9 7.5 8.2
($ billion)
Pollution effect -30.2 1.4 1.0 2.6 2.6 0.8 1.1
($ billion)
Tax revenue 0 49.7 47.6 78.5 108.5 43.0 53.6
($ billion)
P.S. oil supply – -1.5 -3.4 25.8 -7.9 -4.3 -5.2
($ billion)
P.S. corn supply – -8.8 7.4 7.0 15.2 16.0 18.4
($ billion)
C.S. corn demand – 6.4 -4.9 -4.6 -9.6 -10.1 -11.5
($ billion)
C.S. fuel demand – -36.4 -18.7 -49.6 -48.3 -9.8 -14.3
($ billion)
C.S. petroleum – -10.2 -22.3 -48.1 -50.5 -28.2 -33.9
byproduct ($ billion)
CO2 emissions 1509.0 -70.1 -50.9 -128.7 -128.7 -41.4 -54.2
(million tCO2)
1.6.2 The First Best Policies
In the baseline scenario, the marginal emissions damage is $20/tCO2 and thus the first best
policy entails a tax on carbon emissions of $20/tCO2, in addition to oil import and corn export
tariffs. This carbon tax is equivalent, in our model, to a gasoline tax of $.23/GEEG, which is
actually smaller than the status quo (average) fuel tax of $0.39. Since in the baseline model
ethanol is assumed to pollute less than gasoline, and since the $0.23 tax is assumed levied on
gallons of fuel, then a gross subsidy to ethanol of $0.11/gallon is required to support the first
best solution. Thus, the first best policies entail a 17c/GEEG tax on ethanol, a 23c/GEEG tax
on gasoline, a $17.5/barrel import tariff on oil, and a $1.26/bushel export tariff on corn. These
policies would increase welfare by $11.5 billion compared to the laissez faire scenario, and $4.8
billion relative to the status quo. Compared to the laissez faire scenario, the combined effect of
these policies is to increase U.S. oil prices by about 21%, while world oil prices fall by about 7%.
Despite the corn export tariff, U.S. corn prices increase by 17% (world corn prices rise by 58%);
because of the conversion of corn into ethanol, the negative impact on U.S. corn prices of the
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corn export tariff is overwhelmed by the positive impact of higher domestic oil prices. Overall
fuel consumption falls significantly, and ethanol replaces some gasoline, so carbon emissions fall
by 8.5%. U.S. dependence on foreign oil falls sharply, as imports fall by 20%, oil consumption
falls and domestic oil production rises. From a welfare perspective, domestic oil producers and
corn producers both gain and the government gains significant tax revenue, but consumers lose
both because of higher oil (and fuel) prices and because of higher corn prices.
Compared to current policies, the first best policy leads to a significant reduction in oil
imports, fuel consumption and pollution, and a significant increase in ethanol production.
Corn prices fall as the negative impact of the lower ethanol subsidy and the corn export tariff
more than offset the positive impact on corn prices because of the oil import tariff. Thus,
while the implementation of first best policies brings a welfare gain of $4.8 billion compared to
the status quo, there is a significant redistribution of income away from consumers and corn
producers to oil producers and the government. About a third of the welfare gain is accounted
for by the decline in pollution costs.
1.6.3 Second Best Policies: Fuel Taxes and Ethanol Subsidies
The second best fuel tax and ethanol subsidy are presented in the fourth column of Tables 1.5
and 1.6. Interestingly, we see that these policies perform almost as well as the first best policies
in terms of the welfare gain, and actually result in an equal reduction in carbon emissions. In
addition, oil imports are only 2.5% larger than under first best policies. The first best oil tariff
of $17.5/barrel (at 23.6 gallons per barrel) amounts to a gasoline tax of $0.74/gallon; combined
with the $0.23/gallon tax for pollution damages, this means the first best policies are similar
to an overall fuel tax of $0.97, which is remarkably close to the second best tax of $0.96, as
given in Table 1.5.38 We also see from the table that, relative to the first best, the ethanol
subsidy increases significantly. Note that the second best policy can be characterized as a tax
on gasoline at the rate of $0.96/gallon and a small net subsidy on ethanol of $0.09/GEEG
(the second-best subsidy of $1.02/gallon for ethanol more than offsets the fuel tax). Ethanol
38The reason the gasoline tax is not equivalent to an oil import tariff, despite the assumed Leontief technology
for converting oil to gasoline, is because the gasoline tax is also levied on domestic production.
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production in this scenario reaches 15.5 billion gallons, slightly above the 2015 mandate level of
15 billion gallons. Relative to the first best, the domestic corn price increases 16%. Thus, the
fuel tax increase largely substitutes for the unavailability of the oil import tariff, and the ethanol
subsidy increase partially offsets the impact on the world corn price of the unavailability of the
corn export tariff.39 Compared to the laissez faire, these policies reduce world oil prices by
6.5% and increase world corn prices by 36%. Relative to the first best, world oil prices increase
by a very modest $0.53/barrel and world corn prices fall by a more substantial $0.65/bushel.
Even though the second best policy captures 86% of the gains achievable by the first best
policy mix (relative to laissez faire), the distributional effects differ. Compared to the first
best policy mix, consumers lose more, largely because of higher domestic corn prices; domestic
oil producers suffer significant losses as the domestic price of oil falls, but corn producers gain
and government tax revenue increases. Overall, the policy largely redistributes income from
oil producers to the government. Perhaps the principal surprise is how well this second best
policy mix performs compared to the first best policy mix.
It should also be noted that the crucial difference between this second best scenario and
the first best scenario discussed earlier is that, here, border policies (oil import and corn
export tariffs) are precluded. Having restricted the policy space to taxing fuel while supporting
ethanol production, which policy instrument is used in the ethanol market does not matter.
More precisely, the second best policy mix could be alternatively characterized as comprising
an ethanol mandate equal to the second best ethanol production (15.51 billion gallons) along
with the appropriate fuel tax (which can be shown to equal $0.86/gallon).
1.6.4 Optimal (Constrained) Ethanol Policy
Columns 6 and 7 of Tables 1.5 and 1.6 report the results of two scenarios in which ethanol
policy instruments are the only levers, with the fuel tax fixed at its current rate of $0.39/gallon.
Specifically, in the scenario of column 6 an ethanol subsidy is the only discretionary policy
instrument, and in the scenario of column 7, an ethanol mandate is the only instrument. For
both cases it is seen that, while there are significant welfare gains relative to the laissez faire
39Of course, the fuel tax affects corn prices and the ethanol subsidy has a modest affect on oil prices.
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equilibrium, the gains compared to the status quo are not large; thus, in terms of our second
best policy instruments, the fuel tax has a potentially larger impact on welfare than does
ethanol policy. As shown in the sixth column of Table 1.5, the optimal ethanol subsidy, when
the fuel tax is fixed at $0.39/GEEG, is $0.67/gallon, higher than the status quo subsidy level
but, as predicted by the theory, well below the second best subsidy level that applies when
fuel taxes are also chosen optimally. However, because here the fuel tax is held at $0.39/gallon
fuel tax, the ”net” subsidy to ethanol is actually $0.40/GEEG (as opposed to a net subsidy
of only $0.09/GEEG in the second best scenario). Compared to the second best scenario,
ethanol production increases by 3.3%, and slightly exceeds the 2015 mandate level of 15 billion
gallons. Compared to the second best, the lower fuel tax means that gasoline consumption also
increases, so CO2 emissions are not only higher than in the second best, they are higher than
in the status quo situation (Table 1.6). Overall, then, given the fuel tax, the welfare benefits
of adjusting the subsidy away from its status quo value are minimal, and the environmental
benefits are actually negative.
As noted in Lapan and Moschini (2009), an ethanol mandate is equivalent to a revenue
neutral ethanol subsidy and fuel tax. Since column 7 combines this mandate with the status
quo fuel tax, and since this combined effective fuel tax is lower than the second best combination
of fuel tax and ethanol subsidy, the optimal mandate yields higher welfare than the optimal
subsidy policy (column 6). Of course, by construction, the welfare level that is attained here is
lower than that associated with the optimal second best policy (column 5). Compared to the
optimal subsidy policy, since raising the ethanol mandate simultaneously raises the effective
fuel tax, gasoline consumption is lower under the mandate than under the subsidy whereas
ethanol production (and hence the price of ethanol) exceeds that under any other policy.40
This ethanol consumption level exceeds the RFS2 mandate requirement of 15 billion gallons
per year of conventional biofuel (corn ethanol) by 2015. The mandate also leads to higher
domestic corn prices than under any of the other policies, and world corn prices are higher only
in the first best case when a corn export tariff is used. World oil prices are lower than under
40In the case in which the mandate is the only choice variable, raising it has the additional effect of reducing
gasoline consumption and imports; under either first or second best policies, gasoline consumption can be
controlled through its own policy instrument.
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the status quo or the optimal ethanol subsidy, but higher than under the first or second best
policies.41 Carbon emissions are lower than under the optimal ethanol subsidy but higher than
under the first or second best policies. These emissions decrease relative to the status quo, even
though total fuel consumption increases slightly, because of the replacement of some gasoline
by ethanol. Welfare, by definition, is higher than under the status quo, and also higher than
under the optimal subsidy, but considerably lower than under first or second best policies.
1.6.5 Summary of Baseline Results
By definition, the inability to use the first best policies, including import and export tariffs,
must result in lower welfare. Nevertheless, when we are free to choose optimally the ethanol
subsidy and fuel tax, this second best policy combination comes surprisingly close to matching
the first best policy in terms of welfare gains and carbon emission reductions. Naturally, the
additional restriction to only one free policy instrument-the ethanol subsidy or the ethanol
mandate-leads to further welfare declines. In either of these cases, since fuel taxes (or oil
import tariffs) are not choice variables, it is desirable to increase ethanol consumption (and
price), with the larger increase coming under the mandate because of the fact that raising the
mandate increases the effective tax on fuel. Because of this effective tax, the ethanol mandate
yields higher welfare and higher ethanol utilization than does the ethanol subsidy, and, as
noted, the optimal mandate leads to fulfillment of the RFS2 mandate on conventional biofuel
by 2015, as do all of the second best policies we considered. Still, the clear lesson is that fuel
taxes are a more powerful instrument for reducing carbon emissions and increasing welfare than
are ethanol policies.
1.6.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to investigate the robustness of our conclusions, we varied the key nine parameters
one at a time, recalibrated the model (when necessary) to the status quo 2009 baseline, and
then explored the welfare implications of alternative policies. The alternative values for each of
41World corn and oil prices are important because they reflect the terms of trade for the United States and
thus are one component of the welfare impact of each policy.
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the parameters that we considered are summarized in Table 1.7. Needless to say, the optimized
value of the relevant policy instruments changed with the change in these basic parameters.
Whereas the Appendix, and Tables A.1-A.9 therein, provide more details, there are several
results that are common to all sensitivity analysis experiments:
• For all cases considered, the status quo policies dominated laissez faire and in all cases,
except when foreign oil export supply is relatively inelastic, delivered at least 44% of the
maximal benefits achievable with first best policies.
• The basic result that the fuel tax/ethanol subsidy regime is a close substitute for first
best policy holds for all cases.
• The optimal mandate policy dominated the optimal subsidy policy in all cases and it
resulted in the highest use of ethanol in all cases considered. Nevertheless, in most cases
it did not significantly outperform the status quo in welfare terms, the one exception
being when foreign oil export supply was very inelastic.
• In all cases in which ethanol emitted less pollution than gasoline (per GEEG), the optimal
mandate resulted in lower pollution than the optimal ethanol subsidy (even when carbon
dioxide was priced at $5/tCO2). The mandate also resulted in lower pollution than laissez
faire in all cases except when ethanol pollutes more than gasoline (λ = 2.0).)
• In all cases, though, the carbon emissions reductions achieved through either the first best
or the second best policy of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies were very close to each other
and far exceeded those achieved under any other considered policy. Not surprisingly, oil
imports were always lowest under the first best, when oil tariffs were used, but the second
best was a very close second in reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil.
• The welfare gains achievable with the second best policy of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies
was greater than 76% of the maximum gains achievable in all cases (the average of this
fraction of the maximum welfare gain, over all experiments reported in the Appendix, is
86%).
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• The case in which optimal policy delivered small gains-and hence did not improve much
on other policies such as the status quo or the optimal mandate-was when the world oil
export supply elasticity was large (ε¯o = 5). This illustrates the dominating role played
by the oil market on the potential gains from government policy.
• Varying the parameters of the model does not change one of our basic results: the case
for ethanol is not largely about pollution, but rather, it is about the policy’s impact on
the U.S. gains from trade (through its impact on the terms of trade).
Table 1.7: Parameters and Values Used in the Sensitivity Analysis
Parameter symbol baseline range
Cost of CO2 emission ($/tCO2) σ′(·) 20 [5 , 80]
Ethanol CO2 emission efficiency λ 0.75 [0.5 , 2.0]
Elasticity of fuel demand ηf -0.5 [-0.9 , -0.2]
Elasticity of petroleum byproduct demand ηh -0.5 [-0.9 , -0.2]
Elasticity of foreign corn import demand η¯c -1.5 [-3.0 , -1.0]
Elasticity of foreign oil export supply ε¯o 3.0 [1.0 , 5.0]
Elasticity of domestic corn demand ηc -0.20 [-0.5 , -0.1]
Elasticity of domestic corn supply εc 0.30 [0.1 , 0.5]
Elasticity of domestic oil supply εo 0.20 [0.1 , 0.5]
As an additional sensitivity analysis exercise we carried out a Monte Carlo simulation meant
to represent our uncertainty about the model’s true parameters. Specifically, the parameters
of the model were randomly drawn 100,000 times, from a beta distribution consistent with the
ranges reported in Table 1.7, with the shape parameters of this distribution calibrated with
the so-called PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) methodology (Davis, 2008)
- see the Appendix for more details - and for each parameter vector we calculated the optimal
values of the policy instruments for the various scenarios analyzed. One way to interpret the
results of this Monte Carlo experiment is as a robustness check on the magnitude of the policy
tool parameters that we computed in our baseline. Within this perspective, some of our main
conclusions are re-emphasized by the Monte Carlo simulation. For example, for the second
best scenario we find that the optimal fuel tax and ethanol subsidy remain significantly above
the status quo level. Specifically, taking the 10% and 90% of the empirical distribution from
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the simulation, the fuel tax ranges from $0.75/gallon to $1.27/gallon and the ethanol subsidy
ranges from $0.86/gallon to $1.28/gallon. More details concerning this and other scenarios are
reported in Table A.10.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper constructs a tractable computational model, which applies and extends the
analytical model of Lapan and Moschini (2009), to analyze the market and welfare impacts of
U.S. energy policies. Specifically, using this framework, we formally solve the optimal values
for policy instruments under alternative policy scenarios. We then calibrate the model to fit
the baseline period of 2009, and use simulation to compare equilibrium quantities, prices and
net welfare under the alternative policy settings. Not surprisingly, the simulations support the
policy rankings in Lapan and Moschini (2009), and in particular the conclusion that an ethanol
mandate dominates an ethanol subsidy policy.
There are several interesting findings. First, the second best instruments of a fuel tax
and an ethanol subsidy come close to replicating the outcomes under the first best policy
combination of oil import tariffs, corn export tariffs and a carbon tax. For our baseline model,
the second best fuel tax of $0.96/GEEG and ethanol subsidy of $1.02/gallon would increase
ethanol consumption to 15.51 billion gallons, a 44% increase compared to the current (status
quo) situation, it would decrease gasoline consumption by 7.5% and it would reduce emissions
by 5.3%, as compared to the status quo.
In addition, the ethanol mandate, when used optimally in conjunction with the existing
fuel tax, would achieve the highest ethanol consumption of approximately 17.5 billion gallons,
which exceeds the RFS2 mandate on conventional biofuels (15 billion gallons per year by 2015).
However, since the effective tax on fuel is lower than under either the first or second best policy,
it would achieve a smaller reduction in carbon emissions and a smaller welfare gain than would
either of these policies. Finally, because of the magnitude of U.S. oil imports, the greatest
economic gain arising from any policy intervention considered is due to the terms of trade
effects through the world oil market. Because we have not included any other putative gain
from reducing oil imports (e.g., national security effects arising from a reduced dependence
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on imports), we probably still significantly underestimate the potential gains associated with
policies that reduce oil imports.
Finally, a few caveats. In our analysis we have ignored the ”blend wall” issue, which might
make it difficult to increase ethanol consumption beyond ten percent of total fuel use. But
of course the blend wall is also ignored by RFS2 and, in any event, such an issue might be
addressed as an increasing fleet of vehicles that can utilize E85 fuel becomes available, and/or
by allowing newer standard vehicles to use E15 fuel. We have also assumed, as is the norm, that
markets are competitive. If imperfect competition were present in some of the markets, this
would affect the model both through the specification of equilibrium conditions and through
the analysis of optimal policy. For example, if there were monopoly power exercised by a U.S.
firm in the corn export market, then this would reduce the benefits derived from government
policies which restrict corn exports. On the other hand, if foreign oil exporters were exercising
monopoly power, this would mean higher world prices than would otherwise prevail and thus
could increase the desirability of U.S. oil import policy or ethanol policies that reduce the
demand for oil.
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CHAPTER 2. INDUCED CLEAN TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
2.1 Introduction
U.S. manufacturers contribute to about 20 percent of gross domestic output,1 and roughly
70 percent of the total value of exports,2 while at the same time, emit around one-fourth of
the total amount of air emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). The entire
manufacturing industry has been cleaning up air pollutants over the last decade. This cleanup
is mainly attributable to the improvement of production or abatement technologies (Levinson,
2009). The technology improvement could be achieved through manufactures’ decisions of
adopting production or pollution abatement technologies. How are the decisions of polluting
manufactures affected by environmental regulations and openness to trade? This is the most
fundamental question for policy implication. The economic consequences of environmental
policies and the effects of the openness to trade on the U.S. manufacturers are the subjects of
heated public debates and high-pitched academic discourses. Disentangling these effects will
set out to gain further insights in the assessment of comprehensive climate legislation that will
curb our global warming pollution.
The literature in environmental economics - until recently - remains silent on the role of
heterogeneous productivity in the context of an open economy. The increasing availability of
micro datasets, however, has demonstrated that this heterogeneity performs a substantial role
in firms that are exposed to export activities. The stylized facts that heterogeneous firms suffer
differential impacts of the openness to trade have emerged from these datasets, and suggest
the need to shift the focus from countries and industries to firms, when it comes to the effects
1Bureau of Economics Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
2U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services - Annual Revision for 2010.
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of environmental regulations in an open economy with costly trade.
To that end, this paper introduces a factor-biased technology choice and environmental pol-
lution into the trade model with heterogeneous firms, which is the so-called Melitz framework
(Melitz, 2003). The main purpose of this research is to study dynamic decisions of hetero-
geneous firms in response to the further exposure to trade and stringency of environmental
regulations. The model setup starts from a closed economy with two exogenous technolo-
gies (i.e., dirty and clean) in a single (manufacturing) industry, then extends it to an open
economy with costly trade. Production requires labor used as a primary input and emits pol-
lution byproducts (e.g., air emissions), which are regarded as inputs of the production. The
government implements a domestic emission permit cap-and-trade program. Technologies are
represented by cost functions exhibiting (constant) marginal cost with fixed production costs.
The clean technology is a factor-biased technical change as compared with the dirty technology.
Adopting the clean technology requires a higher fixed production cost, but provides a lower
marginal cost than adopting the alternative dirty technology as long as emitting pollution is not
free from charges. The model predicts that a continuum of heterogeneous firms is partitioned
by technology choice and export status. The paper focuses on a scenario in which all firms
adopting the clean technology (hence called clean firms) select to export, while only a fraction
of productive firms adopting the dirty technology (hence called dirty firms) choose to partic-
ipate in the export market. The comparative statics with respect to trade cost and emission
permit cap are carried out assuming that the aforementioned partitioning pattern would not
be reversed in response to changes in policy instruments.
The model developed in this paper offers novel predictions on the impact of a stringent envi-
ronmental regulation in terms of a lower cap of emission permit. The fundamental mechanism,
in which this policy instrument comes into effect, is through its differential impacts on various
types of firms (i.e., clean or dirty firms). If the clean technology is labor biased, the clean
firms bear relatively less burden of rising emission costs than the dirty firms. The benefits of
adopting the labor-biased clean technology rises as the emission costs go up, inducing relatively
productive dirty firms to adopt the clean technology while shutting down the least productive
dirty firms. Resources are then reallocated from the dirty firms to the clean firms. In contrast,
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when the clean technology is emission-biased, the reallocation of resources runs in the opposite
direction, from the clean firms back to the dirty ones.
This paper also provides insights in the environmental impact of the openness to trade. A
reduction in variable trade cost expands the export market for firms which have already been in
the market. Moreover, it opens up new avenues of the export market for those which originally
serve only the domestic market. Competition in the factor markets is relatively fierce in labor
rather than emission permit if the clean technology is labor biased. As a consequence, the trade
cost reduction lowers down the permit price relative to the wage rate. On the contrary, if the
clean technology is emission biased, the excess demand for emission permits over labor bids up
the relative permit price. Even though the total emission level is capped, the further exposure
to trade does reshape the composition of the whole industry.
The paper contributes to a large body of literature on environmental economics concerning
the clean technology adoption. The related work has given much attention on an efficiency
assessment of environmental policies between market-based instruments (e.g., pollution tax,
subsidy, tradable permit) and command-and-control regulations (e.g., standards). Several the-
oretical studies have found that the incentive for adoption and diffusion of new technology is
greater under the market-based instruments than under the direct regulations, but the liter-
ature has not reached any consensus on the theoretical comparisons among the market-based
instruments (Milliman and Prince, 1989, 1992; Jung et al. 1996; Parry, 1998). This issue of
the tax-versus-standard, however, is not the focus of this paper, since the quantity of aggregate
emission is fixed at the cap level.
Another strand of the literature this paper adds to is the relationship between trade and
the environment. The main departure of this paper from the related literature is the feature
of the firm-level difference in productivity. The existing theoretical studies, which examine the
environmental consequences of international trade, focus on aggregate (e.g., industry, country)
variations (Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 1995). Surprisingly, little is known about the impact
of environmental regulations on firm dynamics. To my knowledge, Li and Shi (2010) is the
only research that addresses the role of heterogeneous productivity in assessing environmental
policies (i.e., tax-versus-standard) in a closed economy. In this paper, my model sheds light
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on the intra-industry impacts of the openness to trade. It captures decisions of technology
adoption, entry, exit, and export as heterogeneous firms adjust to further exposure to trade.
The paper is more closely related to the Melitz framework, which has fairly recently en-
joyed widespread attention in many topics, in particular, technology adoption. Yeaple (2005)
examines the interaction between the characteristics of competing technologies with trade costs
and with worker heterogeneity. His analytical study emphasizes a scenario in which only high
technology firms export but none of low technology firms do. Bustos (2011) looks at a different
scenario, the same scenario upon which my analysis is based, in which all high technology firms
export and a fraction of low technology firms select to trade. When the dynamic impact of
trade on the technology adoption and diffusion is concerned, Ederington and McCalman (2008)
suggest that trade has a generally positive impact on the equilibrium rate of adoption. Differed
from the above studies, Unel (2011)’s attention is on the welfare implication of a unilateral
reduction in the technology adoption cost in a two-country model. The paper is inspired from
these studies in modeling technology adoption. The clean or high technology preserves a factor-
augmenting feature relative to the dirty or low technology. Adopting the factor-augmenting
technology benefits from lower marginal costs at the expense of higher fixed costs. Whereas
the paper differs from them in assuming two factor inputs of production, which in turn draws
attention to the factor-biased technical change.
The remaining paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup and charac-
terizes the equilibrium in a closed economy, then followed by an investigation on the responses
of the economy to a lower emission permit cap. Section 3 extends the model into an open
economy with costly trade, and examines the intra-industry impacts of reductions in trade cost
and emission permit cap. The discussion and concluding remarks come in the last section of
the paper.
2.2 Model Setup in a Closed Economy
In this section, I start with a model setup in a closed economy to highlight the essential
mechanism through which an environmental policy (i.e., cap-and-trade) comes into play to
induce the clean technology adoption. Slight adjustments are required to extend the model to
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an open economy with costly trade.
2.2.1 Preference
A representative consumer with an infinite life has preference of constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) form over a continuum of varieties indexed by ω, and also suffers disutility
from pollution externality arising from the production process. The per-period utility function
is,
U =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)ρdω
]1/ρ
−D(E) (2.1)
where the measure of the set Ω represents the mass of varieties; E denotes aggregate emissions;
D(·) is an increasing and convex domestic damage function. The potential global pollution
damage and long-term pollutant stock effects are not accounted in this paper. Varieties are
substitutes with a constant elasticity of σ = 1/(1 − ρ) > 1 and I assume that ρ ∈ (0, 1). As
shown in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the consumer problem can be thought by considering the
set of varieties consumed as an aggregate good Q associated with an aggregate price P ,
Q =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)ρdω
]1/ρ
;P =
[∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σdω
]1/(1−σ)
(2.2)
The iso-elastic form of residual demand curve for any varieties can be then derived from these
aggregates,
q = Q
(
P
p
)σ
= RP
σ−1
pσ
(2.3)
where R = PQ denotes aggregate expenditure; P 1−σ captures the strength of the market
crowding or local competition effect (Baldwin et al. 2003); RP σ−1 refers to the market potential
index (Okubo, 2009), which is decreasing in the market crowding but increasing in the aggregate
expenditure.
2.2.2 Production
Irrespective of production technology, each firm with a firm-specific productivity draw, in-
dexed by ϕ, produces a different variety, and faces a residual demand curve with a constant
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elasticity of σ > 1, thus chooses the profit maximizing markup. This specification of monopo-
listic competition with heterogeneity rules out strategic interactions among firms.
Production requires labor used as both fixed and variable inputs. The labor endowment is
given at its aggregate level L. There exists a choice of technology adoption between either dirty
or clean technology. Both technologies create pollution emissions as byproducts but differ in two
aspects: (i) the fixed production costs of adopting technology j, denoted by fj > 0, measured in
labor thereafter sunk; and (ii) the technology-specific cost share of inputs. Following Copeland
and Taylor (1995)’s technique to treat emission as an additional input factor of production, the
production function via adopting technology j is assumed to have a CES form:
qj = ϕ
[
(βje)
η−1
η + (αjl)
η−1
η
]η/(η−1)
(2.4)
where l is variable labor input; e denotes pollution emissions; ϕ indexes the firm-specific pro-
ductivity; βj and αj are two separate technology terms, and η ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of
substitution between the two factors; j ∈ {c, d} refers to clean and dirty, respectively.
Each firm must purchase emission permits from the government to emit the equivalent
amounts of pollution. Given the common wage rate w and permit price pe, the variable cost
function corresponding to the production function (2.4) is:
Cj(ϕ,w, pe) =
qjcj(w, pe)
ϕ
= qj
ϕ
(pe
βj
)1−η
+
(
w
αj
)1−η1/(1−η) (2.5)
where cj(w, pe) is the marginal cost of production adopting technology j.
Assumption 1 fc > fd, cc(w, pe) < cd(w, pe), ∀w, pe > 0
Define f ≡ fc − fd > 0 as extra fixed costs of adopting the clean technology relative to the
dirty one, or the technology upgrade fee. Here I assume that adopting the clean technology
requires a higher fixed cost than adopting the alternative dirty technology. The clean technol-
ogy, however, provides lower marginal costs than the dirty technology because the former is
assumed to be factor-augmenting technical change relative to the latter.
The clean technology is emission-augmenting technical change relative to the dirty technol-
ogy provided that αc = αd and βc > βd; it is labor-augmenting provided that αc > αd and
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βc = βd; whereas, it is Hicks-neutral provided that βc/βd = αc/αd > 1. With the elastic-
ity of substitution between labor and emission inputs, the factor-augmenting technical change
could be related to factor-biased one. If the two factors are gross substitutes (η > 1), labor-
augmenting technical change is also labor-biased. In contrast, if the factors are gross comple-
ments (η < 1), labor-augmenting technical change is then emission-biased.
Define sej ≡ ∂cj∂pe
pe
cj
as the cost share of emission permits when the production adopts tech-
nology j. Similarly, slj ≡ ∂cj∂w wcj refers to the cost share of labor inputs.3 By the cost function’s
property, sej + slj = 1, ∀j ∈ {c, d}.
Remark 1 If the clean technology is labor-biased, then slc > sld & ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe > 0; If the
clean technology is emission-biased, then sec > sed & ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe < 0; If the clean technology
is Hicks-neutral, then sec = sed & ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is simple: when the technology is labor-biased, an increase in productivity
raises the marginal product of labor more than that of emission input. The increasing marginal
product of labor relative to emission requires a higher labor-emission ratio, henceforth a higher
labor-emission cost ratio, implying that slc > sld. The higher labor cost share of the clean
technology relative to the dirty technology also indicates that the gain of lower marginal costs
by adopting the clean technology becomes more prominent as the permit price (relative to
wage rate) rises, reflected by ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe > 0. This feature ensures that the economy will
be favorable for adopting the clean technology in response to the higher permit price. On
the contrary, when the technology is emission-biased, implying that sec > sed or equivalently
∂(cd/cc)/∂pe < 0, the economy is not conducive for the clean technology adoption as the permit
price keeps rising. If the technical change is Hicks-neutral, however, the cost share of inputs
remains unchanged, sec = sed, indicating that the gains of adopting clean technology is insensitive
to the permit price, ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe = 0. This feature, that the relationship between the relative
marginal costs and permit price does not rely on the specific CES production function form
but the factor-biased technical change, will play an important role in the discussion below.
3sej ≡ ∂cj∂pe
pe
cj
= ∂cj
∂pe
peqjϕ
cjqjϕ
= ∂(qjcj/ϕ)
∂pe
pe
qjcj/ϕ
= ∂Cj
∂pe
pe
Cj
. By Shephard’s lemma, ∂Cj
∂pe
pe
Cj
= peej
Cj
, which is cost
share of emission permit. Likewise for the cost share of labor.
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Despite of heterogeneous productivity, there are two types of firms: clean firms for those
adopting the clean technology, and dirty firms for those adopting the dirty technology. All
firms adopting the same technology share the same amount of fixed production costs, but
have different variable costs, which depend upon their productivity draws ϕ. The static profit
maximization of a firm with productivity ϕ gives rise to the following optimal pricing rule and
output level,
pj(ϕ) =
cj
ρϕ
; qj(ϕ) = RP σ−1
(
ρϕ
cj
)σ
(2.6)
Note that cj ≡ cj(w, pe) is a function of endogenous input prices. All firm-level outcomes
are functions of the firm-specific productivity, endogenous input prices, and aggregate variable
indices. Revenue and profit functions of the firm are specified as follows,
rj(ϕ) = RP σ−1
(
ρϕ
cj
)σ−1
;pij(ϕ) =
RP σ−1
σ
(
ρϕ
cj
)σ−1
− wfj (2.7)
The input demand function for the firm adopting technology j could be derived from the
cost function using Shephard’s lemma,
ej(ϕ) =
ρsej
pe
rj(ϕ); lj(ϕ) =
ρslj
w
rj(ϕ) (2.8)
where (sej , slj) denote the cost shares of emission input, and of labor input.
2.2.3 Entry and Exit
The timing of events follows exactly as the one in the Melitz model except adding technology
choices prior to production. Within each time period, there is a large pool of identical firms
prior to entry. To enter the market, each firm pays a time-invariant entrance fee of fe > 0
as an initial investment. The new entrant then draws the firm-specific productivity ϕ from a
common density distribution g(ϕ) with a positive support of (0,∞). Upon observing the draw,
the firm decides to exit immediately. If the firm chooses to produce, it could adopt technology
j ∈ {c, d} to operate a plant with an additional fixed production cost of fj > 0. In the end of
the period, the firm also faces a constant probability δ ∈ (0, 1) of an idiosyncratic shock that
forces it to exit regardless of its technology choice. All fixed costs, measured in labor units
thereafter sunk, are known to all firms.
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There exist two productivity cutoff values: one is the zero-profit productivity cutoff of
adopting the dirty technology, denoted by ϕd; the other is the equivalent-profit productivity
cutoff of adopting the clean technology, denoted by ϕc. They are defined accordingly,
pid(ϕd) =
R
σ
(
Pρ
cd
)σ−1
(ϕd)σ−1 − wfd = 0 (2.9a)
pid(ϕc)− pid(ϕc) =
[(
cd
cc
)σ−1
− 1
]
R
σ
(
Pρ
cd
)σ−1
(ϕc)σ−1 − wf = 0 (2.9b)
The above two equations together give rise to the relative equilibrium cutoff values, which
depend upon the relative fixed production costs and relative marginal costs:(
ϕc
ϕd
)σ−1
= f
fd
[(
cd
cc
)σ−1
− 1
]−1
(2.10)
Intuitively, an increase in the technology upgrade fee (f) requires firms to draw higher pro-
ductivity so that they could earn enough revenue to at least cover the fixed production costs.
The higher the relative marginal cost is, the more attractive adopting the clean technology
will be, because even the less productive dirty firms could benefit from upgrading to the clean
technology. Thus, the productivity gap between the least productive clean firms and the least
productive dirty firms drops.
Assumption 2 The cost structure satisfies that f/fd >
[
(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1
]
Lemma 1 Given Assumption 2 and σ > 1, ϕc > ϕd.
Figure 2.1: Productivity Cutoffs in the Closed Economy
It is not difficult to show that ϕc > ϕd under Assumption 2. The partitioning of firms by
technology choice implies that only relatively productive firms adopt the clean technology. As
47
depicted in Figure 2.1, any new entrants with productivity draws below ϕd immediately exit
the market; those with productivity draws between these two cutoffs (ϕd and ϕc) adopt the
dirty technology; only those with productivity draws not below ϕc adopt the clean technology.
As a consequence, the ex post distribution of productivity, denoted by µ(ϕ), is conditional on
successful entry hence is truncated at ϕd:
µ(ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕd) if ϕ > ϕd
0 otherwise
where G(ϕ) is the cumulative distribution function for g(ϕ).
Assumption 3 The firm-specific productivity ϕ follows a Pareto distribution, G(ϕ) = 1 −
(k/ϕ)c, where k > 0, c > 0.
Note that k > 0 is the minimum value of productivity draw, and c > 0 is a shape parameter that
determines the skewness of the Pareto distribution. Assuming c > σ−1 so that the variance of
log productivity is finite, in which case the term ϕσ−1g(ϕ) = ξh(ϕ), where h(ϕ) = γkγϕ−(γ+1),
ξ ≡ ckc−γ/γ. The corresponding cumulative distribution also follows a Pareto distribution with
a form of H(ϕ) = 1 − (k/ϕ)γ , where γ ≡ c − σ + 1 > 0 provided that c > σ − 1. The Pareto
distribution has been widely used in many extensions of the Melitz model, since it allows to
derive the closed form solutions of the equilibrium cutoff values (Bernard, Redding, and Schott,
2007; Okubo, 2009). In this paper, the productivity distribution assumption only helps simplify
the proof of comparative statics by relating the ex post fractions of firms to the relative cutoffs.
Given an unbounded pool of potential new entrants, in any equilibrium with unrestricted
entry, the expected value of entry, denoted by V , must equal its sunk entry cost wfe. This
defines the free entry condition,
V = p¯i [1−G(ϕd)]
δ
= wfe (2.11)
where the expected value of entry (V ) is the ex ante probability of successful entry (1−G(ϕd))
multiplied by the expected profitability of producing the good and until hit by the bad shock
(p¯i/δ); the expected profit from successful entry, denoted by p¯i, is defined as:
p¯i =
∫ ϕc
ϕd
pid(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
pic(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ (2.12)
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The expected profit could be decomposed into: (i) one from adopting the dirty technology
conditional on successful entry, captured by the first integration; and (ii) another from operating
a clean plant conditional on successful entry, expressed by the second term. Following the
technique of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), the above free entry condition could be
rewritten as,
fd
∫ ∞
ϕd
[(
ϕ
ϕd
)σ−1
− 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ+ f
∫ ∞
ϕc
[(
ϕ
ϕc
)σ−1
− 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ = δfe (2.13)
In equilibrium, ϕc and ϕd are related according to equation (2.10). Thus, the equilibrium pro-
ductivity cutoffs are determined by the cost structure and factor rewards, hence environmental
policy (i.e., emission permit cap).
In the end, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of firms entering
in each period (called potential new entrants), Me, and a constant mass of operating firms
(called incumbents), M . The mass of successful new entrants exactly replaces the mass of
incumbents who are hit by the bad shock and exit,
δM = [1−G(ϕd)]Me (2.14)
The mass of dirty firms, Md, and of clean firms, Mc, could be related to the equilibrium
cutoffs and mass of operating firms in the following ways,
Md =
G(ϕc)−G(ϕd)
1−G(ϕd) M = λdM ;Mc =
1−G(ϕc)
1−G(ϕd)M = λcM (2.15)
where (λd ≡ [G(ϕc)−G(ϕd)]/[1−G(ϕd)], λc ≡ [1−G(ϕc)] / [1−G(ϕd)]) represent the ex ante
probability of adopting the dirty technology conditional on successful entry, and that of adopt-
ing the clean technology conditional successful entry, respectively. Alternatively, (λd, λc) also
refer to the ex post fraction of dirty firms, and of clean firms, respectively. Note that λd+λc = 1,
since there only exist two types of firms, either dirty or clean. With the Pareto distribution
specified in Assumption 3, the ex post factions are linked with the relative cutoffs,
λd ≡ G(ϕc)−G(ϕd)1−G(ϕd) = 1−
(
ϕd
ϕc
)c
;λc ≡ 1−G(ϕc)1−G(ϕd) =
(
ϕd
ϕc
)c
(2.16)
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2.2.4 Aggregate Variables
Using the equilibrium individual pricing rule (2.6), the aggregate price index is given by,
P 1−σ = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
pd(ϕ)1−σµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
pc(ϕ)1−σµ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(2.17)
In equilibrium, aggregate expenditure equals aggregate revenue, which is the mass of firms
multiplied by the weighted average revenue r¯.
R = Mr¯ ≡M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
rd(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
rc(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(2.18)
The expected variable profit (r¯/σ) equals the expected fixed cost plus the expected profit due
to the free entry condition (2.13), that is, r¯/σ = p¯i + wfd + wfλc. The aggregate expenditure
is the sum of total payments to labor and emission permits in equilibrium,
R = wL+ peE (2.19)
Total emissions generated during the production process are the mass of firms multiplied
by the weighted average emission defined as the term in the curly bracket in equation (2.20).
Thus the emission permit market clearing condition is,
E = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
ed(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
ec(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(2.20)
where E is the per-period total emission permit cap elaborated in what follows. Similarly, the
labor market clearing condition is,
L = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
ld(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
lc(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
+M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
fdµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
fcµ(ϕ)dϕ
}
+Mefe
(2.21)
where the first term in the right hand side denotes the aggregate labor demand used as variable
inputs; the rest of two are fixed costs used as technology adoption and initial entrance fees.
2.2.5 Government
The market failure due to the pollution externality arising from the production intrinsically
creates room for government intervention, in particular, a domestic emission permit cap-and-
trade program. The government sets a time-invariant emission cap and irrevocably precommits
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to it. This assumption allows one to take a close look at how the steady-state equilibrium
responds to a lower permit cap. For future extensions, the model could relax this assumption
by allowing a sequence of permit cap declining over time to reflect a certain emission reduction
goal (e.g., a 10% reduction by the end of 2015 given the baseline year 2011).
The government sets the emission permit volume (each permit equals 1 ton of pollution
emissions) with the total number of permits summing to the cap in each period. The total
emission permits, denoted by E, are auctioned to all operating firms. Each firm must have
permits equivalent to the amount of pollution emitted in each period. Moreover, the revenue
from auctioning emission permits is transferred to the representative consumer in a lump-sum
form. To keep it simple, the paper assumes away the inter-temporal emission permit trade
scheme. In the end, the aggregate emissions and permits must satisfy the per-period feasibility
constraint: E = E, which is assumed to be binding.
2.2.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the closed economy is a vector of five variables including the mass of
firms, the wage rate, the emission permit price, the productivity cutoff of adopting the dirty
technology, and the cutoff of adopting the clean technology: {M,w, pe, ϕd, ϕc}. All other
endogenous variables may be written as functions of these variables. The equilibrium vector is
determined by the following five equilibrium conditions: the equilibrium relationship between
cutoffs (2.10), free entry condition (2.13), the equivalence of expenditure and revenue condition
(2.18), emission permit market clear condition (2.20), and labor market clear condition (2.21).
One of the conditions is redundant due to Walras’ Law. The proof of the existence of the
equilibrium could be carried out by sorting out a system of five equations in the same number
of unknowns.
2.2.7 Comparative Statics
Throughout this section I assume that the firms’ partitioning pattern (ϕd < ϕc) does not
reverse in response to changes in policy instruments. A reduction in emission permit cap occurs
when the government implements a stringent environmental regulation to clean up pollution.
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It is not straightforward to conclude a rising pollution cost as a result of the lower permit
cap. With the factor-augmenting assumption on the clean and dirty technologies, however,
the monotonic feature of the aggregate emission permit input demand can be established in
Proposition 1.4 The classical debate of the price-versus-quantity in environmental economics
does not arise within the context of this framework. The government can find an equivalent
tax rate to achieve the impacts that are similar to those by a permit cap.
Proposition 1 A lower emission permit cap (dE < 0) reduces permit price, ∂pe/∂E < 0
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, a reduction in the emission permit cap leads to an excess demand for emission
permits, bidding up its price consequently. However, there is no further information about
how the aggregate permit auction revenue responds to the lower permit cap. Neither does the
change in the aggregate revenue.
How do the productivity cutoffs vary with the emission permit cap? Proposition 2 estab-
lishes that changes of the cutoffs depend upon whether the adopted technology is labor-biased
or emission-biased.
Proposition 2 A lower emission permit cap (dE < 0),
(i) if the clean technology is labor-biased, ∂ϕd/∂E < 0, ∂ϕc/∂E > 0;
(ii) if the clean technology is emission-biased, ∂ϕd/∂E > 0, ∂ϕc/∂E < 0;
(iii) if the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, ∂ϕd/∂E = 0, ∂ϕc/∂E = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2.2 depicts the impacts of the tough environmental policy on productivity cutoffs.
An increase in permit price, due to the lower cap, puts upward pressure on all operating firms
4Benard, Redding, and Schott (2007) assumes a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function form for skilled and unskilled
labor inputs used as both variable and fixed costs, and a CD function for preference. By taking advantage of
the constant cost shares, it is not difficult to establish the monotonicity of the aggregate input demand, and to
show the neutrality of input endowments. Other trade models with heterogeneous firms and technology adoption
assume a single input production, hence showing the monotonicity is not a problem either (see e.g., Ederington
and McCalman, 2008; Bustos, 2011; Unel, 2011).
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with different magnitudes across technologies. The clean firms suffer relatively less pressure
than the dirty firms, when the clean technology is labor-biased. The marginal cost advantage of
adopting the clean technology becomes more pronounced, attracting even less productive dirty
firms to upgrade to the clean technology. However, the least productive dirty firms no longer
receive enough revenue to cover the fixed production costs hence exit the market. Resource
reallocations induced by the stringent environmental regulation raise the cutoff of adopting the
dirty technology, ϕd ↑, but lower the cutoff of adopting the clean technology, ϕc ↓, as illustrated
in the upper panel of Figure 2.2.
In contrast, when the clean technology is emission-biased, the emission cost share of the
clean firms is higher than that of the dirty firms. The profitable incentive of adopting the clean
technology becomes less promising as the permit price keeps rising. Only the productive clean
firms can afford emission permits with the higher price. The least productive clean firms have
to downgrade their technology to the dirty one, illustrated by a rising ϕc. Whereas for the
dirty firms, their unit costs fall as the permit price rises, attracting even less productive new
entrants to enter the market and adopt the dirty technology, represented by a falling ϕd, as
depicted in the lower panel of Figure 2.2.
When the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, all firms, regardless of types, are bearing bur-
dens of rising permit prices with the same proportions. Resource reallocation between the clean
and dirty firms would not be induced by the lower permit cap. Recall Remark 1, the relative
cutoffs is independent of factor rewards, henceforth environmental regulation. The tightened
policy leaves no effects on the two productivity cutoffs.
Figure 2.2: Impacts of a Stringent Environmental Policy in the Closed Economy
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To illustrate changes in the ex post fractions of dirty (λd), and of clean firms (λc) in response
to the regulation, one could link the ex post fractions with productivity cutoffs using equation
(2.16). The following Corollary is then immediate,
Corollary 1 A lower emission permit cap (dE < 0),
(i) if the clean technology is labor-biased, ∂λc/∂E < 0, ∂λd/∂E > 0;
(ii) if the clean technology is emission-biased, ∂λc/∂E > 0, ∂λd/∂E < 0;
(iii) if the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, ∂λc/∂E = 0, ∂λd/∂E = 0.
When the clean technology is labor-biased, the ex post fraction of dirty firms (λd) falls but
that of clean firms (λc) rises. The cost-saving technology adoption effect reallocates market
shares towards the relatively productive clean firms, and contributes to an aggregate produc-
tivity gain by shutting down the least efficient dirty firms. The whole industry is now shifting
towards a green one. When the clean technology is emission-biased, resource reallocation runs
the opposite direction where the ex post fraction of dirty firms (λd) rises but that of clean
firms (λc) falls. The entire industry consists of less clean firms but more dirty ones. When
the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, the stringent environmental policy has no impact on the
composition of the industry.
Using Proposition 2 and the free entry condition (2.11), how the expected profit (p¯i) and
weighted average revenue (r¯) vary with permit cap can be concluded in the next Corollary.
Corollary 2 A lower emission permit cap (dE < 0),
(i) if the clean technology is labor-biased, ∂p¯i/∂E < 0, ∂r¯/∂E < 0;
(ii) if the clean technology is emission-biased, ∂p¯i/∂E > 0, ∂r¯/∂E > 0;
(iii) if the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, ∂p¯i/∂E = 0, ∂r¯/∂E = 0.
When the clean technology is labor-biased. the expected profit (p¯i) must rise as the cutoff
of adopting the dirty technology (ϕd) increases. So does the weighted average revenue (r¯),
since r¯/σ = p¯i +wfd +wfλc. It is worth noting that the inspection of the increasing expected
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profit and expected revenue also reveals that potential new entrants are required to draw better
productivity to survive in the market. Conversely, when the clean technology is emission-biased,
both the expected profit and weighted revenue fall as the permit cap drops by inspecting the
free entry condition. Lastly, when the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, neither is affected
following the same logic.
To find out how the equilibrium mass of operating firms (M) varies with the stringent
environmental policy, further knowledge about the varying aggregate revenue with permit cap
is needed. Given no inference can be drawn on the aggregate revenue of permit auction, it is
unclear what influence the policy eventually has on the mass of operating firms, of clean firms,
and of dirty firms.
The model offers a novel prediction on job creation and destruction, which is completely
absent from homogeneous firms models. When the adopted technology is labor-biased, there is
gross job creation at high-productive dirty firms that switch to the clean technology combined
with simultaneously gross job destruction at low-productive dirty firms that exit the market. An
emission permit cap reduction cleans up the environment and creates green jobs. Conversely,
when the adopted technology is emission-biased, there exist job reallocations from the clean
firms towards the dirty firms.
When it comes to the welfare implication, there is a tradeoff between environmental qual-
ity and love-of-variety, since both emissions and varieties fall provided the labor-biased clean
technology with gross substitute factors. Without specifying the domestic pollution damage
function, whether social welfare gains or loses from the stringent environmental policy cannot
be determined.
2.3 Model Setup in an Open Economy
This section starts to examine the impacts of environmental policy and trade cost reductions
in the context of an open economy with costly trade. To lay out a theoretical framework for
future numerical simulation, I consider a world of two asymmetric countries, home and foreign,
which differs in labor endowment, stringency of environmental policy (i.e., permit cap), and
technology upgrade fee. For the analysis of comparative statics in the steady-state equilibrium,
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whereas, I assume the two countries are identical such that the analytical derivation is tractable.
Additionally, the inter-temporal and across-border permit trade schemes are assumed away.5
Other assumptions about the government role remain.
I maintain the assumption that international trade is costly throughout this section. Ex-
porting requires a fixed cost of fx > 0 measured in labor, thereafter sunk. It is also subject to
the standard iceberg form of variable cost (e.g., transportation cost) whereby τ > 1 units of a
good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at the destination. The assumption of trade
costs is consistent with recent empirical evidence suggested in the trade literature (Bernard et
al. 2003), and it is one of essential assumptions creating the partition of firms by exporting
status in the Melitz framework. To keep it simple, I assume that the trade costs are irrelevant
to the production technology and country, but it is straightforward to relax this assumption and
allow the trade costs to vary. The model uses an asterisk to denote foreign country variables
to distinguish them from home country variables when necessary. The equilibrium conditions
for the foreign country are omitted but could be derived analogously.
2.3.1 Preference and Production
The representative consumer in each country (home and foreign) shares the same preference
defined by equation (2.1) in the closed economy. As a result of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition, for any varieties produced by technology j ∈ {c, d} in home country, the residual
demand in the home market, denoted by qjh, and that in the export market, denoted by qjx,
have the iso-elastic forms,
qjh =
RP σ−1
(pjh)σ
; qjx =
R∗(P ∗)σ−1
(pjx)σ
(2.22)
where the first subscript j ∈ {c, d} denotes technology choice, clean or dirty, respectively; the
second subscript (h, x) represents the home and export market, respectively. (pjh, pjx) denote
individual variety prices across markets. (P, P ∗) are the aggregate prices. (R,R∗) are the
aggregate expenditure indices. These aggregate indices will be presented shortly.
5In a symmetric setting, the assumption of no across-border permit trade scheme is irrelevant.
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Each firm with a heterogeneous productivity parameter faces both the home and export
residual demand functions with a constant elasticity of σ > 1 defined in equation (2.22). Hence
the firm chooses optimal price as constant markups over marginal costs. The exporting firm
sets a higher price in the export market, reflecting a higher marginal cost of export. The
optimal pricing rules and output levels across markets are given by,
pjx(ϕ) =τpjh(ϕ) =
τcj
ρϕ
(2.23a)
qjx(ϕ) =τ−σΛqjh(ϕ) = R∗(P ∗)σ−1
(
ρϕ
τcj
)σ
(2.23b)
where Λ ≡ R∗(P ∗)σ−1/ (RP σ−1) denotes the relative foreign market potential, the ratio of
foreign market potential to home market potential. If countries are identical, the relative
foreign market potential is then unit in equilibrium, Λ = 1. Revenues earned from the home
and export market could be linked in the following way,
rjx(ϕ) = τ1−σΛrjh(ϕ) = R∗(P ∗)σ−1
(
ρϕ
τcj
)σ−1
(2.24)
Using Shephard’s Lemma, firm’s variable labor and emission permit input demands across
markets are,
ljx(ϕ) =τ1−σΛljh(ϕ) =
ρslj
w
rjx(ϕ) (2.25a)
ejx(ϕ) =τ1−σΛejh(ϕ) =
ρsej
pe
rjx(ϕ) (2.25b)
Each firm’s profits are separated into components from its home and export sales. The
entire fixed production cost and fixed export cost are apportioned to the home profit, pijh(ϕ),
and to the export profit, pijx(ϕ), respectively. So the profit earned from each market is,
pijh(ϕ) =
rjh(ϕ)
σ
− wfj = R
σ
(
Pρ
cj
)σ−1
ϕσ−1 − wfj ; (2.26a)
pijx(ϕ) =
rjx(ϕ)
σ
− wfx = R
∗
σ
(
P ∗ρ
τcj
)σ−1
ϕσ−1 − wfx; (2.26b)
A firm adopting technology j ∈ {c, d} produces for the home market and also exports if
pijx(ϕ) > 0. Thus, the firm’s total profits are given by,
pij(ϕ) = pijh(ϕ) + max{0, pijx(ϕ)} (2.27)
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2.3.2 Entry and Exit
There are two main scenarios with the corresponding assumption on cost structure: one is
that no dirty firms export, only a fraction of clean firms select to trade; the other describes
that only a fraction of dirty firms export, so do all clean firms.6 The latter one, on which the
remainder of this paper focuses, is consistent with empirical findings emerging from Argentinian
firm-level data sets suggested by Bustos (2011).7
There exist three productivity cutoffs: the zero-profit productivity cutoff of adopting the
dirty technology, denoted by ϕd, above which firms enter the home market and adopt the dirty
technology; the zero-profit productivity cutoff of exporting, denoted by ϕx, above which firms
export; and the equivalent-profit productivity cutoff of adopting the clean technology, denoted
by ϕc, above which firms enter the market and adopt the clean technology. They are defined
as follows,
pidh(ϕd) =
R
σ
(
Pρ
cd
)σ−1
(ϕd)σ−1 − wfd = 0 (2.28a)
pidx(ϕx) =
R∗
σ
(
P ∗ρ
τcd
)σ−1
(ϕx)σ−1 − wfx = 0 (2.28b)
pich(ϕc) + picx(ϕc)− pidh(ϕc)− pidx(ϕc)
=
(
1 + τ1−σΛ
) [(cd
cc
)σ−1
− 1
]
R
σ
(
Pρ
cd
)σ−1
(ϕc)σ−1 − wf = 0 (2.28c)
Assumption 4 The cost structure satisfies that
Λτ1−σfd < fx < f
{
(1 + Λ−1τσ−1)
[
(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1
]}−1
Lemma 2 Given Assumption 4 and σ > 1, ϕd < ϕx < ϕc.
It is easy to show that the cost structure in Assumption 4 guarantees that all clean firms
serve both the domestic and export markets, only a fraction of dirty firms export. Intuitively,
when the trade barrier is prohibitive (τ → ∞), the cutoff of exporting converges to infinity
(ϕx → ∞), implying that no dirty firms are able to export. Neither do clean firms. Hence
the economy returns back to autarky. When variable trade cost is unit (τ = 1) and fx = fd,
6Impacts of reductions in trade cost or permit cap vary systematically with scenarios on which one focuses.
7Using the National Survey on Innovation and Technological Behavior of Industrial Argentinian Firms during
the period 1992-1996, Bustos (2011) finds that, on average, continuing exporters have a 0.33 log points higher
level of technology spending per worker than never exporters in 1992.
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the productivity cutoff of adopting the dirty technology then equals the cutoff of exporting
(ϕd = ϕx), capturing that access to the export market is no more costly than access to the
domestic market.
There are three ways of expressing the relative equilibrium cutoffs within the same country.
First, look at firms adopting the dirty technology but serving different markets,
(
ϕx
ϕd
)σ−1
= τ
σ−1
Λ
fx
fd
(2.29)
It follows immediately that a lower trade cost (τ or fx) bridges the productivity gap between
the least productive exporting firms and the least productive dirty firms, since exports become
more profitable. A rise in fixed costs of adopting dirty technology fd makes the least dirty
firms difficult to survive in the market, hence driving up the productivity gap. If countries
are not identical, this gap also depends upon the relative strength of the home and foreign
market potential, denoted by RP σ−1 and R∗(P ∗)σ−1, respectively. This relative strength also
reflects the relative size of market across countries. The smaller the relative foreign market
potential (Λ) is, the less promising of selling products in the export market is, hence the larger
the proportion of dirty firms only serving the domestic market will be.
The second comparison worthy of attention involves those which serve both markets but
adopt different technologies,
(
ϕc
ϕx
)σ−1
=
( 1
1 + τσ−1Λ−1
)[(
cd
cc
)σ−1
− 1
]−1
f
fx
(2.30)
This expression shows that the proportion of dirty firms serving both the domestic and export
markets, represented by ϕc/ϕx, is inversely related to trade costs (both variable and fixed costs),
relative marginal costs (cd/cc), and relative home market potential index (Λ−1). Factors like a
reduction in trade costs or a rise in foreign market size relative the home market are favorable
of exporting decisions, and enlarge the productivity cutoff gap between the least clean firms
and the least exporters. An increase in the relative marginal costs (cd/cc) encourages to adopt
the clean technology, thus shortens the cutoff gap.
Equations (2.29) and (2.30) together give rise to the equilibrium relationship between the
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technology adoption cutoffs,(
ϕc
ϕd
)σ−1
= 11 + τ1−σΛ
[(
cd
cc
)σ−1
− 1
]−1
f
fd
(2.31)
This expression is worth several comments. The gap between the least productive clean firms
and the least productive dirty firms, captured by ϕc/ϕd, is increasing in variable trade cost but
decreasing in relative marginal costs cd/cc. If a reduction in the variable trade cost reduces
permit price, leading to an indirect negative impact on the relative marginal costs, there then
exists an ambiguous effect on the cutoff gap (ϕc/ϕd).
The entry process is exactly the same as the one in the closed economy except adding export
decisions during the production as depicted in Figure 2.3. The expected profit now consists
of three components: one from adopting the dirty technology and serving only the domestic
market; another from adopting the dirty technology but serving both the domestic and export
markets; and the other from adopting the clean technology and serving both markets.
p¯i =
∫ ϕc
ϕd
pidh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
pidx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[pich(ϕ) + picx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ (2.32)
Figure 2.3: Productivity Cutoffs in the Open Economy
With unlimited entry, the free entry condition under costly trade is rewritten as follows,
fd
∫ ∞
ϕd
[(
ϕ
ϕd
)σ−1
− 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ+ fx
∫ ∞
ϕx
[(
ϕ
ϕx
)σ−1
− 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ
+ f
∫ ∞
ϕc
[(
ϕ
ϕc
)σ−1
− 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ = δfe (2.33)
The equilibrium cutoff values are jointly determined by trade costs (fx & τ), emission permit
cap, and other exogenous key parameters, such as death rate (δ), initial investment costs (fe),
and fixed production costs (fd, fc). The results vary systematically with technology and market.
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In the end, the steady-state equilibrium is still characterized by equation (2.14). The aggre-
gate mass of dirty firms, of exporting firms, and of clean firms, represented by (Md,Mx,Mc),
respectively, are,
Md = λdM ;Mx = λxM ;Mc = λcM (2.34)
where λx ≡ [1−G(ϕx)]/[1−G(ϕd)] denotes the ex ante probability of exporting conditional on
successful entry, and also represents the ex post fraction of exporting firms; (λd, λc) are defined
in the closed economy. Given the Pareto productivity distribution in Assumption 3, the ex
post fractions (or the ex ante conditional probabilities) associated with the relative equilibrium
cutoff values are,
λd = 1−
(
ϕd
ϕc
)c
;λx =
(
ϕd
ϕx
)c
;λc =
(
ϕd
ϕc
)c
(2.35)
2.3.3 Aggregate Variables
The aggregate price index (P ), aggregate expenditure (R), and market clear conditions of
emission permits and labor are given as below. All aggregate indices consist of components from
dirty firms serving the home market, dirty firms serving both the home and export markets,
and cleans firms serving both markets.
P 1−σ =M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
pdh(ϕ)1−σµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
pdx(ϕ)1−σµ(ϕ)dϕ
+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[
pch(ϕ)1−σ + pcx(ϕ)1−σ
]
µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(2.36)
R =M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
rdh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
rdx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[rch(ϕ) + rcx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(2.37)
E =M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
edh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
edx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[ech(ϕ) + ecx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(2.38)
L =M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
ldh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
ldx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[lch(ϕ) + lcx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
+M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
fdµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
fxµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
(fc + fx)µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
+Mefe (2.39)
2.3.4 Equilibrium
The costly trade equilibrium in the open economy is a vector of eight variables in each
country (home and foreign) {ϕd, ϕx, ϕc, w, pe, P,R,M,ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x, ϕ∗c , w∗, p∗e, P ∗, R∗,M∗} subject to
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eight conditions in each country: two equilibrium relationships between cutoff values (2.29) &
(2.30) (any two conditions could derive the third one), free entry condition (2.33), aggregate
price index (2.36), aggregate revenue index (2.37), the equivalent aggregate expenditure con-
dition (2.19), emission permit market clear condition (2.38), and labor market clear condition
(2.39). One of the conditions is redundant by Walras’ Law.
2.3.5 Comparative Statics
The current model is well-suited to address mechanisms in which the exposure to trade and
environmental policy come into play and interact. I consider changes of policy instruments in a
bilateral and symmetric way to make derivation tractable. Throughout this section, I maintain
the assumption that the firms partitioning pattern stated in Lemma 2 (ϕd < ϕx < ϕc) always
holds, and also assume the two identical countries. The symmetry assumption ensures that
the two countries share the same input prices, aggregate variables, and productivity cutoffs.
Thus the relative foreign market potential is unit, Λ = 1. To shed lights on the effects of
policy instruments in an asymmetric setting (including an unilateral policy change), numerical
simulations of a parameterized model are required but beyond the scope of this paper.
2.3.5.1 Stringent Environment Policy
A reduction in the emission permit cap occurs when both home and foreign governments
cooperatively and simultaneously participate in cleaning up pollution. This stringent environ-
mental policy raises the cost of emitting pollution as established in the following Proposition,
Proposition 3 A lower emission permit cap (dE∗ = dE < 0) increases permit price, ∂pe/∂E <
0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of the rising permit price as the permit cap falls follows exactly the same
as in the closed economy. It still has no detailed information about the changing aggregate
permit auction revenue in response to the cap. Whereas, responses of productivity cutoffs to
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the lower emission cap vary with the factor-biased feature. The relations are expressed in the
next Proposition.
Proposition 4 A lower emission permit cap (dE∗ = dE < 0),
(i) if the clean technology is labor-biased, ∂ϕd/∂E < 0, ∂ϕx/∂E < 0, ∂ϕc/∂E > 0;
(ii) if the clean technology is emission-biased, ∂ϕd/∂E > 0, ∂ϕx/∂E > 0, ∂ϕc/∂E < 0;
(iii) if the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, ∂ϕd/∂E = 0, ∂ϕx/∂E = 0, ∂ϕc/∂E = 0;
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2.4 depicts the impacts of the stringent environmental policy on the productivity
cutoffs in the open economy. The intuition directly comes from the general equilibrium im-
plications for the permit input market. A reduction in the permit cap puts upward pressure
on the input prices, affecting all operating firms with different magnitudes across technologies.
When the clean technology is labor-biased, the clean firms suffer relatively less pressure from
the factor market compared with the dirty firms. The cost-saving advantage of adopting the
clean technology becomes more prominent, thereby creating profitable incentives of adopting
it even for less productive dirty firms, illustrated by a falling ϕc. Competition in the factor
markets causes the least productive dirty firms which serve only the domestic market to drop
out, since they are unable to earn enough revenue to cover their fixed production costs, rep-
resented by a rising ϕd. For the least productive exporting firms, while the increasing permit
price stops them from entering the export market due to negative profits. But they still can
keep operating in the domestic market, expressed by a rising ϕx.
When the clean technology is emission-biased, on the other hand, the clean firms bear more
pressure from the rising permit price than the dirty firms. The less productive clean firms are
forced to downgrade to the dirty technology, while the less productive dirty firms enter the
export market because of profitable incentives. When the clean technology is Hicks-neutral,
all types of firms are facing the same proportional increasing environmental costs. Resource is
not reallocated either between exporters and non-exporters, or between clean firms and dirty
firms.
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Figure 2.4: Impacts of a Stringent Environmental Policy in the Open Economy
Directly from Proposition 4 coupled with the relationship between the relative cutoffs and
the ex post fractions in equation (2.35), one can easily inspect changes of the ex post fractions
of firms in response to a reduction in the permit cap.
Corollary 3 A lower emission permit cap (dE∗ = dE < 0),
(i) if the clean technology is labor-biased, ∂λd/∂E > 0, ∂λc/∂E < 0, ∂λx/∂E = 0;
(ii) if the clean technology is emission-biased, ∂λd/∂E < 0, ∂λc/∂E > 0, ∂λx/∂E = 0;
(iii) if the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, ∂λd/∂E = 0, ∂λc/∂E = 0, ∂λx/∂E = 0.
The ex post fractions of dirty firms (λd) and of clean firms (λc) vary with the factor-biased
feature, and the intuition follows exactly the same as one in the closed economy. While the
reason why the ex post fraction of exporting firms does not respond to the permit cap reduction
lies in the same proportional burdens of rising permit prices for all dirty firms across exporting
status.
When the clean technology is labor-biased, the expected profit rises as ϕd increases. As a
consequence, the weighed average revenue rises due to the increasing expected profit, the ex
post fraction of exporting firms, and that of clean firms, using the rewritten free entry condition
r¯ = σ(p¯i+wfd+wfxλx+wfλc). Conversely, when the clean technology is emission-biased, both
the expected profit and weighted average revenue drop as the permit cap goes down because
of the non-increasing ϕd, λc, and λx. When the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, neither the
expected profit nor the weighted revenue change as the permit cap.
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2.3.5.2 Trade Cost Reduction
The exposure to trade could occur in the way of lowering the variable trade cost or fixed
cost. The fixed cost structure plays an essential role in generating the partitioning of firms by
exporting status. As long as a small change in the fixed trade cost does not violate the assumed
cost structure in Assumption 4, it has economic implications that are similar to the impacts of
a reduction in the variable trade cost. Here, I only consider changes in the variable trade cost,
which also capture the stylized facts that cross-border transportation costs have been declining
overtime.
The effect of the exposure to trade driven by a reduction in the variable trade cost (dτ < 0)
differs substantially from a reduction in the emission permit cap. Trade costs are exogenous,
hence are not affected by environmental policy instruments. The variable trade cost reduction,
on the other hand, has an indirect impact on the emission permit price. This indirect impact
is stated as follows,
Proposition 5 A reduction in the variable trade cost (dτ < 0),
(i) if the clean technology is labor-biased, ∂pe/∂τ > 0;
(ii) if the clean technology is emission-biased, ∂pe/∂τ < 0;
(iii) if the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, ∂pe/∂τ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
A reduction in the variable trade cost brings with an increasing demand from the foreign
market for exporters, and creates profitable incentives even for less productive dirty firms, which
originally did not select to export. This market expansion, if the technology is labor-biased,
increases the competition in labor inputs relative to emission permits, hence bids up the wage
rate relative to the permit price. Conversely, if the technology is emission-biased, the factor
demand for emission permits increases more than that for labor, thereby driving up the permit
price relative to the wage rate. If the clean technology is Hicks-neutral, the factor demand for
emission permits rises as the same as for labor, henceforth leaving no influence on the relative
factor rewards.
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The last research question of this paper is to investigate how the productivity cutoffs vary
with variable trade costs. Before addressing this point, I define two indices measuring the
openness to trade and the technology adoption effect. The trade literature regards τ1−σ as a
measure of the openness to trade (Okubo, 2009). Here I introduce T ≡ (1 + τσ−1)1/(1−σ) as a
similar measure. The openness to trade index is decreasing in τ given σ > 1. When the trade
barrier is prohibitive (τ →∞), T → 0 implying the autarky. ∂T∂τ τT < 0 then denotes the trade
cost elasticity of the openness to trade, representing a positive effect on the openness to trade
from the lower τ , which is favorable for exporting.
Define ∆ ≡
[
(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1
]1/(1−σ)
as an index of the advantage of adopting the clean
technology, where cd/cc denotes the marginal costs of adopting the dirty technology relative
to the alternative one. When cd = cc, there is no cost-saving advantage of adopting the clean
technology. Then ∆ → ∞ given σ > 1, capturing that no firms would have any profitable
incentives to adopt the clean technology. Given permit price and σ > 1, ∆ is inversely related
with the relative marginal cost. The larger ∆ is, the less the advantage of adopting the clean
technology will be.
As stated in Proposition 5, a reduction in the variable trade cost reduces permit price
if the technology is labor-biased, otherwise increases permit price. Combined with the fea-
ture of factor-biased technical change that ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe > 0 if the technology is labor-biased,
∂(cd/cc)/∂pe < 0 if the technology is emission-biased, ∂(cd/cc)/∂τ > 0 always hold, implying
that the advantage of adopting the clean technology always falls as the variable trade cost falls,
∂∆/∂τ < 0. Therefore, regardless of the factor-biased technology feature, the variable trade
cost reduction has an indirectly negative impact on the clean technology adoption, which is
not favorable for adopting the clean technology, reflected by ∂∆∂τ
τ
∆ < 0.
Proposition 6 A reduction in the variable trade cost (dτ < 0):
(i) ∂ϕx/∂τ > 0;
(ii) ∂ϕd/∂τ < 0, ∂ϕc/∂τ < 0, if ∂∆∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
τT = 0;
(iii) ∂ϕc/∂τ < 0, but the sign of ∂ϕd/∂τ is ambiguous, if ∂∆∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
τT < 0;
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(iv) ∂ϕd/∂τ < 0, but the sign of ∂ϕc/∂τ is ambiguous, if ∂∆∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
τT > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
A reduction in the variable trade cost makes export profitable even for less productive dirty
firms, so that the relative cutoff between exporting and adopting the dirty technology falls,
ϕx/ϕd ↓, when examining the relative equilibrium cutoff in equation (2.29). The variable trade
cost reduction also squeezes out profitable incentives of adopting the clean technology through
both a direct impact on the openness to trade and an indirect impact on the clean technology
adoption. Hence the cutoff gap between adopting the clean technology and exporting rises,
ϕc/ϕx ↑. These two opposite forces (ϕx/ϕd ↓ & ϕc/ϕx ↑) together push the less productive
dirty firms to select to trade, illustrated by a falling ϕx. When examining the effect of the
variable trade cost reduction on ϕc/ϕd in equation (2.31), there exists a negative effect on the
clean technology adoption (∂∆∂τ
τ
∆) but a positive effect on the openness to trade (
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
τT ). The
relative strength of these two opposing effects jointly determine the productivity cutoffs ϕd and
ϕc.
2.4 Conclusion
The feature of heterogeneous productivity in the Melitz framework plays a significant role in
modeling firms’s decisions of exporting and adopting technology. This paper is the first study
of applying and extending this framework into environmental economics. I incorporate a tech-
nology choice of dirty or clean and pollution externality into the Melitz model. Heterogeneous
firms make decisions of entry, exit, and export. More importantly, they decide to adopt either
dirty or clean technology. The latter is considered as factor-biased technical change compared
with the former but incurs higher fixed costs. The objective of this study is to examine the im-
pact of stringent environmental policy and openness to trade on heterogeneous firms’ dynamic
decisions, thereby making inferences about the aggregate productivity and composition of the
entire industry.
I investigate the implications concerning reductions in emission permit cap, and show that
how these implications vary with the factor-biased technology feature. When the clean technol-
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ogy is labor-biased technical change relative to the alternative dirty technology, a lower permit
cap reallocates market share and resource from the dirty firms to the clean ones, encouraging
firms to adopt the emission-saving clean technology, but discouraging the least productive firms
to enter the market. The entire industry is composed of more clean firms but less dirty ones.
It also experiences an gain of improved aggregate productivity by driving out the least produc-
tive firms. When the clean technology is emission-biased technical change, the reallocation of
resource induced by the lower permit cap runs in the opposite direction.
This paper sheds light on the environmental impact of the openness to trade in terms of a
variable trade cost reduction. When the clean technology is labor-biased compared with the
dirty technology, the trade cost reduction raises the factor demand of labor more than emission
permits, and thus lowers down the permit price relative to the wage rate. When the clean
technology is emission-biased, however, the excess demand for emission permits rather than
labor inputs drives up the relative emission permit price. When it comes to the impact of the
further exposure to trade on firm dynamics, the lower variable trade costs leaves a positive effect
on the selection to trade, but an indirectly negative impact on the clean technology adoption.
The relative strength of these two opposing forces jointly determines the intra-industry firm
decisions.
The paper represents a push toward understanding the comprehensive climate legislation in
the context of an open economy with costly trade. An appealing research agenda is to calibrate
the model to capture some salient features of U.S. data on firm distribution and dynamics.
The parameterized model can be employed to explore the impacts of unilateral or multilateral
climate policy change in an asymmetric setting on the inter- and intra-industry firm dynamics.
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CHAPTER 3. ARE EXPORTERS MORE ENVIRONMENTALLY
FRIENDLY THAN NON-EXPORTERS? THEORY AND EVIDENCE
3.1 Introduction
With the increasing availability of micro-level data sets, the differences between exporters
and non-exporters have been receiving widespread attention in many dimensions, e.g., produc-
tivity growth, price markup, etc (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Tybout, 2003; Loecker, 2007).
However, the variations of firm-level environmental performance across exporting status have
received scant attention. Neither theoretical nor empirical studies provide a clear-cut answer
as to the relationship among export, productivity, and pollution. Part of the reason is the lack
of longitudinal micro-level data sets containing both emissions and export. This is unfortunate
because environmental variations between exporters and non-exporters are arguably of growing
importance from the government’s point of view. For instance, policies targeting various types
of firms (either exporters or non-exporters) might have unintended differential environmental
consequences, thereby generating ambiguous impacts on curbing global warming pollution.
In this paper, we explore the firm-level relationship between export status and environmen-
tal pollution from both theoretical and empirical approaches. To guide the empirical work, we
incorporate a technology upgrading choice and pollution externality into a trade model with
heterogeneous firms, using the approach of the so-called Melitz model (Melitz, 2003). The up-
graded technology is assumed to be an emission-saving technical change relative to the initial
technology.1 Upgrading the technology requires extra fixed costs but provides lower marginal
1The upgraded emission-saving technology could be process/equipment modification or redesign including
in-process recycling and pollution control devices to reduce pollution from the manufacturing process. The
technology varies with pollutants that must be removed. For example, spray towers applied in food processing
and foundries industries remove gaseous pollutants and particulates; thermal oxidizer used in chemical industries
destroys hazardous air pollutants and volatile organic compounds from industrial air emissions.
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costs. The augmented model predicts that a continuum of heterogeneous firms is partitioned
by technology upgrade choice and export status. Productive firms can earn enough revenues to
cover the fixed costs of entering the export market and thus select to be exporters. Moreover,
only the most productive exporters upgrade to the emission-saving technology because they are
the only ones with profitable incentives. The paper provides this technology upgrading mech-
anism to explain a negative correlation between the export status of a firm and its emission
intensity. An analytic expression of the relative emission intensity across export status derived
from the model gives rise to two testable predictions: (i) facility productivity is inversely re-
lated to the emission intensity; and (ii) export status is negatively correlated with the emission
intensity.
To test the model, we compiled a unique detailed facility-level dataset of the U.S. manufac-
turing industry in years 2002 and 2005. The dataset is assembled from a variety of sources. The
National Emission Inventory (NEI) of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pro-
vides the facility-level criteria air pollution data, i.e., Ammonia (NH3), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2),
Carbon Monoxide (CO), Ozone (O3), and Total Suspended Particulates (TSPs). The facility-
level economic characteristics data are obtained from the National Establishment Time Se-
ries database (NETS). These two databases are matched through the Data Universal Number
System (DUNS), which is a unique facility identifier. To measure facility’s exposure to en-
vironmental compliance costs, we further augment the dataset with pollutant-specific county
nonattainment/attainment designations under the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) legis-
lation.
The endogeneity of the export decision is a common problem in the empirical literature
on trade and the environment. To address this endogeneity issue, the empirical strategy em-
ployed in this paper involves two main steps. First, facility productivity is measured by total
factor productivity (TFP), which is estimated as a Cobb-Douglas production function residual.
Second, with the estimated facility TFP, we explore the correlation between exporting status
and emission intensity using a two-stage estimation for each pollutant. In the first stage, we
estimate the impacts of facility attributes on the probability of selection to export via a logistic
regression of export status on measures of trade costs and facility TFP, as well as a facility’s
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exposure to environmental regulations (i.e., the CAAA). Two measures of trade variable costs
are used as instrumental variables for export decisions. One is facility-specific geographical dis-
tance to the nearest U.S. port, the other is industry-specific freight rate. In the second stage,
an OLS regression is employed to investigate the impact of predicted likelihood of exporting on
emission intensity, while controlling for facility-level productivity and industry characteristics.
Empirical findings presented in this paper are overall supportive of the theoretical predic-
tions. For each criteria air pollutant, i.e., NH3, SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs, we find a significantly
negative correlation between the estimated facility productivity and emission intensity. Con-
ditional on a facility’s estimated productivity and exposure to the CAAA, facilities with high
probability of exporting emit less emissions per value of sales than those with relatively low
probability within the same industry. The impact of the predicted export likelihood on emission
intensity is highly significant (1 percent level) for all pollutants we track. To take advantage of
the variation of the environmental regulation across space and time, we also provide estimates
of the impact of the CAAA on facility emission intensity. There is some evidence that polluters
located in CO, O3, or TSPs nonattainment counties have lower emission intensity than those
residing in attainment areas.
The paper contributes to a growing literature in trade and the environment. With a the-
oretical foundation from Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995), the existing studies document
the mixed environmental impacts of trade at the aggregate (e.g., country) level (Antweiler,
Copeland, and Taylor, 2001; Jeffrey and Rose, 2005; Managi, Hibiki, and Tsurumi, 2009).
These studies, however, do not account for firm heterogeneity and fail to capture the firms’ dy-
namic decisions of entry and exit. To remedy this, Cui (2011) incorporates technology adoption
and environmental pollution into the Melitz framework. The analysis by Cui (2011) is theoret-
ical in nature, aiming at the impacts of openness to trade and stringency of an environmental
policy on the induced clean technology adoption and firm dynamics. In this paper, we apply the
basic model setup in Cui (2011) to provide a theoretical guide for the empirical investigation
on the firm-level relationship between export status and environmental performance.
The empirical evidence found in this paper contributes to the recent trade literature on
the differences between exporters and non-exporters, in particular on the role of exporters in
71
environmental performance. The literature has addressed the question using micro-level data
sets from different countries and various measures of environmental behavior, and has identi-
fied robust findings in favor of exporters’ environmental advantage over non-exporters. Girma,
Hanley, and Tintelnot (2008) use a measure of a four-point ordinal response, ranging from not
at all important to very important, to two surveyed questions concerning the environmental
impacts of innovation for UK firms. They find that exporters are more likely to denote innova-
tion as having ”high” or ”very high” environmental effects than non-exporters. Batrakova and
Davies (2010) adopt fuel consumption as a proxy for firms’ environmental behavior, and show a
negative correlation between exporting status and fuel expenditures for high fuel intensity firms
for a panel of Irish manufacturing firms. Similarly, Forslid, Okubo, and Ulltveit-Moe (2011)
construct firm-level CO2 emissions using data on all type of fuel use together with emission
coefficients from Swedish firms. Their findings also suggest a negative correlation between ex-
port dummy and CO2 emission intensity at the firm level. However, the self-reported answers
to survey and fuel input consumption, on which these three papers focus, may not truly reflect
firms’ environmental performance.
Another recent paper by Holladay (2010) investigates toxic pollution emissions from the
United States’ manufacturing establishments over the years 1990-2006. His main results show
that exporters emit less toxic emissions than non-exporters when controlling for establishment
output and industry characteristics. One aspect our work shares in common with Holladay
(2010) is the utilization of the NETS database. He matches plant-level toxic pollution emitters
reported in the Toxic Release Inventory of the EPA with those covered in the NETS, while our
paper sheds light on criteria air polluters collected in the NEI of the EPA. One departure of
the present paper from his study is the empirical implementation in our paper, which controls
for the estimated facility TFP and facility’s exposure to the CAAA. In addition, our paper
attempts to address the endogeneity issue of export decision using measures of trade costs as
instrumental variables.
This paper also relates to a handful of empirical studies on the impacts of the Clean Air
Act (CAA) and CAAA on industrial activities. Greenstone (2002) finds negative impacts of
the CAA on the growth of polluting manufactures in nonattainment counties during the 1967-
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1987 period, i.e., the growth of employment, capital stock, and shipments. Additionally, it
has been further pointed out that the CAAA nonattainment designation is associated with
drops in TFP for surviving polluting plants (Becker, 2010; Greenstone, List, and Syverson,
2010). Both studies use the plant/establishment level data from the U.S. Census Bureaus.
Moreover, there is a long-lasting debate on whether the CAAA causes firms to reallocate
within the country or even flee the country. Henderson (1996) and his follow-up study with
Becker (Becker and Henderson, 2000) show that the O3 nonattainment regulation leads to
the reallocation of polluting plants from more to less polluted areas during 1963-1992. Hana
(2010), on the other hand, finds robust findings that the CAAA causes regulated U.S. based
multinational firms to increase their foreign assets and outputs. When it comes to the impact
of the regulation on pollution cleanup, Greenstone (2004) documents evidence that the SO2
nonattainment designation plays a minor role in the dramatic decline of county-level ambient
concentrations of SO2 during the 1969-1997 period. However, the main departure of the present
paper from the foregoing studies is to explore the link among productivity, export status, and
environmental pollution, controlling for facility’s environmental regulatory pressure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
framework and derives the firm-level relationship among productivity, exporting status, and
emission intensity. Section 3 introduces the CAAA regulation. Section 4 describes the facility-
level dataset constructed from a variety of data sources. Section 5 provides the empirical
strategy and results. The last section concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Model
This section extends the Melitz framework by incorporating environmental pollution and a
choice of technology upgrade. The augmented model considers a world of two countries, home
and foreign, with labor endowment L and emission permit cap E. Each economy consists
of a single monopolistically competitive industry. The government implements a domestic
emission permit cap-and-trade program. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity.
They produce differentiated products using labor as a primary input and generate emissions
as byproducts. The notation uses an asterisk to denote foreign country variables to distinguish
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them from home country variables when necessary. Equations for the foreign country are
omitted but could be derived analogously.
3.2.1 Setup of the Model
3.2.1.1 Entry and Exit
The timeline is depicted in Figure 3.1. At the beginning of each time period, there is
a large pool of identical firms prior to entry. To enter the market, each firm pays a time-
invariant entrance fee of fe > 0 as an initial investment. The new entrant then draws the
firm-specific productivity ϕ from a common density distribution g(ϕ) with a positive support
on (0,∞). Upon observing ϕ, each firm decides to either stay or exit the market immediately.
If the firm stays, production requires fixed production costs of fd > 0. In addition, the firm
chooses whether to upgrade to an emission-saving production technology or not. Upgrading
the technology requires extra fixed costs of f > 0. Export entails additional fixed costs of
fx > 0 and the standard iceberg form of variable cost (e.g., transportation cost) whereby τ > 1
units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at the destination. In the end of
the period, the firm faces a constant probability δ ∈ (0, 1) of an idiosyncratic shock that forces
it to exit regardless of the technology upgrading choice and exporting status. All fixed costs,
measured in labor units and thereafter sunk, are known to all potential entrants.
Figure 3.1: Timeline
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3.2.1.2 Technology Upgrade
The technology upgrade is modeled as a choice between two different technologies dirty
and clean. The initial production technology is labeled as the dirty technology. The upgraded
technology is assumed to be an emission-saving technical change, and is thus labeled as the
clean technology. These two technologies differ in the fixed production cost and cost share of
emission permit. The production with the upgraded clean technology requires total fc = fd+f
amount of fixed costs but reduce the cost shares of emission permits. The latter is due to the
emission-saving feature of the clean technology.
3.2.1.3 Production
Output produced using technology j employs labor as a primary input and generates emis-
sions as byproducts, which are treated as production inputs following Copeland and Taylor’s
technique (1994), where j ∈ {c, d} refers to the clean and dirty technology, respectively. The
production function is written as:2
qj = ϕFj(e, l) (3.1)
where l is variable labor input; e denotes pollution emissions; ϕ indexes the firm-specific pro-
ductivity. The production function Fj(e, l) is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree
one in e and l. Concavity is a conventional curvature assumption on the production function.
The property of homogeneous of degree one allows us to derive the equivalent expression be-
tween the marginal cost and unit cost functions, which in turn guarantees that the relative
input demand across productivity preserves the same structure as the relative revenue across
productivity. This nice feature makes derivation tractable.
Each firm must purchase emission permits from the domestic government to emit the equiv-
alent amounts of pollution. Given the common wage rate w and permit price pe, the variable
cost function corresponding to the production function (3.1) is:
Cj(ϕ,w, pe) =
qjcj(w, pe)
ϕ
(3.2)
2There exists a pollution abatement technology behind the production technology. Let the production tech-
nology be, qj = ϕ(1 − θ)Qj(l), pollution byproducts ej = A(θ)Qj(l), where θ ∈ [0, 1] denotes an endogenous
faction of resources to abatement activity, A(θ) represents an abatement technology with A(0) = 1, A(1) = 0,
and ∂A/∂θ < 0. Thus, the joint production technology is given by qj = ϕ[1−A−1(ej/Qj)]Qj .
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where cj(w, pe) is the marginal cost of production adopting technology j. As always, cj(w, pe)
is increasing and concave in input prices.
3.2.1.4 Consumption
Preferences across differentiated varieties produced in the single industry have the standard
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form, with an elasticity of substitution of σ = 1/(1−
ρ) > 1 and we assume that ρ ∈ (0, 1). As a result of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition,
for any varieties produced by technology j in home country, the iso-elastic form of residual
demand in the home market, denoted by qjh, and that in the export market, denoted by qjx,
can be written as functions of aggregate price indices (P, P ∗), aggregate expenditure indices
(R,R∗), as well as individual variety’s prices (pjh, pjx):
qjh =
RP σ−1
(pjh)σ
; qjx =
R∗(P ∗)σ−1
(pjx)σ
(3.3)
where the first subscript j ∈ {c, d} denotes technology choice, clean or dirty, respectively; the
second subscript (h, x) represents the home and export market, respectively. (pjh, pjx) index
the variety prices in the home market and in the export market, respectively.
3.2.2 Firm Behavior
Each firm with the firm-specific productivity ϕ faces the home and export residual demand
functions with a constant elasticity of σ > 1 defined in equation (3.3). Under CES preferences
the profit maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal costs. The optimal prices and
outputs across markets are given by:
pjh(ϕ) =
cj
ρϕ
; pjx(ϕ) =
τcj
ρϕ
(3.4a)
qjh(ϕ) =RP σ−1
(
ρϕ
τcj
)σ
; qjx(ϕ) =R∗(P ∗)σ−1
(
ρϕ
τcj
)σ
(3.4b)
Firms charge a higher price in the export market than the home market due to the extra trade
variable costs. Note that cj ≡ cj(w, pe) is a function of endogenous input prices. Revenues
earned from each market are:
rjh(ϕ) =RP σ−1
(
ρϕ
cj
)σ−1
; rjx(ϕ) = R∗(P ∗)σ−1
(
ρϕ
τcj
)σ−1
(3.5)
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Using Shephard’s Lemma, firm’s variable labor and emission permit input demands across
markets are:
ljh(ϕ) =
ρslj
w
rjh(ϕ); ljx(ϕ) =
ρslj
w
rjx(ϕ) (3.6a)
ejh(ϕ) =
ρsej
pe
rjh(ϕ); ejx(ϕ) =
ρsej
pe
rjx(ϕ) (3.6b)
where (sej ≡ ∂cj∂pe
pe
cj
, slj ≡ ∂cj∂w wcj ) denote the cost shares of emission permits, and of labor,
respectively.3 By the cost function’s properties, sej + slj = 1, ∀j ∈ {c, d}.
We separate each firm’s profits into components from sales in the home and export markets
to make the derivation tractable. The entire fixed production cost and fixed export cost are
apportioned to the home profit pijh(ϕ) and to the export profit pijx(ϕ), respectively. So the
profit earned from each market is given by:
pijh(ϕ) =
rjh(ϕ)
σ
− wfj ; pijx(ϕ) = rjx(ϕ)
σ
− wfx (3.7)
3.2.3 Sorting Pattern
There exist three productivity cutoffs: (i) the zero-profit productivity cutoff of adopting
the dirty technology, denoted by ϕd, above which firms enter the market and adopt the dirty
technology; (ii) the zero-profit productivity cutoff of exporting, denoted by ϕx, above which
firms select to export; and (iii) the equivalent-profit productivity cutoff of upgrading to the
clean technology, denoted by ϕc, above which firms choose to upgrade the technology. They
are defined as follows:
pidh(ϕd) = 0⇒ R
σ
(
Pρ
cd
)σ−1
(ϕd)σ−1 = wfd (3.8a)
pidx(ϕx) = 0⇒ R
∗
σ
(
P ∗ρ
τcd
)σ−1
(ϕx)σ−1 = wfx (3.8b)
pich(ϕc) + picx(ϕc) = pidh(ϕc) + pidx(ϕc)⇒(
1 + τ1−σΛ
) [(cd
cc
)σ−1
− 1
]
R
σ
(
Pρ
cd
)σ−1
(ϕc)σ−1 = wf (3.8c)
We assume that: Λτ1−σfd < fx < f
{
(1 + Λ−1τσ−1)
[
(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1
]}−1, such that the
partitioning of firms by technology upgrade choice and export status occurs. As depicted in
3sej ≡ ∂cj∂pe
pe
cj
= ∂cj
∂pe
peqjϕ
cjqjϕ
= ∂(qjcj/ϕ)
∂pe
pe
qjcj/ϕ
= ∂Cj
∂pe
pe
Cj
. By Shephard’s Lemma, ∂Cj
∂pe
pe
Cj
= peej
Cj
, which is the
cost share of emission permit. Likewise for the cost share of labor, slj .
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Figure 3.2, all clean firms serve both the home and export markets, only a fraction of dirty
firms select to export, that is ϕd < ϕx < ϕc.4 As a consequence, the ex post distribution of
productivity, denoted by µ(ϕ), is conditional on successful entry, and is thus truncated at ϕd:
µ(ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕd) if ϕ > ϕd
0 otherwise
(3.9)
where G(ϕ) is the cumulative distribution function for g(ϕ).
Figure 3.2: Technology and Exporting Choices
Given an unbounded pool of potential new entrants, in any equilibrium with unrestricted
entry, the expected value of entry, the ex ante probability of successful entry (1 − G(ϕd))
multiplied by the expected profitability of producing the good and until hit by the bad shock
(p¯i/δ), must equal its sunk entry cost wfe. This defines the free entry condition:
p¯i [1−G(ϕd)]
δ
= wfe (3.10)
where the expected profit conditional on successful entry, denoted by p¯i, is defined as:
p¯i =
∫ ϕc
ϕd
pidh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
pidx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[pich(ϕ) + picx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ (3.11)
The expected profit consists of three components: one from adopting the dirty technology
and serving only the domestic market; another from adopting the dirty technology but serving
both the domestic and export markets; and the other from upgrading the clean technology and
serving both markets.
In the end, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of firms entering
in each period, Me, and a constant mass of operating firms, M . The mass of successful new
4By assumptions on parameters and cost structure, one could also have ϕd < ϕc < ϕx.
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entrants exactly replaces the mass of incumbents who are hit by the bad shock and exit:
δM = [1−G(ϕd)]Me (3.12)
3.2.4 Equilibrium
The paper focuses on a steady-state equilibrium. The equilibrium is defined as a vector
of eight variables in each country {ϕd, ϕx, ϕc, w, pe, R,M,Me} subject to the following eight
equilibrium conditions: two equilibrium relationships between cutoff values (3.8) (any two con-
ditions could derive the third one), free entry condition (3.10), law of motion (3.12), aggregate
revenue index (3.17), emission permit market clear condition (3.13), labor market clear condi-
tion (3.16), and the equivalent aggregate expenditure condition (3.18). One of the conditions
is redundant by Walras’ Law.
Total emissions generated during the production process are the mass of firms multiplied
by emissions aggregated from the home and export markets and from the dirty and upgraded
clean technology. Thus the emission permit market clearing condition is:
E = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
edh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
edx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[ech(ϕ) + ecx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(3.13)
Similarly, the aggregate variable labor input demand is given by:
Lv = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
lch(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
ldx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[lch(ϕ) + lcx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(3.14)
The aggregate fixed labor inputs used in the domestic production, export, and initial investment
as entry costs are:
Lf = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
fdµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
fxµ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
(fc + fx)µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
+Mefe (3.15)
The aggregate labor demand is then given by the sum of the above two aggregate variable
labor input demand Lv and fixed labor input demand Lf . The labor market clearing condition
satisfies,
L = Lv + Lf (3.16)
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The aggregate expenditure equals the aggregate revenue, which is the mass of firms multi-
plied by the weighted average revenue expressed as the term in the curly bracket:
R = M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
rdh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
rdx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[rch(ϕ) + rcx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
(3.17)
In equilibrium, the aggregate expenditure is the sum of total payments to labor and emission
permits,
R = wL+ peE (3.18)
3.2.5 Environmental Performance
Differences in emission intensity, measured by emissions per output, between exporters and
non-exporters is the primary focus of this paper. The relative emission intensity across export
status and technology upgrading choice is derived as follows:
[ech(ϕ′) + ecx(ϕ′)] / [qch(ϕ′) + qcx(ϕ′)]
edh(ϕ)/qdh(ϕ)
=
(
1 + τ1−σΛ
1 + τ−σΛ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market Size Effect
(
ccs
e
c
cds
e
d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Technology Effect
(
ϕ
ϕ′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity Effect
(3.19)
where Λ ≡ R∗(P ∗)σ−1/ (RP σ−1) denotes the relative foreign market potential, the ratio of
foreign market potential to home market potential. The market potential index is decreasing
in the market crowding (P 1−σ) but increasing in the aggregate expenditure (Okubo, 2009).
The right hand side of the above equation can be decomposed into the following three effects.
The market size effect (in the first parenthesis) is reflected by the production expansion
as a result of the export decision. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the relative foreign market
potential Λ raises the market size effect. This effect is always greater than one as long as the
iceberg trade cost exceeds one, that is τ > 1. If τ = 1, implying that accessing to the export
market is no more costly than accessing to the home market, a partitioning of a continuum
of firms across export status will not be induced, thus the market size effect equals one. If
the two countries are identical, the aggregate variables would be same across countries. As a
consequence, the market size effect only depends upon the trade variable cost τ .
The technology effect (in the middle parenthesis) is represented by the emission-saving
benefit from the upgraded clean technology. The clean technology has lower marginal cost
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relative to the dirty technology, the inequality of cc < cd always holds because of the factor-
augmenting feature. This effect is less than one (ccsec < cdsed), if the clean technology is the
emission-saving technique change relative to the dirty technology.5
The productivity effect (in the last parenthesis) is associated with the relative productivity
gains. The higher the productivity, the lower the emission intensity is. Both the technology
and productivity effects contribute to emission intensity reductions, but the market size effect
leads to more emissions.
The firm-level relationship between export status and pollution intensity in equation (3.19)
provides theoretical guidance for the empirical investigation. Due to a lack of detailed trade and
technology information at the firm level, the available data do not allow us to directly estimate
the decomposed effects of the market size, technology, and productivity. Alternatively, there
are two main testable predictions implied by the theoretical model: (i) the productivity effect,
measured by the relative productivity, is inversely related to the emission intensity; and (ii)
exporting status is negatively correlated with the emission intensity if the technology and
productivity effects together dominate the market size effect. Before turning to the empirical
implementation, we discuss the related environmental regulation and the data in next two
sections.
3.3 The Clean Air Act
In this section, we discuss environmental regulations, i.e., the Clean Air Act. The data and
analysis in the paper relate to implementation and changes in this regulation.
3.3.1 Background
The Clean Air Act, initially passed in 1970 and amended in 1977 and 1990 (the CAAA there-
after), regulated that the EPA should classify each county in the United States into pollutant-
specific nonattainment and attainment categories based upon the ambient concentrations of
four criteria air pollutants: i.e., SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs. Under the 1977 amendments, each
5As shown in Cui (2011), the technology effect is emission-saving, that is sec < sed, if the clean technology is
a labor-biased technique change relative to the dirty technology. The technology effect is labor-saving, that is
sec > s
e
d, if the clean technology is an emission-biased technique change relative to the dirty technology.
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July, the pollutant-specific nonattainment/attainment designation is officially reclassified for
every U.S. county under the national standards for each criteria pollutant.
When a county is designated as nonattainment, the state of the county is required to develop
a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which lays out specific regulations for every major source
of each pollutant for which the county is in nonattainment. Existing facilities located in the
county are subject to reasonably available control technology which usually involves retrofitting
existing equipment, whereas new facilities are exposed to the lowest achievable emission rate
(LAER), requiring the installation of the cleanest available technology. The 1977 amendments
added the requirement that new facilities could be required to purchase pollution offsets from
existing facilities. In contrast, when a county is in attainment, existing facilities are not subject
to any technological standards. Only those new facilities with the potential to emit over 100
tons per year of a criteria pollutant, classified as class A polluters, have to comply with best
available control technology control standard, a weaker standard than the LAER. New small
facilities in attainment counties are exempt from the regulation.
In summary, new and existing facilities are each exposed to more stringent regulations in
nonattainment counties relative to attainment ones, while new small facilities in attainment
counties are exempt from the regulation. Additionally, non-polluters are free from the regula-
tion in both sets of counties.
3.3.2 Regulation Variation
County nonattainment designation is adopted as a proxy for a facility’s exposure to stringent
environmental regulation. There exist three sources of variations, in which facilities are affected
by the nonattainment designation. First, the regulation is pollutant-specific and only applies
to polluting facilities located in nonattainment counties. The comparison across facilities but
within the same industry removes industry-specific shock, hence identifies the regulation effect
from the shock. Second, every year, each county’s attainment/nonattainment designations
are reclassified. Consequently, the variation of an individual facility’s exposure to regulation is
traceable over time. The comparison within a facility across the attainment and nonattainment
regimes ensures that firm-specific factors (e.g., heterogeneous productivity) do not drive the
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results. However, the facility fixed effect cannot be implemented in the econometric estimation
that follows (because such an effect cannot be identified separately from the parameter of an
export indicator, which is time-invariant in the dataset). Third, the exposure to a regulatory
program within nonattainment counties varies across facilities, only those emitting the relevant
pollutant are subject to the regulation. Accounting for the intra-county variations by adding
county by year effects ensures that time-varying factors common to all facilities within a county
are not confounded with the effects of regulation.
3.4 Data
We compiled the unique detailed facility-level emission data on criteria air pollutants and
facility characteristics in the U.S. manufacturing industry in years 2002 and 2005. This section
describes data sources and how we match the data from two different facility-level databases.
3.4.1 Data Sources
A facility is a place where economic activities resulting in air emissions occur. In general,
facility emission data come from the NEI of the U.S. EPA, and facility economic characteristics
are taken from the NETS Database. These two databases are matched through the DUNS
number assigned by Dun and Bradstreet to identify unique business establishments. The regu-
latory attainment/nonattainment county status information is obtained from the Green Book
Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants reported by the EPA.6 A list of variables and data
sources used in the paper is summarized in Table C.3 in the Appendix.
For each criteria air pollutant we track, the Green Book indicates whether only part of a
county or the whole county is in nonattainment. We assign a county to the nonattainment
category for each of four criteria pollutants, i.e., CO, SO2, O3,7 and TSPs,8 if the entire county
6For detailed information, see http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/greenbk/index.html.
7The formation of ground-level ozone is a complicated chemical process that involves volatile organic com-
pounds (VOCs) and oxide of nitrogen (NOx) when these two react in the presence of sunlight. There are separate
standards for nitrogen dioxide, 1-hour ozone, and 8-hour ozone. We classify a county as nonattainment for ozone
if it is in nonattainment for nitrogen dioxide or ozone including both 1-hour and 8-hour standards. Therefore,
the pollution of VOCs and NOx is associated with this combined O3 nonattainment designation.
8TSPs is defined as the sum of Particulate Matter-10 (PM-10) and Particulate Matter-2.5 (PM-2.5). There
exist separate standards for PM-10 and PM-2.5 (There exists 1997 standard and 2006 standard. Only 2006
standard is effective during the sample period). We classify a county as nonattainment for TSPs if it is in
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or part of the county is designated as nonattainment status.
We now turn to an introduction of two primary facility-level databases. The NETS database,
developed through a joint venture with Dun and Bradstreet by Walls and Associates, is a truly
unique business establishment database covering over 300 fields and 40 million unique estab-
lishments on a national basis for every year since 1990. The data acquired for this study include
number of employee, value of sale, export indicator, DUNS number, geographic location (i.e.,
latitude and longitude), five-digit zip code, and five-digit Federal Information Processing Stan-
dard (FIPS) county code.
The EPA’s NEI database contains information about facilities that emit criteria air pollu-
tants for all areas of the United States.9 It releases an updated version of the NEI database
every three years since 2002. The facility-level emission data in the NEI database acquired
for this empirical study includes emissions of six criteria air pollutants: i.e., SO2, CO, VOCs,
NOx, TSPs, and NH3, in years 2002 and 2005.10
3.4.2 Data Matching
The data matching work consists of two main procedures. First, we retrieve DUNS numbers
for polluting facilities in the NEI database from the Facility Registry System (FRS) of the
EPA. Second, we match them with those appearing in the NETS database through the DUNS
number.
The NEI database assigns each polluting facility a unique NEI site ID, which we use to
retrieve facility geographic information and facility registry ID from the FRS of the EPA.
The FRS is a centrally-managed database that identifies facilities, sites, or places subject to
environmental regulations or of environmental interests. Facility geographic information and
DUNS numbers are obtained from the FRS through two different channels. Specifically, EZ
nonattainment for at least one of these standards.
9For a detailed discussion on the facility-level NEI database, please see the Appendix.
10The EPA has been collecting facility-level criteria air emissions since 1990. It has emission reports for years
1990, 1996 through 2002, and 2005. Because of changes in EPA emission inventory procedures, emissions for
1999 and later years may not be directly comparable with prior years, especially with regard to particulate
matter emissions. Some facility IDs and names changed in the 1999 data, so it may not be possible to identify
unambiguously the corresponding 1999 data and data in years prior to 1999 for some facilities. In addition,
facility IDs are not uniquely assigned and not well organized in years 1999 through 2002, therefore making the
facility data matching work across years less promising.
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Query in the FRS provides data download options for a customized list of facilities, which are
associated with the NEI program.11 The data obtained from the EZ Query include: facility
registry ID uniquely assigned by the FRS, NEI site ID assigned by the NEI, FIPS county code,
zip code, latitude, longitude, and four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code.12 For
each polluting facility in the NEI database, we obtain two different IDs assigned uniquely by
each source, i.e., the facility NEI ID and facility registry ID. With the facility registry ID,
facility DUNS numbers are retrieved separately through Facility Registry System Query.13 In
the end, the facility-level emission dataset we compiled contains criteria air emissions, facility
name, FIPS county code, zip code, geographic location (i.e., latitude and longitude), SIC code,
facility NEI ID, facility registry ID, and DUNS number.
In the next step, we match polluting facilities in the NEI database with those that appear in
the NETS Database through the DUNS number. The EPA does not provide further information
about how DUNS numbers are reported for polluting facilities and why some of them have
missing DUNS numbers in the dataset.14 A pair of facilities from each source is considered as
a match if the following series of criteria are satisfied. They share the same DUNS number and
are located in the same area in terms of five-digit zip code and five-digit FIPS county code.15
More importantly, for each pair, we compare their facility names from each source to ensure
the match.
In the matched dataset, we count the number of facilities with the missing values and zeros
for emission estimates by pollutant and year. For each pollutant, the number of polluting
facilities with zero emissions drops dramatically from year 2002 to year 2005, while the number
of polluting facilities with the missing estimates increases accordingly. This pattern still exists in
the original facility-level NEI database prior to matching. We drop those polluting facilities with
either zeros or the missing values of emission estimates because of incapable of distinguishing
11For EZ Query, see http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/fii/ez.html.
12Given the NEI site ID contained in the FRS, we are able to match all polluting facility in the NEI database
with those in the FRS through the NEI site ID.
13For Facility Registry System Query, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/fii/fii_query_java.html.
14Due to an incomplete report on DUNS numbers in the FRS, approximately 80 percent of polluting facilities
in the manufacturing industry collected in the NEI database have associated DUNS numbers.
15In the NEI database, a small fraction of polluting facilities does not report a complete five-digit zip code.
In that case, we will only match their FIPS county codes.
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non-emitting facilities from emitting ones.
Finally, this matching procedure narrows down our dataset to 15,604 polluting facilities in
year 2002 and 15,006 polluting facilities in year 2005, all in the U.S. manufacturing industry
as determined by having a four-digit SIC code between 2000 and 4000. That is roughly half
of polluting facilities with DUNS numbers in the manufacturing industry reported in the NEI
database.
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
The merged dataset in this study consists of an unbalanced panel of polluting facilities
in years 2002 and 2005. The analysis uses 30,610 facility-by-year observations from 17,594
facilities located among 2,025 U.S. counties. There are 13,016 facilities surviving throughout
the study period. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on a number of variables. It is worth to
note that each facility emits at least one pollutant, but not all facilities have emissions reports
for all five criteria air pollutants. In many cases, facilities only have estimates for one pollutant
in the NEI database. In addition, the dataset contains some observations with extremely low
emissions, which are dropped in the two-stage estimation. As listed at the bottom of Table 3.1,
these outliers only account for a small fraction of total relevant observations.16
Table 3.2 summarizes the differences between exporters and non-exporters across facility
characteristics. Exporters are larger than non-exporters in terms of sale and number of em-
ployee. This result is in line with the growing empirical trade literature on heterogeneous firms.
When it comes to the environmental performance, exporters emit more SO2 and TSPs, but less
CO, O3, and NH3 than non-exporters. Pollution intensity, measured by emissions per value of
sales (tons per thousand dollars), is lower for exporters relative to non-exporters for all criteria
air pollutants. As shown in column 4 of Table 3.2, simple two-group mean-comparison tests
(T-test) do not present any significant mean differences in the pollution intensity across export
status. The differences are persistent for sample years 2002 and 2005 separately.
Figures C.1-C.5 in the Appendix present a series of U.S. maps indicating geographic loca-
16For each pollutant, a fraction of observations with annual emissions less than 0.001 tons are listed as follows:
i.e., 6.55 percent for SO2, 0.45 percent for CO, 0.15 percent for O3, 1.01 percent for TSPs, and 3.79 percent for
NH3.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales (thousand $) 30,610 23387.0 41257.5 8 3,130,369
Employees 30,610 147.0 179.5 1 998
NH3 (tons) 6,998 10.9 92.2 0.001 3,280.3
SO2 (tons) 14,823 128.3 1319.3 0.001 96,822.7
CO (tons) 17,803 133.8 1386.3 0.001 56,727.5
O3 (tons) 27,421 95.6 460.1 0.001 20,592.5
TSPs (tons) 22,405 63.3 475.4 0.001 36,211.4
Export Indicator 30,610 0.24 0.43 0 1
Any NA 30,610 0.50 0.50 0 1
SO2 NA 30,610 0.01 0.08 0 1
CO NA 30,610 0.08 0.27 0 1
O3 NA 30,610 0.48 0.50 0 1
TSPs NA 30,610 0.23 0.42 0 1
Note: NA stands for Nonattainment.
tions of polluting exporters and non-exporters on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis.17 The pink
points indicate polluting non-exporters, the light green points refer to polluting exporters, and
the yellow areas represent pollutant-specific nonattainment counties. According to the Green
Book reported by the EPA, in year 2002, only a small number of the total 3,143 U.S. counties
are designated as nonattainment: 21 counties in SO2 nonattainment, 19 counties in CO nonat-
tainment, 251 counties in O3 nonattainment, and 64 counties in TSPs nonattainment. In year
2005, the number of counties with SO2 or CO nonattainment designations declines to 12 and
11, respectively, while the number of counties with O3 or TSPs nonattainment status increases
drastically to 431 and 259, respectively. Most of nonattainment counties, shown in Table 3.3,
are covered in our merged dataset. Additionally, the EPA has not regulated NH3 emissions
under the CAAA. However, industries heavily emitting the other four criteria air pollutants
are usually also dirty polluters of NH3, as shown in Table C.2 in the Appendix (e.g., Industrial
Organic Chemicals with three-digit SIC codes 286, 287, and 289).18 To capture NH3 polluters’
17Polluting facilities located in the State of Alaska and State of Hawaii are not shown in the figures, but do
exist in the merged dataset.
18As reported in Table C.2 in Appendix, shares of total emissions from these three industries to aggregate
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Table 3.2: Exporter and Non-Exporter Differences
Year 2002 and 2005
Exporter Non-Exporter Mean T-Stat
Mean Mean Difference
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales (thousand $) 31291.6 20910.6 10381.0 18.87∗∗∗
Employees 194.9 132.0 62.9 26.44∗∗∗
NH3(tons) 10.8 10.94 -0.141 -0.06
SO2(tons) 136.5 125.5 10.9 0.45
CO (tons) 122.8 137.4 -14.7 -0.61
O3 (tons) 95.2 95.7 -0.5 -0.07
TSPs (tons) 66.7 62.2 4.5 0.60
NH3 per sale 0.001 0.004 -0.004 -1.13
SO2 per sale 0.010 0.067 -0.057 -1.63
CO per sale 0.019 0.075 -0.056 -1.22
O3 per sale 0.023 0.038 -0.015 -1.43
TSPs per sale 0.016 0.022 -0.006 -0.76
Note: ∗∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ significant at the 5
percent level, ∗ significant at the 10 percent level.
exposure to additional environmental compliance costs, a NH3 polluter is considered regulated
if it resides in a county which is nonattainment for at least one criteria air pollutant. This
regulation indicator, denoted as any nonattainment throughout the paper, equals one if the
county is designated as nonattainment status for one or more criteria air pollutants, and equals
zero otherwise.19
Table 3.4 summarizes the number of polluting facilities across the exporting status and
pollutant-specific county status for each criteria air pollutant. The first two rows of the table
present the number of NH3 polluting facilities across any nonattainment/attainment designa-
tion and export status, while the remaining rows report the number of other polluting exporters
and non-exporters. For example, there are 941 NH3 polluting exporters located in counties,
which are designated for at least one criteria air pollutants. There are 152 SO2 polluters
residing in the SO2-specific nonattainment counties in the sample period.
emissions from the entire manufacturing sector are: 14.7 percent for SO2, 10.3 percent for CO, 8.6 percent for
VOC, 13.7 percent for NOx, 7.6 percent for TSPs, and 38.1 percent for NH3.
19The indicator of any nonattainment was first defined by Greenstone, List, and Syverson (2011). They
adopted this regulation indicator to estimate the impact of nonattainment designations on productivity.
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Table 3.3: Number of Nonattainment Counties
SO2 CO O3 TSPs
number of counties in nonattainment status
2002 21 19 251 64
2005 12 11 431 259
number of counties in nonattainment status covered in the dataset
2002 17 18 231 52
2005 9 11 402 219
Source: The Green Book Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollu-
tants reported by the EPA.
Several key patterns arise from both Table 3.4 and the location figures. First, around
half of NH3 emitters are located in any nonattainment counties, and the number of these
emitters increases substantially from year 2002 to year 2005. Such drastic changes are likely
driven by the substantial increases in the number of O3 and TSPs nonattainment counties
during the study period. Second, only a very small fraction of SO2 emitters are subject to
extra environmental compliance costs associated with the SO2-specific pollution abatement
activities. Similarly, a small number of CO emitters are located in counties, which are in CO
nonattainment, and roughly one-tenth of exporting CO emitters reside in CO nonattainment
counties during the study period. Finally, a substantial fraction of O3 and TSPs polluters,
however, are located in the relevant pollutant-specific nonattainment counties, and are thus
exposed to the corresponding regulation requiring considerable efforts in abating the pollution.
Table 3.5 summarizes the variation in nonattainment designations across counties between
years 2002 and 2005. It is a Markov transition matrix of counties’ lagged and current nonat-
tainment status by pollutant. The number in the table is the probability of going from one
status to the other. For example, 89.07 percent of any pollutant attainment counties in 2002
still remain attainment in 2005. While the rest 10.93 percent fall into attainment in 2005. For
any pollutant nonattainment designations, counties fall into nonattainment and come back into
attainment at roughly the same rates. Looking at specific pollutants, counties with either CO
or SO2 attainment status in 2002 still retain that attainment status in 2005, while roughly 40
percent of counties with CO or SO2 nonattainment status in 2002 are reclassified as attainment
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Table 3.4: Number of Polluting Facilities
Year 2002 and 2005 Year 2002 Year 2005
Exporter Non-Exporter Exporter Non-Exporter Exporter Non-Exporter
Any Nonattainment 941 2,569 350 868 591 1,701
Any Attainment 902 2,586 523 1,513 379 1,073
SO2 Nonattainment 32 120 27 98 5 22
SO2 Attainment 3,694 10,977 1,875 5,658 1,819 5,319
CO Nonattainment 290 1,193 147 609 143 584
CO Attainment 4,199 12,121 2,145 6,229 2,054 5,892
O3 Nonattainment 3,293 10,173 1,473 4,511 1,820 5,662
O3 Attainment 3,512 10,443 2,002 6,061 1,510 4,382
TSPs Nonattainment 1,200 3,882 370 1,283 830 2,599
TSPs Attainment 4,210 13,113 2,366 7,315 1,844 5,798
Note: The indicator of any nonattainment is defined as a county-level dummy which equals one if
the county is designated as nonattainment status for at least one criteria air pollutant, and zero
otherwise. The first two rows report the number of NH3 polluters.
in 2005. Changes in attainment status are similar for TSPs and O3. Around 10 percent of
counties change their status from one to the other. It is worth mentioning that theses varia-
tions only reflect counties covered in the merged dataset and but not the annual status changes
through years 2002 to 2005.
3.5 Empirics
In this section, we would like to test the two main predictions derived from the theoretical
model: first, whether productivity is inversely related to emission intensity; second, whether
there exists a negative correlation between export status and emission intensity. We begin
by estimating the facility productivity as a residual of the production function. Given the
estimated facility productivity, we then employ a two-stage estimation procedure on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis. The first stage estimates the probability of selecting to export conditional
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Table 3.5: Changes in Attainment Status between Years 2002 and 2005
Any NA
Status in 2005
Attainment Nonattainment
Status in 2002 Attainment 89.07 10.93Nonattainment 8.66 91.34
SO2 NA
Status in 2005
Attainment Nonattainment
Status in 2002 Attainment 100.00 0.00Nonattainment 43.75 56.25
CO NA
Status in 2005
Attainment Nonattainment
Status in 2002 Attainment 100.00 0.00Nonattainment 38.89 61.11
O3 NA
Status in 2005
Attainment Nonattainment
Status in 2002 Attainment 89.99 10.01Nonattainment 8.12 91.88
TSPs NA
Status in 2005
Attainment Nonattainment
Status in 2002 Attainment 91.63 8.37Nonattainment 15.09 84.91
Note: NA stands for Nonattainment. Changes in county nonattainment
status only reflect counties covered in the dataset.
on facility productivity and measures of trade variable costs. The second stage investigates
the impact of predicted exporting probability on emission intensity controlling for facility and
industry characteristics.
3.5.1 Productivity Measures
The productivity estimate is measured by TFP, which is calculated as a production function
residual. The production function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form with two inputs:
capital and labor. Pollution byproducts are omitted in measuring productivity. All facilities
within the same industry share the same structure of production technology in terms of identical
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input cost shares, but they differ in heterogeneous firm-specific productivity. Facilities across
industries display differences in both input cost shares and productivity. A facility i with
productivity ϕi in industry j at time t has the following production technology:
qijt = ϕi(lijt)αj (kijt)βj (3.20)
where lijt and kijt are labor and capital inputs, respectively. qijt represents output, and ϕi
indexes the facility-specific productivity. αj and βj denote the input cost shares of labor
and capital, respectively. The input cost shares also reflect the technology variation across
industries.
The facility-level capital or investment data are not provided in the merged dataset. To
implement the TFP estimation, we assume that the input price ratio is the same within industry
but differs across industries. Given the iso-elastic residual demand curves, each facility with
a heterogeneous productivity parameter ϕi in industry j chooses the profit-maximizing labor
and capital inputs facing the common wage rate (wj) and capital rent (rj). Consequently, the
optimal input ratio of capital to labor is proportional to the ratio of capital rent to wage rate,
that is kijt/lijt ∝ rj/wj . Assuming cost minimization, the production function can be rewritten
as:
qijt ∝ ϕi
(
wj
rj
)βj
(lijt)αj+βj (3.21)
With the assumption of the input price equalization within the same industry, we use three-
digit SIC industry dummies to proxy the input price ratio, wj/rj . The estimation is conducted
by first taking the logarithm of the above production function (3.21), and is then carried out
with the following specification:
log(qijt) = Constant + (αj + βj)log(lijt) +
∑
j
βjSICj + Residualijt (3.22)
where qijt denotes output measured by values of sales and lijt is measured by numbers of
employees. SICj indexes a set of three-digit SIC dummies, which equals one if the facility
belongs to industry j. Residualijt is an error term containing the unobserved heterogeneous
productivity ϕi and other possible explanatory factors, which are not covered in the regression.
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Finally, given the estimated coefficients of (αˆj + βˆj) and βˆj from the above specification
(3.22), we recover the (exogenous) heterogeneous productivity ϕi of facility i in industry j at
time t as follows:
log(ϕˆit) ≡ ̂Residualijt = log(qijt)− ( ̂Constant)− (αˆj + βˆj)log(lijt)−∑
j
βˆjSICj (3.23)
where log(ϕˆit) is the estimated facility TFP.
3.5.2 Two-Stage Estimation
To estimate the impact of exporting status on emission intensity, an endogeneity problem
regarding the export indicator arises. According to the theoretical model aforementioned, the
exporting status is endogenous, depending upon trade variable costs, environmental compliance
costs, and other cost parameters. Aiming at correcting for the endogeneity, we look for proxies
of trade variable costs serving as instrument variables for the export dummy. Two proxies em-
ployed in the study are facility-specific and industry-specific trade variable costs. The former
is measured by the geographical distance of each polluting facilities to its nearest U.S. port,
and the latter is measured by the ad valorem freight rate at the four-digit SIC industry level.20
The geographic distance reflects the costs associated with transportation of goods from manu-
facturing sites to the port of shipment. The freight rate, constructed by Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (2006), is the markup of the Cost-Insurance-Freight (CIF) value over the Free-on-Board
(FOB) value relative to the FOB. This industry-specific freight rate only serves as a proxy of
the iceberg trade costs associated with ocean or inland waterway transport of the goods to the
port of destination. These two measures together are considered as proxies of trade variable
costs. Given that facilities have made their location decisions prior to the sample year 2002,
these geographic variable and product freight rate are exogenous yet highly correlated with
export decisions, thus making valid instrumental variables.
With the estimated TFP as a measure of heterogeneous productivity, for each pollutant,
we employ a two-stage estimation to investigate the impact of exporting status on emission
intensity. Using a logit model, the first stage estimates the probability of selecting to export
20According to IHS Global Services, U.S. seaborne trade with the rest of the world accounts for 78.05% by
volume (millions of metric tons), and 48.47% by value of total U.S. trade (billions of dollars) in year 2008.
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conditional on the estimated facility TFP, two measures of trade variable costs, and exposure
to environmental regulations controlling for industry characteristics. The first-stage logistic
regression is specified as follows:
Pr(Expi = 1) =F (γ1st0 + γ1st1 Distancei + γ1st2 Freightjt + γ1st3 Prodit (3.24)
+ γ1st4 Sizeit + γ1st5 Regcpt + θj + λt + εijt)
where i indexes a facility, j indicates an industry, c denotes a county, p refers to a pollutant,
and t references a year. θj is an industry-specific coefficient that control for the variations
of production and pollution abatement technologies across three-digit SIC industry. λt is a
year-specific coefficient, and εijt is the stochastic error term. F (·) indexes a logistic function.
Expi is a time-invariant export indicator that equals one if the facility exports and zero
otherwise. Prodit denotes facility productivity measured as the TFP residual estimated in
equation (3.23). The estimated TFP is in a logarithmic fashion in the regression. We also
include a measure of facility size, denoted by Sizeit, by the number of employees, as this has
been found to influence facility decisions of becoming exporters (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott,
2006).21
Distancei denotes the distance of a polluting facility to its nearest U.S. port.22 The World
Port Source online database provides geographic locations (i.e., latitude and longitude) of a
total of 548 U.S. ports including harbor, river port, seaport, off-shore terminal, and pier, jetty
or wharf.23 For each polluting facility, we compute its distance to all 548 U.S. ports based on
the ”Haversine” formula, given the latitude and longitude of two points,24 then pick the shortest
distance as the distance to the nearest port. Freightjt indexes the freight rate at four-digit SIC
industry level. The industry-level data on CIF and FOB are acquired from the online data
source of U.S. Manufacturing Exports and Imports compiled by Peter Schott.
Regcpt is a county-level indicator of nonattainment status, measuring a facility’s environ-
21In the regression, the size variable is converted to number of thousand employees.
22In the regression, the distance variable is converted to thousand miles.
23The locations of a total of 548 U.S. ports, which are denoted as blue triangles, are shown in Figures C.1-
C.5 in the Appendix. For detailed information, please refer to the website http://www.worldportsource.com/
states.php.
24The ”Haversine” formula calculates the great-circle distance between two points, that is, the shortest distance
over the earth’s surface.
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mental regulatory pressure. The construction of Regcpt varies with types of polluting facilities
examined in the first-stage specification. For each pollutant p, it equals one if the facility emits
that pollutant and is located in the pollutant p-specific nonattainment county at time t, and
zero otherwise. p belongs to the set of four criteria air pollutants {SO2,CO,O3,TSPs}. When
NH3 polluters are of interest, we adopt an indicator of any pollutant nonattainment defined
earlier to proxy NH3 polluters’ exposure to environmental compliance costs.
The main interest of this paper is to capture the relationship between exporting status
and emission intensity. With the likelihood of selecting to export predicted after the first-stage
estimation, denoted by ̂Pr(Expit), we then turn into the second-stage estimation. In the second
stage, an OLS regression is employed to explore the impact of the predicted exporting likelihood
on emission intensity conditional on facility-level productivity and industry characteristics. The
regression is given by:
Eipt = γ2nd0 + γ2nd1 ̂Pr(Expit) + γ2nd2 Prodit + γ2nd3 Regcpt + θj + λt + εijt (3.25)
where Eipt is the facility’s emission intensity measured by emissions per value of sales (tons per
thousand dollars). The dependent variable is implemented in a logarithmic fashion. To test the
model pollutant-by-pollutant, the emission intensity is computed for each criteria air pollutant.
This pollutant-specific regression examines the relationship between exporting likelihood and
emission intensity among facilities emitting the same pollutant and within the same industry,
which is captured by the main parameter of interest γ2nd1 .
Another interest of this paper lies in γ2nd2 , the coefficient of the estimated facility produc-
tivity that indicates whether facility productivity is inversely related to emission intensity as
predicted by the productivity effect in the theoretical model. Moreover, it has a clear economic
interpretation, i.e., the estimated coefficient reflects the elasticity of emission intensity with
respect to productivity.
3.5.3 Results
We start with presenting the empirical results including the estimated TFP measures. Using
the data on 30,610 facility-by-year observations from 17,594 facilities, we obtain the following
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estimation based on the specification in (3.22):
log( ̂sales) = 11.767+ 1.027 log(employees), R2 = 0.89
(0.363) (0.003)
where the quantities in parenthesis are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The coef-
ficient estimates of SIC dummies are omitted to save space. The F -statistic of F (134, 30475) =
1868.73 shows a statistical joint significance. The estimate of log(employees) is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that an one percent increase in the number of
employees leads to 1.027 percent increase in the value of sales.
Table 3.6 presents the results of the first-stage estimation in equation (3.24) on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis. The columns correspond to various pollutants. The sample size of polluting
facilities varies with pollutant type.25 All columns include a set of three-digit SIC dummies
and a year dummy as noted at the bottom of the table. The standard errors are robust.26 The
regulatory variable Regcpt in column 1 captures the impact of any nonattainment regulation
on NH3 emission intensity, while in the remaining columns it reflects the impact of a pollutant-
specific nonattainment designation on the relevant polluting facilities.
The empirical findings concerning the decisions to export are in favor of our theoretical
model. First of all, as expected, an estimated coefficient of distance to port is negative, and
significant at the 1 percent level for four criteria air pollutants, i.e., O3, SO2, CO, and TSPs,
and at the 5 percent level for NH3. These negative location effects suggest that facilities residing
closer to ports have lower costs associated with transporting the goods from manufacturing sites
to the ports of shipment, and thus appear to be more likely to engage in the export market.
When it comes to the impact of freight rates on the export decisions, facilities in industries with
lower freights rates tend to be more likely to export for NH3 emitters as shown by a negative
and significant coefficient of γ1st2 in column 1. However, the impact of industry freight rates is
not statistically significant and changes sign in column 4, suggesting that the selection effect is
not more pronounced for the remaining pollutants than for NH3.
25The number of observations drops as compared with the number in Table 3.1, since Peter Schott’s online
data source does not provide data for all four-digit SIC industries.
26Alternative specifications of standard errors (i.e., cluster at industry level, county level, or facility level) are
considered but not reported in the paper. These specifications do not alter the estimates in any significant ways.
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Table 3.6: First-Stage Estimation: Export Status
XXXXXXXXXXXXVariable
Pollutant NH3 SO2 CO O3 TSPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance to Port -0.672∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -0.618∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.197) (0.178) (0.123) (0.150)
Freight Rate -2.981∗∗ -0.927 -0.979 0.721 -0.199
(1.332) (0.989) (0.922) (0.824) (0.878)
Productivity 0.184∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.042) (0.039) (0.032) (0.035)
Size 1.228∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.111) (0.101) (0.087) (0.095)
Any NA 0.023
(0.069)
SO2 NA -0.092
(0.232)
CO NA -0.249∗∗∗
(0.082)
O3 NA -0.030
(0.035)
TSPs NA -0.033
(0.046)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,744 12,520 14,844 22,595 18,696
R2 0.093 0.099 0.096 0.086 0.105
Note: the dependent variable is a binary export decision. All regressions include a set
of three-digit SIC dummies and a year dummy. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. NA stands for Nonattainment. Coefficients for the regression constant and
variables of industry and year dummies are suppressed. ∗∗∗ significant at the 1 percent
level, ∗∗ significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ significant at the 10 percent level.
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Second, a positive coefficient of productivity indicates that the higher productivity a facility
is, the more likely it is to engage in the export market. The positive productivity effect
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all five pollutants. In addition, we find
evidence that the larger the size of a facility, the higher the probability of selecting to export is,
as documented by positive and statistically significant coefficients on the size variable. These
two empirical findings also match results from a substantial body of empirical research on
export decisions (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006, etc).
Last but not least, we find a negative and statistically significant impact of CO nonattain-
ment designation. This evidence suggests that CO polluters subject to strict regulatory controls
might have additional environmental burdens, are thus less likely to export than those exempt
from environmental charges associated with CO emissions. However, there is no evidence
supporting that the remaining pollutant-specific nonattainment designations have regulatory
influences on the export decisions.
Table 3.7 reports the second-stage estimation results based on the specification in equation
(3.25). Columns in the table correspond to various pollutants of interest. All regressions
incorporate industry and year fixed effects as noted at the bottom of the table. The robust
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
The estimated effect of nonattainment designations on pollution intensity is negative and
significant at the 1 percent level for all pollutants in the paper except for SO2 nonattain-
ment designation. These negative impacts of pollutant-specific designations suggest that strict
regulatory controls have beneficial effects on reducing emission intensity. The estimated co-
efficients show that polluters located in nonattainment counties have approximately from 22
percent (NH3) to overwhelmingly 77 percent (CO) less pollution intensity than those in at-
tainment areas. There is some evidence that any nonattainment regulations contribute to the
clean-up of NH3 emission intensity. It is plausible that as enforced by the pollutant-specific
nonattainment regulations, abating criteria air pollutants other than NH3 may share pollution
abatement technologies, therefore having unintentionally beneficial consequences on curbing
NH3 emission intensity. Surprisingly, a positive and significant SO2 regulatory impact suggests
that SO2 emitters located in the pollutant-specific nonattainment counties pollute roughly 66
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Table 3.7: Second-Stage Estimation: Emission Intensity
XXXXXXXXXXXXVariable
Pollutant NH3 SO2 CO O3 TSPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Export Status -12.290∗∗∗ -9.744∗∗∗ -7.061∗∗∗ -8.303∗∗∗ -8.429∗∗∗
(0.635) (0.675) (0.461) (0.296) (0.419)
Productivity -0.521∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.625∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.056) (0.040) (0.027) (0.038)
Any NA -0.252∗∗∗
(0.070)
SO2 NA 0.509∗
(0.301)
CO NA -1.465∗∗∗
(0.077)
O3 NA -0.872∗∗∗
(0.028)
TSPs NA -0.585∗∗∗
(0.046)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,744 12,520 14,844 22,595 18,696
R2 0.303 0.413 0.390 0.286 0.396
Note: the dependent variable is log of emissions per value of sales (tons per thousand dollars).
”Export Status” is the estimated likelihood of selecting to export. ”Productivity” is the esti-
mated facility TFP. All regressions include a set of three-digit SIC dummies and year dummy.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. NA stands for Nonattainment. Coeffi-
cients for the regression constant and variables of industry and year dummies are suppressed.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗ significant at the 5 percent level, ∗ significant at the
10 percent level.
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percent more SO2 per unit sales than those free from the regulation. This finding should be
interpreted with caution, since the merged dataset contains insufficient observations of SO2
polluters located in SO2-specific nonattainment counties.27
Of greater interest is the relationship between productivity and emission intensity. The esti-
mated coefficient on the productivity is negative and highly significant at the 1 percent level for
all pollutants, confirming the theoretical prediction that productivity is inversely related to the
emission intensity. The estimated elasticity of emission intensity with respect to productivity,
reflected by γ2nd2 , ranges from -0.52 to -0.80, depending upon the pollutant type. Among all
pollutants reported in the paper, SO2 has the highest elasticity, suggesting that an one percent
increase in productivity of SO2 polluters leads to approximately 0.80 percent decrease in SO2
emissions per value of sales.
The central interest of this paper is γ2nd1 , the coefficient on the predicted likelihood of
selecting to export. The estimates consistently show negative correlations between the predicted
export likelihood and emission intensity for all five criteria air pollutants. These negative
impacts are highly significant at the 1 percent level. The empirical findings are in line with
the aforementioned theoretical prediction that exporting status is negatively correlated with
emission intensity. Facilities with a high probability of selecting to the export market tend to
be more environmentally friendly than than those with a relatively low exporting probability
in terms of lower emission intensity.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, a model is proposed to provide the theoretical guide for the empirical investi-
gation on the differences between exporters and non-exporters in the environmental dimension.
A productive firm is more likely to export and upgrade the emission-saving clean technology
than a less productive firm. The analytic expression of relative emissions per output across
exporting status predicts two negative correlations: one is between productivity and emissions
27A small number of U.S. counties are in SO2 nonattainment status in the study period (21 counties in 2002,
12 counties in 2005), and only a very small fraction of SO2 polluting facilities residing in these nonattainment
counties are covered in the merged dataset (131 out of 8,184 in year 2002, 27 out of 7,714 in year 2005) as shown
in Table 3.4.
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per output, and the other is between export status and emissions per output.
The evidence provided in the paper supports the theoretical predictions. Using a two-
stage estimation, we find robust evidence of a negative correlation between the estimated
facility productivity and emissions per value of sales. The negative impact of productivity is
statistically significant for each criteria air pollutant we track. More importantly, we find that
facilities with high probability of selecting to export tend to emit less emissions per value of
sales than their competing non-exporters within the same industry conditional on estimated
TFP and exposure to the CAAA. Additionally, the paper provides evidence of negative impacts
of pollutant-specific nonattainment designations on the relevant polluters in the case of CO,
O3, and TSPs regulations.
These empirical results, coupled with a substantial body of identified findings on the growth
of productivity due to engaging in the export market (Benard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006,
Loecker, 2007), shed some light on policy implications. The environmental advantage of ex-
porters could be cited as an argument for active export promotion. Policies oriented to facilitate
access to foreign markets would contribute to reducing emissions per output, and might be able
to clean up the aggregate emissions by driving the least efficient firms out of the market. Alter-
natively, policy makers should be aware of unintentionally negative environmental consequences
of policies, which are aimed at protecting the least productive local polluters.
101
APPENDIX A. WELFARE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE BIOFUEL
AND ENERGY POLICIES
Sensitivity Analysis
Tables A.1 to A.9 provide a few more details on the sensitivity analysis carried out. In these
tables we concentrate on the main four scenarios discussed in the text: the first best solution
with border policies and the carbon tax; the second best solution without border policies but
where the fuel tax and the ethanol subsidy are optimally chosen; the case when the only active
policy instrument is an ethanol subsidy; and the case in which the active policy instrument is
the ethanol mandate. For each case only one parameter at a time is changed from the set of
baseline values, and for each of these tables we report the results of the baseline parameters
(middle column) along with the lower and upper ends of the parameter ranges postulated (as
reported in Table 1.7).
The elasticity of the foreign oil export supply ε¯o plays a predictable, but crucial, role.
Naturally, the optimal oil import tariff varies inversely with this elasticity. The second best
policy with the optimal fuel tax and ethanol subsidy also varies inversely with this parameter’s
values. But note that even a fairly elastic supply of foreign oil (ε¯o = 5.0) provides scope
for a fairly large fuel tax and ethanol subsidy ($0.69/gallon and $0.77/gallon, respectively),
and the second best solution still achieves over 83% of the gain achievable with the first best
policy. Perhaps the most noticeable effect is that, as the export supply elasticity increases,
the relative performance of the ethanol-only policy (compared to the first and second best)
improves, because the higher foreign supply elasticity means that the gains obtained from
taxing foreign oil become less important.
Altering the elasticity of foreign corn import demand η¯c over the range considered has
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predictable results. Hardly surprising, the first best corn export tariff varies inversely with this
elasticity, but the impact on the optimal oil tariff is minimal (and the first best carbon tax
is unaffected). The most notable result, perhaps, is that the second best instruments do not
perform as well, in a relative sense, when the foreign corn demand is very inelastic. This is
not a surprise because, whereas the fuel tax does a good job of approximating an import tariff
(given the low domestic oil supply elasticity), the ethanol subsidy-or mandate-is not a very
good substitute for the corn export tariff. Thus, when foreign corn demand is inelastic, the
second best policies, and ethanol policies alone, are not as effective. Still, ethanol policies are
useful, and in the case when fuel taxes are not endogenous, the optimal mandate can exceed
18 billion bushels.
Varying the elasticity of domestic demand for fuel and petroleum byproducts, ηf and ηh
does not have very dramatic results. As one would expect, the oil import tariff, or, in the case
of the second best, the fuel tax, is (marginally) higher when fuel demand is inelastic. Also,
given the fuel tax, the optimal ethanol subsidy, or ethanol mandate, is higher when domestic
fuel demand is inelastic. The basic result that the fuel tax/ethanol subsidy regime is a close
substitute for first best policy still holds.
When the cost of CO2 is reduced to $5/tCO2, the first best gasoline tax is only 6c per
gallon, and the relative attractiveness of ethanol because of its lower pollution emissions is
negligible. Nevertheless, the first best policies - which include a very modest ethanol subsidy
- not only deliver significant welfare gains compared to the status quo, but they also result
in sharp increases in ethanol production and-despite a $1.21/bushel tax on corn exports-an
increase in the U.S. corn price. This outcome is driven by the $18/barrel oil import tariff,
which drives up domestic fuel prices and increases the competitiveness of ethanol. In the
second best case, the high fuel tax proxies for the oil import tariff and the ethanol subsidy
(the net ethanol subsidy is $0.19/GEEG) partly proxies for a corn export tariff. Because of
these two policies, the second best price of corn is considerably higher than in the first best
situation (though the world price of corn is lower than in the first best case); and the world
price of oil in the second best case is only slightly higher than in the first best case, indicating
that the fuel tax is a much better proxy for an oil import tariff than is the ethanol subsidy for
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a corn export tariff. Finally, given an exogenous fuel tax of $0.39/GEEG, the optimal subsidy
is larger than the status quo level, and thus a binding ethanol mandate can improve upon both
the status quo and an ethanol subsidy. Note that, even without a carbon-pollution rationale
for ethanol mandates, the impact of the mandate on world oil and corn prices is such that
ethanol production under the mandate exceeds the current mandated level for 2015 by about
2.5 billion gallons.
Raising the cost of CO2 to $80/tCO2 has predictable effects on first and second best policies
and outcomes. The first best fuel tax increases to $0.90/gallon - reflecting the costs of emissions
- and due to the assumption that ethanol releases less pollution, a gross subsidy of $0.44/gallon
is part of the first best solution. The higher fuel tax, by itself, would reduce U.S. imports and
this, in turn, means that tariffs will be lower than under the case where the pollution tax was
minimal. Note that in this case the second best policy, while still a good proxy for first best
policies, far outperforms the case in which only ethanol policy is discretionary. Indeed, given
the existing fuel tax, the optimal subsidy - and the welfare outcome - is only slightly above the
status quo level. In this case, the ethanol mandate leads to a considerable improvement over
the ethanol subsidy and to considerably more ethanol output than the subsidy. The reason for
the dominance of the mandate is because the tax on fuel is very low compared to its second
best level ($0.39 versus $1.56), and hence the implicit fuel tax embodied in the mandate is
more important than the implicit ethanol subsidy. One less transparent result, perhaps, is that
ethanol production - under either the optimal subsidy or the optimal mandate - is lower when
pollution costs are high. That is, while more ethanol on the market crowds out some gasoline,
total fuel consumption expands as ethanol production increases, and the efficiency gain of
using ethanol is not sufficient to offset the pollution costs of the expanded fuel consumption.
Thus, the argument for an ethanol mandate is not really because of ethanol’s relative pollution
efficiency, but rather because of both the implicit tax on fuel and also the terms-of-trade effect.
Clearly, then, in the logic of this model, combining an ethanol subsidy with the mandate is
very poor policy.
Variations in the relative efficiency of ethanol in terms of pollution emissions - from λ = 0.5
to λ = 2 - have predictable results in terms of the ethanol subsidy/tax but don’t otherwise
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overturn other patterns with the exception that, in the case when ethanol pollutes more than
gasoline, optimal ethanol mandates lead to more pollution than optimal ethanol subsidies (not
a surprising result). Nevertheless, mandates still deliver higher welfare, and the largest use of
ethanol still occurs under mandates. Despite the significant subsidies to ethanol, status quo
policies - even when ethanol is more polluting - still deliver higher welfare than laissez faire,
and the status quo subsidy is remarkably close to the optimal subsidy, given the fuel tax. The
story remains that the case for ethanol is not largely about pollution, but rather it is about
the policy’s impact on the U.S. gains from trade (through the impact on the terms of trade).
The effects of changing, one at a time, the elasticities of domestic corn demand, of domestic
corn supply and of domestic oil supply are fairly minimal for the variables reported in Tables
A.7-A.9, at least over the range of these parameters that is being considered.
As an additional sensitivity analysis exercise we carried out a Monte Carlo simulation meant
to represent our uncertainty about the model’s true parameters. Specifically, we carried out
our policy calculations a large number of times, each time using a randomly drawn vector of
parameters. The parameters were drawn from independent beta distributions, with the shape
parameters of the beta distribution calibrated with the so-called PERT (Program Evaluation
and Review Technique) methodology (Davis, 2008). More precisely, each beta distribution
has a finite support on [a, b], where the extreme of this interval are the minimal and maximal
parameter values reported in Table 1.7. Given [a, b], the shape parameters of the beta distri-
bution are picked so that the standard deviation satisfies σ2 = (b− a)/6 and the mean is equal
to the baseline value as reported in Table 1.7. The Monte Carlo simulation relied on 100,000
randomly drawn parameter vector. The results from this exercise are summarized in Table
A.10, which reports the 10% and 90% percentile points (as well as the mean) of the resulting
empirical distribution of a number of variables of interest, for the same four scenarios covered
in Tables A.1-A.9. One way to interpret the results of this Monte Carlo experiment is as a
robustness check on the magnitude of the policy tool parameters that we computed in our base-
line. Within this perspective, some of our main conclusions are re-emphasized by the Monte
Carlo simulation. For example, for the first best scenario the critical role of the terms of trade
are reflected in the substantial level of border policies: the optimal oil tariff that we compute
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ranges from $14/barrel to $23.67/barrel, and the optimal corn tariff ranges form $0.93/bushel
to $1.70/bushel. Similarly, for the second best scenario, the fuel tax ranges from $0.75/gallon
to $1.27/gallon, whereas the ethanol subsidy ranges from $0.86/gallon to $1.28/gallon. When
the only active policy instrument is the ethanol subsidy, with the fuel tax held at its current
value of $0.39/gallon, the optimal subsidy range is fairly compact, ranging from $0.60/gallon
to $0.77 gallon. Similarly, if the ethanol mandate is the only active policy instrument, with the
fuel tax held at its current value, the optimal ethanol quantity is shown to range from 15.51 to
20.32 billion gallons.
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Table A.1: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Foreign Oil Export Supply
ε¯0 = 1.0 ε¯o = 3.0 ε¯o = 5.0
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 6.88 6.03 5.77
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1495.21 1508.97 1513.21
Social welfare ($ billion) 753.05 759.47 761.47
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -37.10 -50.87 -55.11
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 13.12 6.70 4.70
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 43.71 17.53 11.21
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 0.95 1.26 1.39
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 18.30 13.94 12.25
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -197.79 -128.70 -100.92
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 40.88 11.48 6.84
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 2.00 0.96 0.69
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 2.01 1.02 0.77
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -208.56 -128.71 -99.34
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 34.72 9.92 5.72
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.96 0.67 0.59
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -6.97 -41.11 -49.91
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 16.90 7.46 4.99
Mandate only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 28.21 17.45 14.70
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -25.05 -54.24 -60.44
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 21.36 8.19 5.28
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.2: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Foreign Corn Import Demand
η¯c = -3.0 η¯c = -1.5 η¯c = -1.0
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 4.87 6.03 6.45
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1506.89 1508.97 1509.73
Social welfare ($ billion) 759.23 759.47 759.56
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -48.78 -50.87 -51.63
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.94 6.70 6.61
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.53 17.53 17.53
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 0.64 1.26 1.89
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 13.90 13.94 13.95
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -126.70 -128.70 -129.43
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 11.14 11.48 11.98
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.96 0.96 0.96
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.96 1.02 1.05
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.00 15.51 15.80
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -127.78 -128.71 -128.80
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 9.97 9.92 9.94
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.61 0.67 0.71
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.59 16.02 16.29
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -40.09 -41.11 -41.68
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.50 7.46 7.48
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 17.01 17.45 17.76
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -51.10 -54.24 -55.64
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.16 8.19 8.27
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
108
Table A.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Fuel Demand
η¯f = -0.9 η¯f = -0.5 η¯f = -0.2
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 6.71 6.03 5.16
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1523.30 1508.97 1490.76
Social welfare ($ billion) 612.87 759.47 1252.60
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -65.19 -50.87 -32.65
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.47 6.70 5.75
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.20 17.53 17.99
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.34 1.26 1.16
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 12.85 13.94 15.43
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -164.79 -128.70 -80.66
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 12.71 11.48 9.91
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.94 0.96 0.98
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 1.01 1.02 1.02
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.55 15.51 16.83
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -163.49 -128.71 -82.07
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 11.10 9.92 8.39
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.62 0.67 0.74
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.05 16.02 17.22
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -52.66 -41.41 -31.68
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.94 7.46 6.98
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.99 17.45 17.96
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -65.72 -54.24 -40.95
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.83 8.19 7.44
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.4: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Petroleum Byproduct Demand
η¯h = -0.9 η¯h = -0.5 η¯h = -0.2
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 5.22 6.03 7.40
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1522.12 1508.97 1486.76
Social welfare ($ billion) 671.89 759.47 1052.28
status quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -64.01 -50.87 -28.65
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.30 6.70 4.09
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.15 17.53 18.25
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.21 1.26 1.36
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.66 13.94 12.60
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -155.51 -128.70 -81.02
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 13.56 11.48 7.96
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.94 0.96 0.98
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.99 1.02 1.06
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.22 15.51 14.16
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -156.84 -128.71 -78.33
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 12.09 9.92 6.21
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.70 0.67 0.61
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.93 16.02 14.38
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -57.36 -41.41 -17.20
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 9.31 7.46 4.46
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 18.60 17.45 15.31
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -75.81 -54.24 -22.33
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 10.25 8.19 4.87
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.5: Sensitivity Analysis: Cost of CO2 Pollution ($/tCO2)
σ′(·) = 5 σ′(·) = 20 σ′(·) = 80
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 6.03 6.03 6.03
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1508.97 1508.97 1508.97
Social welfare ($ billion) 782.10 759.47 668.93
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -50.87 -50.87 -50.81
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 5.94 6.70 9.76
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.06 0.23 0.90
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.03 0.11 0.44
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.97 17.53 15.79
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.21 1.26 1.46
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.62 13.94 11.20
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -104.39 -128.70 -225.94
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 9.74 11.48 22.12
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.81 0.96 1.56
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.94 1.02 1.30
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.14 15.51 12.98
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -104.61 -128.71 -225.12
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.17 9.92 20.53
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Fuel tax Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.69 0.67 0.59
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.51 16.02 14.03
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -40.52 -41.41 -44.98
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.84 7.46 10.05
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 17.46 17.45 17.44
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -54.24 -54.24 -54.24
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.38 8.19 11.45
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.6: Sensitivity Analysis: Ethanol Pollution Efficiency Parameter
λ = 0.5 λ = 0.75 λ = 2.0
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 6.03 6.03 6.03
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1497.41 1508.97 1567.95
Social welfare ($ billion) 759.70 759.47 758.29
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -59.93 -50.87 -4.59
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.89 6.70 5.78
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.15 0.11 -0.09
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.47 17.53 17.83
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.21 1.26 1.55
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.71 13.94 10.01
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -143.60 -128.70 -98.72
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 11.80 11.48 10.32
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.96 0.96 0.97
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 1.04 1.02 0.87
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.21 15.51 11.90
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -146.63 -128.71 -79.56
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 10.30 9.92 8.42
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.70 0.67 0.52
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.72 16.02 12.42
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -60.65 -41.41 14.64
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.85 7.46 5.85
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 18.18 17.45 13.68
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -77.56 -54.24 19.83
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.65 8.19 6.33
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.7: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Domestic Corn Demand
η¯c = -0.5 η¯c = -0.2 η¯c = -0.1
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 4.98 6.03 6.41
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1507.09 1508.97 1509.65
Social welfare ($ billion) 712.44 759.47 837.70
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -48.98 -50.87 -51.55
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.82 6.70 6.66
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.54 17.53 17.53
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.26 1.26 1.27
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 13.88 13.94 13.96
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -126.96 -128.70 -129.33
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 11.60 11.48 11.44
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.96 0.96 0.96
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.98 1.02 1.03
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.64 15.51 15.43
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -126.53 -128.71 -129.57
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 9.93 9.92 9.93
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.64 0.67 0.68
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.30 16.02 15.89
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -39.03 -41.41 -42.32
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.47 7.46 7.46
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 1.94 17.45 17.24
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -51.17 -54.24 -55.43
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.19 8.19 8.20
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.8: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Domestic Corn Supply
εc = 0.1 εc = 0.3 εc = 0.5
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 7.28 6.03 4.93
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1511.22 1508.97 1507.00
Social welfare ($ billion) 764.53 759.47 754,42
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -53.12 -50.87 -48.89
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.57 6.70 6.83
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.53 17.53 17.54
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.27 1.26 1.26
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.01 13.94 13.87
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -130.78 -128.70 -126.87
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 11.35 11.48 11.61
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.96 0.96 0.96
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 1.07 1.02 0.98
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.17 15.51 15.64
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -131.73 -128.71 -126.44
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 9.97 9.92 9.93
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.72 0.67 0.64
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.51 16.02 16.31
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -44.57 -41.41 -38.92
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.49 7.46 7.47
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.65 17.45 17.96
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -58.35 -54.24 -51.03
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.26 8.19 8.19
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.9: Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Domestic Oil Supply
ηo = 0.1 ηo = 0.2 ηo = 0.5
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 6.04 6.03 5.99
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1508.78 1508.97 1509.52
Social welfare ($ billion) 765.27 759.47 742.05
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -50.67 -50.87 -51.41
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.80 6.70 6.43
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.11 0.11 0.11
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 17.73 17.53 17.00
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 1.25 1.26 1.29
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.08 13.94 13.54
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -131.29 -128.70 -121.70
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 11.23 11.48 12.17
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.97 0.96 0.93
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 1.03 1.02 0.99
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.56 15.51 15.33
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -129.75 -128.71 -125.68
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 10.14 9.92 9.31
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.62 0.67 0.66
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 16.10 16.02 15.78
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -41.00 -41.41 -42,54
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.58 7.46 7.12
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 17.57 17.45 17.11
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -53.94 -54.24 -55.10
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 8.34 8.19 7.78
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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Table A.10: Sensitivity Analysis: Monte Carlo on Selected Nine Parameters
10% Mean 90%
Laissez Faire
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 5.17 6.09 6.98
CO2 emission (million tCO2) 1490.58 1507.32 1527.05
Social welfare ($ billion) 670.38 799.59 946.80
Status Quo
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -64.17 -49.25 -32.97
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 4.98 6.78 8.81
First Best
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.08 0.23 0.43
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.03 0.11 0.23
Oil tariff ($/barrel) 14.00 18.32 23.67
Corn tariff ($/bushel) 0.93 1.31 1.71
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 12.35 14.06 15.80
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -173.72 -129.18 -87.82
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 7.98 12.34 17.80
Tax & Subsidy
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.75 0.99 1.27
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.86 1.05 1.28
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.01 15.63 17.31
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -175.55 -129.28 -85.55
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 6.60 10.60 15.60
Subsidy-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol subsidy ($/gallon) 0.60 0.68 0.77
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 14.45 16.18 18.11
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -62.86 -40.94 -14.24
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 5.52 7.67 10/14
Mandate-only (with existing fuel tax)
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 15.51 17.69 20.32
CO2 emission changes (million tCO2) -80.71 -53.73 -21.08
Social welfare changes ($ billion) 5.91 8.48 11.51
Notes: CO2 emission changes and welfare changes are relative to laissez faire.
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APPENDIX B. INDUCED CLEAN TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
Proof of Proposition
Proof of Remark1.
The relationship between the relative marginal costs (cd/cc) and permit price could be
related to the cost shares,
∂(cd/cc)
∂pe
= pecd
cc
(
∂cd
∂pe
pe
cd
− ∂cc
∂pe
pe
cc
)
= cd
pecc
(sed − sec)
Thus, sign(∂(cd/cc)/∂pe) = sign(sed−sec). If the clean technology is labor-biased (sed > sec), then
∂(cd/cc)/∂pe > 0; if it is emission-biased (sed < sec), then ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe < 0; if it is Hicks-neutral,
then ∂(cd/cc)/∂pe = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Recall revenue functions rj(ϕ) = r˜jϕσ−1, where r˜j ≡ RP σ−1 (ρ/cj)σ−1. Use the definition of
ϕd, r˜d = wfdσ(ϕd)1−σ and r˜c = r˜d (cd/cc)σ−1. Recall emission input demand functions ei(ϕ) =
ρsejrj(ϕ)/pe = ρsej r˜jϕσ−1/pe. Use M = R/r¯, the emission permit market clear condition is,
E =M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
ed(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
ec(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
=R
pe
ρsedr˜d
∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ ρsec r˜c
∫∞
ϕc
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
r˜d
∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ r˜c
∫∞
ϕc
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
Define A ≡
(∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
)
(cc/cd)σ−1/
(∫∞
ϕc
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
)
, recall the Pareto distribution
assumption for ϕ, A = [H(ϕc)−H(ϕd)] (cc/cd)σ−1/ [1−H(ϕc)], further simplification yields
A = [(ϕc/ϕd)γ − 1] (cc/cd)σ−1, where γ = c + σ − 1 > 0. Using the equilibrium relative
cutoffs ϕc/ϕd in equation (2.10) and Assumption 1, it comes immediately that sign( ∂A∂pe ) =
sign(∂(cc/cd)∂pe ) = sign(
∂(ϕc/ϕd)
∂pe
) = sign(sec − sed). In addition, A > 0 provided with Lemma 1.
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Use the equilibrium R = peE + wL and r˜c = r˜d (cd/cc)σ−1, the emission market clear
condition is,
peE =wL
ρsec + ρsedA
(1− ρsec) + (1− ρsed)A
Rewrite the above equation and define an implicit function F (·) = 0:
F (·) ≡
[
peE(1− ρsec)− wLρsec
]
+
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
]
A
Using the implicit function F (·) = 0, it is easy to check that
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
]

> 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
< 0 if sed < sec
Combined with sign( ∂A∂pe ) = sign(s
e
c − sed), the term
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
]
∂A
∂pe
is always non-
negative.
To show monotonicity, applying the implicit function theorem, ∂E∂pe = −
∂F (·)/∂pe
∂F (·)/∂E ,
∂F (·)
∂E
=pe [1− ρsec + (1− ρsed)A] > 0
∂F (·)
∂pe
=E [1− ρsec + (1− ρsed)A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−ρR
(
∂sec
∂pe
+ ∂s
e
d
∂pe
A
)
+
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
] ∂A
∂pe︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Because the last term is always nonnegative, ∂E∂pe < 0 can be determined if the sum of the first
two terms in ∂F (·)∂pe is positive.
Recall the CES production technology
[
(βje)(η−1)/η + (αjl)(η−1)/η
]η/(η−1)
and its dual unit
cost function cj(w, pe) =
[
(pe/βj)1−η + (w/αj)1−η
]1/(1−η). Hence, the cost share of the emission
permit is given by,
sej ≡
∂cj(w, pe)
∂pe
pe
cj(w, pe)
=
[
βjcj(w, pe)
pe
]η−1
;
∂sej
∂pe
= (1− η)s
e
j(1− sej)
pe

< 0 if η > 1
= 0 if η = 1
> 0 if η < 1
When the factors are gross substitutes (η > 1) or (η = 1), ∂s
e
j
∂pe
≤ 0, ∀j ∈ {c, d}, the sum of
the first two terms in ∂F (·)∂pe is positive, thus
∂E
∂pe
< 0. When the factors are gross complements
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(η < 1), ∂s
e
j
∂pe
> 0, ∀j ∈ {c, d}, the proof of ∂E∂pe < 0 can be finished by plugging
∂sej
∂pe
into ∂F (·)∂pe
and using the definition of F (·).
E [1− ρsec + (1− ρsed)A]− ρR
[
∂sec
∂pe
+ ∂s
e
d
∂pe
A
]
=ρ
{
w
pe
L
[
η(sec + sedA) + (1− η)(sec)2 + (1− η)(sed)2A
]
− E(1− η) [sec(1− sec) + sed(1− sed)A]
}
= E
sec + sedA
{
(1− ρ)
[
(sec)2 + (sedA)2
]
+A
[
(sed)2 + (sec)2 − 2ρsecsed
]
+η(1 +A) [sec(1− sec) + sed(1− sed)A]} > 0
The last inequality holds, since A > 0, ρ < 1, sec < 1, sed < 1, and (sed)2 + (sec)2 ≥ 2secsed.
In summary, ∂E∂pe < 0 holds for all CES functions regardless of the factor-biased feature.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Define J(ϕ∗) ≡ ∫∞ϕ∗ [( ϕϕ∗)σ−1 − 1] g(ϕ)dϕ, so J ′(ϕ∗) < 0, ∀ϕ∗. The free entry condition
(2.13) and the equilibrium relative cutoff condition (2.10) are rewritten as:
fdJ(ϕd) + fJ(ϕc) = δfe;
ϕc
ϕd
= ∆
(
f
fd
)1/(σ−1)
where ∆ ≡ [(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1]1/(1−σ), sign( ∂∆∂pe ) = sign(∂cc/cd∂pe ) = sign(sec − sed) given σ > 1.
Total differentiation of the above two equations with respect to pe yields:
fdJ
′(ϕd)
∂ϕd
∂pe
+ fJ ′(ϕc)
∂ϕc
∂pe
= 0; ∂ϕc
∂pe
= ∂ϕd
∂pe
ϕc
ϕd
+ ∂∆
∂pe
ϕc
∆
The comparative statics results are:
∂ϕd
∂pe
=− ϕd∆
fϕcJ
′(ϕc)
fdϕdJ ′(ϕd) + fϕcJ ′(ϕc)
∂∆
∂pe

> 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
< 0 if sed < sec
∂ϕc
∂pe
=ϕc∆
fdϕdJ
′(ϕd)
fdϕdJ ′(ϕd) + fϕcJ ′(ϕc)
∂∆
∂pe

< 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
> 0 if sed < sec
In summary, when the technical change is labor-biased (sed > sec),
∂ϕd
∂pe
> 0 and ∂ϕc∂pe < 0;
when the technical change is emission-biased (sed < sec),
∂ϕd
∂pe
< 0 and ∂ϕc∂pe > 0; when the
technical change is Hicks-neutral (sed = sec),
∂ϕd
∂pe
= 0 and ∂ϕc∂pe = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.
From this proposition onward, I assume that the two countries (home and foreign) are
identical. Thus, the relative foreign market potential is unit, Λ = 1.
Recall revenue functions rjh(ϕ) = r˜jhϕσ−1, where r˜jh ≡ RP σ−1 (ρ/cj)σ−1. Use the def-
inition of ϕd, r˜dh = wfdσ(ϕd)1−σ, and r˜ch = r˜dh (cd/cc)σ−1. Recall rjx(ϕ) = r˜jxϕσ−1,
where r˜jx ≡ R∗(P ∗)σ−1 (ρ/(τcj))σ−1. Use the definition of ϕx, r˜dx = σwfx (ϕx)1−σ, r˜cx =
r˜dx (cd/cc)σ−1. Recall emission permit input demand functions ejh(ϕ) = ρsej r˜jhϕσ−1/pe and
ejx(ϕ) = ρsej r˜jxϕσ−1/pe. Use M = R/r¯, the emission permit market clear condition is:
E =M
{∫ ϕc
ϕd
edh(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕc
ϕx
edx(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕc
[ech(ϕ) + ecx(ϕ)]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
=M
{
ρsedr˜dh
pe
∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ ρs
e
dr˜dx
pe
∫ ϕc
ϕx
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ ρs
e
c
pe
∫ ∞
ϕc
[
r˜chϕ
σ−1 + r˜cxϕσ−1
]
µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
=Rρ
pe
{
sedr˜dh
∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ sedr˜dx
∫ ϕc
ϕx
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ sec
∫∞
ϕc
[
r˜chϕ
σ−1 + r˜cxϕσ−1
]
µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
{
r˜dh
∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+ r˜dx
∫ ϕc
ϕx
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+
∫∞
ϕc
[r˜chϕσ−1 + r˜cxϕσ−1]µ(ϕ)dϕ
}
Recall A ≡
(∫ ϕc
ϕd
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
)
(cc/cd)σ−1/
(∫∞
ϕc
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
)
, sign( ∂A∂pe ) = sign(s
e
c − sed).
Similarly, define B ≡
(∫ ϕc
ϕx
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
)
(cc/cd)σ−1/
(∫∞
ϕc
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
)
. Use the Pareto distri-
bution of ϕ, B = [H(ϕc)−H(ϕx)] (cc/cd)σ−1/ [1−H(ϕc)] = [(ϕc/ϕx)γ − 1] (cc/cd)σ−1. Using
the relative cutoffs of ϕx/ϕc and technology cost assumption, sign( ∂B∂pe ) = sign(s
e
c − sed). Recall
r˜jh = r˜jh(cd/cc)σ−1 and r˜jx = r˜jhτ1−σ. The above emission market clear condition is rewritten
as,
peE = Rρ
sedA+ sedτ1−σB + sec + secτ1−σ
A+ τ1−σB + 1 + τ1−σ
Plug in R = wL + peE and express the permit auction revenue (peE) as a function of the
rest of variables:
peE = wL
ρsec(1 + τ1−σ) + ρsed(A+ τ1−σ)B
(1− ρscpe)(1 + τ1−σ) + (1− ρsed)(A+ τ1−σ)B
Define C ≡ (A+τ1−σ)B/(1+τ1−σ), sign( ∂C∂pe ) = sign( ∂A∂pe ) = sign( ∂B∂pe ), then the above equation
returns back to the one in the proof of Proposition 1,
peE = wL
ρsec + ρsedC
(1− ρsec) + (1− ρsed)C
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The remaining proof follows exactly as the one in Proposition 1. Therefore, ∂E∂pe < 0 still
holds in the open economy.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Recall J(ϕ∗) ≡ ∫∞ϕ∗ [( ϕϕ∗)σ−1−] g(ϕ)dϕ, J ′(ϕ) < 0, ∀ϕ, the free entry condition (2.33), and
the equilibrium cutoff relationship condition (2.29)-(2.31) are rewritten as:
fdJ(ϕd) + fxJ(ϕx) + fJ(ϕc) = δfe(
ϕx
ϕd
)σ−1
= τσ−1 fxfd ⇒
ϕx
ϕd
= τ
(
fx
fd
)1/(σ−1)
(
ϕc
ϕx
)σ−1
= 11+τσ−1
f
fx
[(
cd
cc
)σ−1 − 1]−1 ⇒ ϕcϕx = ∆T ( ffx)1/(σ−1)(
ϕc
ϕd
)σ−1
= 11+τσ−1
f
fd
[(
cd
cc
)σ−1 − 1]−1 ⇒ ϕcϕd = ∆τT ( ffd)1/(σ−1)
where ∆ ≡
[
(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1
]1/(1−σ)
, T ≡ [1/(1 + τσ−1)]1/(σ−1), and τT ≡ [1/(1 + τ1−σ)]1/(σ−1).
It is easy to see that ∂T∂τ < 0, and
∂(τT )
∂τ > 0. Then total differentiation with respect to pe yields:
fdJ
′(ϕd)
∂ϕd
∂pe
+ fxJ ′(ϕx)
∂ϕx
∂pe
+ fJ ′(ϕc)
∂ϕc
∂pe
= 0
∂ϕx
∂pe
= ∂ϕd
∂pe
ϕx
ϕd
; ∂ϕc
∂pe
= ϕc
pe
(
∂ϕx
∂pe
pe
ϕx
+ ∂∆
∂pe
pe
∆
)
; ∂ϕc
∂pe
= ϕc
pe
(
∂ϕd
∂pe
pe
ϕd
+ ∂∆
∂pe
pe
∆
)
The comparative statics results are:
∂ϕd
∂pe
=− ϕd∆
fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
∂∆
∂pe

> 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
< 0 if sed < sec
∂ϕx
∂pe
=− ϕx∆
fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
∂∆
∂pe

> 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
< 0 if sed < sec
∂ϕc
∂pe
=ϕc∆
fdJ
′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx
fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
∂∆
∂pe

< 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
< 0 if sed < sec
In summary, when the technical change is labor-biased (sed > sec),
∂ϕd
∂pe
> 0, ∂ϕx∂pe > 0, and
∂ϕc
∂pe
< 0; when the technical change is emission-biased (sed < sec),
∂ϕd
∂pe
< 0, ∂ϕx∂pe < 0, and
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∂ϕc
∂pe
> 0; when the technical change is Hicks-neutral (sed = sec),
∂ϕd
∂pe
= 0, ∂ϕx∂pe = 0, and
∂ϕc
∂pe
= 0
Proof of Proposition 5.
Recall the expression of permit auction revenue as a function of the rest of variables in the
proof of Proposition 3.
peE = wL
ρsed(A+ τ1−σB) + ρsec(1 + τ1−σ)
(1− ρsed)(A+ τ1−σB) + (1− ρsec)(1 + τ1−σ)
where A ≡ (cc/cd)σ−1 [H(ϕc)−H(ϕd)]/[1−H(ϕc)], B ≡ (cc/cd)σ−1 [H(ϕc)−H(ϕx)]/[1−H(ϕc)],
as defined above. Thus, sign( ∂A∂pe ) = sign(
∂B
∂pe
) = sign(∂(cc/cd)∂pe ) = sign(s
e
c − sed). Rewrite the
above equation, and define an implicit function F (·) = 0,
F (·) ≡
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
]
(A+ τ1−σB) +
[
peE(1− ρsec)− wLρsec
]
(1 + τ1−σ)
Using the definition of F (·) ≡ 0, it is easy to check that
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed

< 0 if sed > sec
= 0 if sed = sec
< 0 if sed < sec
By the implicit function theorem, ∂pe∂τ = −[∂F (·)/∂τ ]/[∂F (·)/∂pe], the denominator is,
∂F (·)
∂pe
=
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
] ( ∂A
∂pe
+ τ1−σ ∂B
∂pe
)
−
[
(A+ τ1−σB)∂s
e
d
∂pe
+ ρR(1 + τ1−σ)∂s
e
c
∂pe
]
+ E
[
(1− ρsed)(A+ τ1−σB) + (1− ρsec)(1 + τ1−σ)
]
The first term is always nonnegative,
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
] (
∂A
∂pe
+ τ1−σ ∂B∂pe
)
≥ 0. When
sed > s
e
c, the term in the square bracket is negative, the term in the parenthesis is negative as
well since ∂A∂pe < 0,
∂B
∂pe
< 0; vice-versa. If ∂s
e
j
∂pe
≤ 0, ∀j, it is easy to see that ∂F (·)∂pe > 0. If
∂sej
∂pe
> 0, ∀j, one still can show ∂F (·)∂pe > 0 using the similar proof of Proposition 1.
The numerator is then given by,
∂F (·)
∂τ
=
[
peE(1− ρsed)− wLρsed
] [∂A
∂τ
+ τ1−σ ∂B
∂τ
+ (σ − 1)τ
−σ
1 + τ1−σ (A−B)
]
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Combined with ∂F (·)∂pe > 0, one could sign
∂pe
∂τ ,
sign
(
∂pe
∂τ
)
=

sign
{
∂A
∂τ + τ1−σ
∂B
∂τ +
(σ−1)τ−σ
1+τ1−σ (A−B)
}
if sed > sec
0 if sed = sec
−sign
{
∂A
∂τ + τ1−σ
∂B
∂τ +
(σ−1)τ−σ
1+τ1−σ (A−B)
}
if sed < sec
Given Assumption 3 on the Pareto distribution function, recall the relative equilibrium cutoffs
(2.30) and (2.31), and plug into the previously defined terms A and B:
A =
(
cc
cd
)σ−1 [
(∆τT )γ
(
f
fd
)γ/(σ−1)
− 1
]
;B =
(
cc
cd
)σ−1 [
(∆T )γ
(
f
fx
)γ/(σ−1)
− 1
]
A−B =
(
cc
cd
)σ−1
(∆T )γ
[
τγ
(
f
fd
)γ/(σ−1)
−
(
f
fx
)γ/(σ−1)]
Substituting ∂T∂τ = −τσ−2T/(1 + τσ−1) < 0 and ∂(τT )∂τ = τ1−σT/(1 + τ1−σ) > 0 yields:
∂A
∂τ
(
cd
cc
)σ−1
=
(
f
fd
)γ/(σ−1)
(∆τT )γ γτ
−σ
τ1−σ + 1;
∂B
∂τ
(
cd
cc
)σ−1
=
(
f
fx
)γ/(σ−1)
(∆T )γ −γτ
−1
τ1−σ + 1
Further simplification gives rise to:(
∂A
∂τ
+ τ1−σ ∂B
∂τ
)
+ (σ − 1)τ
−σ
1 + τ1−σ (A−B)
=
(
cc
cd
)σ−1 { (∆T )γ
1 + τ1−σ f
γ/(σ−1) [γτ−σ + (σ − 1)τ−σ] [(fd)γ/(1−σ) − (fx)γ/(1−γ)]} > 0
To show the above inequality, recall τ1−σfd < fx in Lemma 2 which guarantees the partitioning
of firms,
fd
fx
< τσ−1 ⇒
(
fd
fx
)1/(σ−1)
< τ ⇒
(
fd
fx
)γ/(σ−1)
< τγ ⇒ (fx)γ/(1−σ) < τγ(fd)γ/(1−σ)
In summary, when the technical change is labor-biased (sed > sec),
∂pe
∂τ > 0; when the
technical change is emission-biased (sed < sec),
∂pe
∂τ < 0; when the technical change is Hicks-
neutral, ∂pe∂τ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Recall J(ϕ∗) ≡ ∫∞ϕ∗ [( ϕϕ∗)σ−1 − 1] g(ϕ)dϕ, J ′(ϕ∗) < 0, ∀ϕ∗. Then the free entry condition
(2.33), and the equilibrium cutoff relationship conditions (2.29)-(2.31) are simplified to:
fdJ(ϕd) + fxJ(ϕx) + fJ(ϕc) = δfe
ϕx
ϕd
= τ
(
fx
fd
)1/(σ−1)
; ϕc
ϕx
= ∆T
(
f
fx
)1/(σ−1)
; ϕc
ϕd
= ∆τT
(
f
fd
)1/(σ−1)
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where ∆ ≡
{
(cd/cc)σ−1 − 1
}1/(1−σ)
, T ≡ (1 + τσ−1)1/(1−σ), τT ≡ (1 + τ1−σ)1/(1−σ).
∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ = −
∂(cd/cc)
∂τ
τ∆σ−1; ∂τT
∂τ
1
T
= T σ−1; ∂T
∂τ
τ
T
= −(τT )σ−1
∂cd/cc
∂τ
= ∂cd/cc
∂pe
∂pe
∂τ
≥ 0

if ∂cd/cc∂pe > 0(s
e
d > s
e
c) then ∂pe∂τ > 0
if ∂cd/cc∂pe = 0(s
e
d = sec) then
∂pe
∂τ = 0
if ∂cd/cc∂pe < 0(s
e
d < s
e
c) then ∂pe∂τ < 0
Total differentiation with respect to τ yields:
fdJ
′(ϕd)
∂ϕd
∂τ
+ fxJ ′(ϕx)
∂ϕx
∂τ
+ fJ ′(ϕc)
∂ϕc
∂τ
= 0
∂ϕx
∂τ
= ϕx
τ
(
∂ϕd
∂τ
τ
ϕd
+ 1
)
∂ϕc
∂τ
= ϕc
τ
[
∂ϕx
∂τ
τ
ϕx
+ ∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂T
∂τ
τ
T
]
∂ϕc
∂τ
= ϕc
τ
[
∂ϕd
∂τ
τ
ϕd
+ ∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
(τT )
]
The comparative statics results are:
∂ϕx
∂τ
=ϕx
τ
fdJ
′(ϕd)ϕd − fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
(
∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂T
∂τ
τ
T
)
fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
∂ϕd
∂τ
=− ϕd
τ
fxJ
′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
[
∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
τT
]
fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
∂ϕc
∂τ
=ϕc
τ
fxJ
′(ϕx)ϕx
(
∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂T
∂τ
τ
T
)
+ fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd
[
∂∆
∂τ
τ
∆ +
∂(τT )
∂τ
τ
τT
]
fdJ ′(ϕd)ϕd + fxJ ′(ϕx)ϕx + fJ ′(ϕc)ϕc
In summary, ∂ϕx∂τ > 0 since J ′(·) < 0, ∂∆/∂τ < 0 and ∂T/∂τ < 0. the possible signs for the
rest of two cutoffs are discussed as follows:
• If ∂∆∂τ τ∆ + ∂(τT )∂τ ττT = 0, then ∂ϕd/∂τ < 0, ∂ϕc/∂τ < 0;
• If ∂∆∂τ τ∆ + ∂(τT )∂τ ττT < 0, then ∂ϕc/∂τ < 0, but the sign of ∂ϕd/∂τ is indeterminate;
• If ∂∆∂τ τ∆ + ∂(τT )∂τ ττT > 0, then ∂ϕd/∂τ < 0, but the sign of ∂ϕc/∂τ is indeterminate.
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APPENDIX C. ARE EXPORTERS MORE ENVIRONMENTALLY
FRIENDLY THAN NON-EXPORTERS? THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Description of the NEI Database
This section provides a detailed introduction of the NEI facility level emission database.
We first introduce the background of emission reporting rule. Then we conduct some data
comparison among several aggregate-level emission databases used in related literature, i.e.,
National Emission Trends (NET) of the EPA,1 and Annual Industrial Sector Pollutant Release
by Industry in Greenstone (2002).2
The NEI database includes estimates of annual criteria and hazardous air pollutant emis-
sions from point, non-point, and mobile sources in the 50 States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The compilation includes emission estimates submitted
by State, Local, and Tribal air pollution control agencies. The collection and updating of emis-
sion inventory information follow with the Consolidated Emissions Reporting Rule (CERR)
published by the EPA in 2002. The CERR requires the reporting emissions for all facilities
sites that emit above certain thresholds, determined by pollutant and depending upon whether
the facility site is located in a nonattainment area. State or local pollution control agencies
have to comply with the CERR requirement. They will continue to report emissions from larger
point sources annually, and have a choice to report smaller point sources every three years or
one-third of the sources each year.3
The NEI database reports estimates for the following facility-level criteria air pollutants:
i.e., NH3, SO2, CO, NOx, VOCs, and TSPs. For each of six pollutants, we aggregate annual
1For National Emission Trends database, please see: http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/trends/.
2For the table of Annual Industrial Sector Pollutant Release by Industry, please see Table A2 in Greenstone
(2002).
3For the CERR Final Rule, please see http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/cerr/cerr.pdf.
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emissions across all facilities and compare them to the national aggregate emission level pro-
vided by the NET of the EPA. As shown in Table C.1, the magnitude of total emissions for
each criteria air pollutant (except VOCs) aggregated from the NEI facility level database comes
close to the national aggregate emission level reported in the NET of the EPA. The latter is
the sum of the following source categories classified in the NET: fuel combustion electric util-
ity, fuel combustion industrial, chemical & allied product manufacturing, metals processing,
petroleum & related industries, other industrial process, solvent utilization, storage & trans-
port, waste disposal & recycling. Columns 2 and 3 in Table C.1 show the comparison between
aggregate emissions from the manufacturing sector with emissions from all industrial activities
within the same NEI database. Since fuel combustion electric utility (SIC code 4911, not in
the manufacturing industry thus excluded in this study) releases roughly 80 percent of total
SO2 emissions, SO2 emitted from the manufacturing sector only accounts for one-tenth of total
emissions. Moreover, TSPs emissions, aggregated from the facility-level NEI database, increase
substantially from year 2002 to year 2005. Part of the reason is due to the enforcement of
PM2.5 reporting rule started effectively on June 1, 2004.4 Such drastic increase cannot reflect
its real change.
Furthermore, we aggregate the industrial emissions from the NEI database by pollutant
type, and compare them with the Annual Industrial Sector Pollutant Release by Industry, which
Greenstone (2002) constructed using the EPA Sector Notebook Project (1995). Note that the
magnitude of the industrial emissions from each data source cannot directly compare since they
reflect the annual emissions during the different periods. In particular, there exists a drastic
reduction in air pollution in the U.S. manufacturing industry during the 1980-2000 period
(Greenstone, 2004; Levinson, 2009). Despite that, we seek some similarities in identifying dirty
industries between these two databases. Table C.2 presents the annual industrial emissions
in major polluting industries between year 2002 and 2005. We define the major polluting
industries as those which emit at least one percent of total emissions from the manufacturing
sector. For each pollutant, the industrial emission is calculated by total emissions of a three-
digit SIC industry, within which emissions of the pollutant are aggregated across all relevant
4Please see the CERR Final Rule: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/cerr/cerr.pdf.
126
polluting facilities. Total emissions from the manufacturing sector are aggregated from all
facilities within that sector. The following industries are defined as pollutant-specific dirty
polluters in both tables: Sawmill and Planning Mills (242, 243): TSPs; Paper and Allied
Products (261-263, 267): SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs; Industrial Inorganic Chemicals (281): SO2;
Industrial Organic Chemicals (286, 287, 289): SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs; Petroleum Refining
and Related Industries (291, 295, 299): SO2, O3, and TSPs; Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete
Products (321-329): SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs.5
5The number in parenthesis is three-digit SIC code range.
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Figures and Tables
(a) Year 2002
(b) Year 2005
Figure C.1: NH3 Polluting Facilities. Source: NEI database. Yellow areas refer to any nonat-
tainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points denote non-exporters, and blue
triangles represent ports.
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(a) Year 2002
(b) Year 2005
Figure C.2: SO2 Polluting Facilities. Source: NEI database. Yellow areas refer to SO2-specific
nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points denote non-exporters, and blue
triangles represent ports.
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(a) Year 2002
(b) Year 2005
Figure C.3: CO Polluting Facilities. Source: NEI database. Yellow areas refer to CO-specific
nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points denote non-exporters, and blue
triangles represent ports.
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(a) Year 2002
(b) Year 2005
Figure C.4: O3 Polluting Facilities. Source: NEI database. Yellow areas refer to O3-specific
nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points denote non-exporters, and blue
triangles represent ports.
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(a) Year 2002
(b) Year 2005
Figure C.5: TSPs Polluting Facilities. Source: NEI database. Yellow areas refer to TSPs-
specific nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points denote non-exporters,
and blue triangles represent ports.
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Table C.1: Aggregate Emission Comparison
Year 2002 Year 2005
National Emission National Emission Inventory National Emission National Emission Inventory
Trends All Industry Manufacturing Merged Manufacturing Trends All Industry Manufacturing Merged Manufacturing
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
SO2 12,072,110 12,637,803 1,982,949 906,395 11,935,123 12,497,875 1,860,094 916,539
VOCs 6,981,811 1,472,397 1,089,903 562,966 6,861,154 1,413,782 1,011,276 490,815
NOx 7,084,325 7,081,272 1,404,672 661,978 6,115,435 6,145,396 1,282,455 603,387
CO 5,221,843 3,833,746 2,637,738 1,187,171 4,880,736 3,966,641 2,325,981 941,782
TSPs 5,845,090 2,116,880 735,775 374,134 5,682,701 3,640,838 1,737,972 890,330
NH3 253,109 184,884 66,213 38,614 251,294 181,613 60,107 31,558
Source: National Emission Trends, and National Emission Inventory of the EPA.
Note: Emissions in the National Emission Trends are converted from short tons to metric tons. All emissions are converted to thousand metric tons. Emissions
in the merged manufacturing industry are calculated after merging the NEI database with the NETS database.
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Table C.2: Annual Industrial Emissions by Pollutant between Years 2002 and 2005
SO2 CO VOCs NOx TSPs NH3
Emissions Share Emissions Share Emissions Share Emissions Share Emissions Share Emissions Share
Industry (3-digit SIC) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Food industry (203-4,206-209) 106617.1 5.6% 92207.6 3.7% 79503.1 7.6% 62240.9 4.6% 107177.9 9.0% 4997.2 7.9%
Sawmill and planning mills, wood products (242-3,249) 5246.3 0.3% 107348.3 4.3% 100579.5 9.6% 33166.1 2.5% 120735.6 9.9% 513.9 0.8%
Household furniture (251) 470.2 0.0% 2225.7 0.1% 24535.6 2.3% 1670.0 0.1% 8545.1 0.8% 3.0 0.0%
Paper and allied products (261-3,267) 370228.2 19.3% 342872.7 13.9% 140386.0 13.4% 250296.9 18.7% 206329.2 16.4% 10408.2 16.6%
Commercial printing (275) 215.8 0.0% 1235.6 0.0% 37495.9 3.6% 1331.2 0.1% 1361.8 0.1% 84.2 0.1%
Industrial inorganic chemicals, plastic materials (281-2) 147339.0 7.7% 164574.7 6.7% 50085.6 4.8% 73361.2 5.4% 55682.9 4.5% 2623.7 4.1%
Industrial organic chemicals (286-7,289) 282418.0 14.7% 258070.9 10.3% 90538.1 8.6% 184888.2 13.7% 95226.8 7.6% 24129.8 38.1%
Petroleum refining and related industries (291,295,299) 380650.8 19.8% 159243.2 6.4% 122406.3 11.6% 190706.6 14.2% 109084.7 8.9% 5506.1 8.7%
Miscellaneous plastics (308) 2665.0 0.1% 1529.4 0.1% 59019.4 5.6% 2752.7 0.2% 7293.7 0.6% 303.2 0.5%
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products (321-9) 249885.1 13.0% 254527.2 10.3% 23547.0 2.2% 362047.2 27.0% 237404.9 18.6% 6018.8 9.6%
Primary metal industries (331-5) 279044.6 14.5% 1035814.5 41.7% 59812.2 5.7% 103780.5 7.7% 188597.6 15.4% 3554.1 5.6%
Fabricated metal products (341,344) 105.6 0.0% 787.9 0.0% 28830.1 2.7% 1457.0 0.1% 3480.3 0.3% 14.4 0.0%
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies (371-3) 5177.6 0.3% 9627.9 0.4% 76024.5 7.2% 9444.8 0.7% 14103.7 1.1% 357.4 0.6%
Photographic equipment and supplies (386) 22781.5 1.2% 1022.4 0.0% 1590.0 0.2% 5341.6 0.4% 1870.5 0.2% 103.9 0.2%
Percent of industrial emissions accounted for 1852845.0 96.4% 2431087.9 97.9% 894353.1 85.2% 1282485.0 95.5% 1156894.7 93.5% 58617.9 92.8%
Source: National Emission Inventory of the EPA.
Note: for each pollutant, column (1) lists metric tons of emissions per year; column (2) reports the share of industrial sector emissions to manufacturing sector emissions.
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Table C.3: Variable List
Variable Definition Source/Explaination
Facility Level
Sales Value of sales ($) NETS
Employees Number of employees NETS
Export Dummy Export indicator, = 1 if exports, = 0 otherwise NETS
Distance Distance of a facility to its nearest port (miles) Calculated
SO2 Sulfur Oxide (tons) NEI
CO Carbon Monoxide (tons) NEI
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds (tons) NEI
NOx Oxide of Nitrogen (tons) NEI
NH3 Ammonia (tons) NEI
PM10-PRI Primary particulate matter less than 10 microns (tons) NEI
PM10-FIL Filterable particulate matter less than 10 microns (tons) NEI
PM25-PRI Primary particulate matter less than 25 microns (tons) NEI
PM25-FIL Filterable particulate matter less than 25 microns (tons) NEI
PM-Con Condensible particulate matter (tons) NEI
TSPs Total Suspended Particulates, sum of the above PMs (tons) Calculated
O3 Ozone, sum of VOCs and NOx (tons) Calculated
NH3 Intensity NH3 per value of sales Calculated
SO2 Intensity SO2 per value of sales Calculated
CO Intensity CO per value of sales Calculated
O3 Intensity O3 per value of sales Calculated
TSPs Intensity TSPs per value of sales Calculated
County Level
SO2 NA SO2 Nonattainment, = 1 if nonattainment, = 0 otherwise EPA
CO NA CO Nonattainment, = 1 if nonattainment, = 0 otherwise EPA
O3 NA O3 Nonattainment, = 1 if nonattainment, = 0 otherwise EPA
TSPs NA TSPs Nonattainment, = 1 if nonattainment, = 0 otherwise EPA
Any NA Any Pollutant Nonattainment, = 1 if nonattainment for at least one pol-
lutant, = 0 otherwise
Calculated
Industry Level at Four-Digit SIC
CIF Cost-Insurance-Freight value of U.S. imports Schott (2010)
FOB Free-on-Board value of U.S. imports Schott (2010)
Freight Rate (CIF - FOB)/FOB Calculated
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